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THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE AND THE INSURANCE ARENA
VONDA MALLICOAT LAUGHLIN*
***
The article discusses the modern application and jurisprudential
background of the “filed rate doctrine.” The filed rate doctrine is used by
courts to uphold the validity of rates approved by regulatory agencies and
as a bar to claims implicating those rates. The doctrine has enduring
relevance to the field of insurance litigation and overrides certain common
legal principles. The article focuses on the broad applicability of the
doctrine and gives a comprehensive overview of the myriad issues
impacting its usage.
The article discusses early cases establishing the doctrine decided
earlier than the United Supreme Court’s decision in Keogh v. Chicago &
Northwestern Railway Co., which is often referenced in connection with the
doctrine’s origination. Based on grounds of legislative intent and the
perceived unfairness of allowing certain plaintiffs to escape from a
legislative scheme applicable to others, the article shows how the doctrine
emerged from judicial deference to federal railroad rate regulations
enacted by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The filed rate doctrine
was later expanded to other federally regulated industries including energy
and telecommunications.
The applicability of the filed rate doctrine to litigation impacting
the insurance industry emerged in the mid-1980s. The article highlights a
number of recent cases showing how various courts have applied the
doctrine to the insurance industry and how various litigants have attempted
to avoid the application of it.
The article delves into a number of issues regarding the filed rate
doctrine that are specific to the insurance industry and conflicting
authority regarding application of the doctrine in the insurance arena. The
*

Associate Professor of Business, Carson-Newman College; J.D. University
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thanks the members of the Connecticut Insurance Law Journal for assistance in the
publication of this article.
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article also discusses the various ways the filed rate doctrine has been
applied to claims for equitable relief. The article discusses the
inapplicability of the filed rate doctrine to various claims, including claims
that an insurer violated insurance regulations. The article also examines
other typical claims including fraud, charges outside of the basic rate,
antitrust claims, discrimination claims, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act claims, breach of contract claims, and claims alleging
the wrongful receipt of kickbacks. The article further discusses the issue of
administrative review.
The article concludes by considering the future of the filed rate
doctrine and predicts its future importance to insurance litigation.
***
The filed rate doctrine upholds the validity of rates approved by a
regulatory authority and is often applied to bar claims implicating
authorized rates. The breadth of the doctrine is in hot dispute, and
insurance cases address it with increasing frequency.1 Cases interpreting
the filed rate doctrine confront questions such as the following:
An insurer refuses to honor a promise to charge a
policyholder a lower rate than the filed rate charged to
other policyholders. Will a court enforce the promise?
An insurer promises a policyholder additional services
without an increase in the filed rate? Is that promise
enforceable?
Will a state court consider the filed rate doctrine, or is
it just a federal issue? Is the McCarran-Ferguson Act 2
1

See, e.g., Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940, 943-46 (8th Cir.
2006); Arroyo-Melecio v. P.R. Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 56, 73 (1st Cir. 2005);
Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227-30 (S.D. Ala.
1999); Schilke v. Wachovia Mortg., No. 09-CV-1363, 2011 WL 4501381, at *8
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2011); Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d
727, 734-40 (S.D. Iowa 2007); Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 721
N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 2006). Compare MacKay v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d
893, 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (approving application of the doctrine to property
and casualty insurance), with Fogel v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 74
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting the doctrine’s application to property and casualty
insurance). See also Alexander v. Wash. Mut. Inc., No. 07-4425, 2008 WL
2600323, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2008).
2
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2006).
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a consideration in relation to the doctrine?
Can injunctive relief regulating future rate charges be
obtained against an insurer?
Will the doctrine be applied to bar enforcement actions
by the government?
Can an insurer take advantage of the filed rate doctrine
if the regulatory agency is merely a “rubber stamp”
performing an inadequate review of rates?
An insurer wrongfully classifies an insured and
charges an excessive premium. Is the policyholder
entitled to a refund?
Do policyholders have the right to sue for damages if
an insurer defrauds a state regulatory agency in order
to obtain favorable rates?
What if the regulatory agency itself is involved in
accepting bribes from an insurer pertaining to rates?
Can policyholders go to court, obtain damages from
the insurer, and have those rates rescinded?
What if administrative charges are added in addition to
a filed rate? Can policyholders use the filed rate
doctrine to avoid such charges?
What if insurers engage in wrongful price fixing? Will
a court order refunds of illegally charged premiums?
Will a court order a refund of excessive premiums
wrongfully charged to a policyholder who is
discriminated against on an illegal basis such as race?
What about entities other than insurers? Does the
doctrine, for example, affect suits against mortgage
lenders who illegally accept kickbacks from property
insurers?
Understanding the implications of the filed rate doctrine, which is
also occasionally referenced as the filed tariff doctrine3 or the Keogh
doctrine,4 is of crucial importance to attorneys confronted with issues such
3

McCray v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322, 326 (D. Del. 2009).
The Supreme Court first applied the filed rate doctrine to the antitrust area in
Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), and some
cases refer to the doctrine by that name. E.g., Blaylock v. First Am. Title Ins. Co.,
504 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1099 n.6 (W.D. Wash. 2007); Amundson & Assoc’s. Art
4
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as those set forth above. The doctrine alters the application of many
commonly accepted legal principles and must be considered in devising
litigation strategy in any case implicating an insurer’s approved rating
structure. Establishing that the filed rate doctrine is not an antiquated relic
living only to a limited extent as some contend,5 this article discusses the
background of the filed rate doctrine, case law interpreting it, and its
modern application in the insurance arena.
Although separation of powers, comity, and legislative intent have
all been referenced in support of the filed rate doctrine,6 it is most often
expressed as serving two interests: (1) the prevention of price
discrimination that is threatened by a judicial determination of rates for
litigants but not for other policyholders and (2) the preservation of the role
of agencies in setting rates, often referred to as the “nonjusticiability”
strand of the doctrine.7 While judicial interest in fairness and
nondiscrimination in relation to the application of rates is self-evident,8 the
“nonjusticiability” strand of the doctrine is conceptually more challenging.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “justiciability” as “[t]he quality or
state of being appropriate or suitable for adjudication by a court.”9 In
accord with that definition, courts typically reference the concept in
connection with avoiding the enmeshment of courts in the rate-making
process.10 For example, according to the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, justiciability concerns
establish that a court is not well-suited to retroactively reallocate rates and
Studio, Ltd. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 988 P.2d 1208 (Kan. Ct. App.
1999).
5
See, e.g., Amundson, 988 P.2d 1208 at 1213-16 (disagreeing with the
position that the doctrine is weak and discredited); Richardson v. Standard Guar.
Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 963 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (disagreeing with the
contention that the filed rate doctrine is a bankrupt theory inapplicable to the
insurance industry).
6
Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 307-08.
7
Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1994); Schilke v.
Wachovia Mortg., 705 F. Supp. 2d 932, 942-43 (N.D. Ill. 2010), rev’d on other
grounds, 758 F. Supp. 2d 542 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Morales v. Attorneys’ Title Ins.
Fund, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1418, 1428 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
8
In Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 493 U.S. 116 (1990),
the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, emphasized the nondiscriminatory strand of
the doctrine, rejecting the application of rates obtained by secret negotiation and
requiring the application of rates duly published and known to all. Id. at 130-31.
9
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 943 (9th ed. 2009).
10
E.g., Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 19; Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 736
F. Supp. 2d 902, 913 (D.N.J. 2010).
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determine what rate an agency would find appropriate in place of an
unlawful rate.11 According to the court in Schermer, rate regulation is an
“intricate ongoing process,” and judicial interference “may set in motion an
ever-widening set of consequences and adjustments” that courts are
powerless to address.12 Similarly, relying on Supreme Court precedent and
emphasizing the difficulty the judiciary would encounter in attempting to
determine what reasonable rates in the past should have been, the court in
Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp. stated that “abstract” notions of
reasonableness are best left for agency determination.13
The concept of nonjusticiability also encompasses the idea that
filed rates are available to those affected by them, and that consumers are
charged with knowledge of those rates. For example, in discussing the
principle of nonjusticiability, the court in Richardson v. Standard
Guarantee Insurance Co. stated that the principle “operates on the
presumption that the plaintiff had knowledge of the filed rates and, thus,
could not reasonably rely upon the regulated entity's misrepresentations or
omissions of material facts.”14
I.

THE GENESIS OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE

Many authorities trace the origination of the filed rate doctrine to
the United States Supreme Court decision of Keogh v. Chicago &
Northwestern Railway Co., in which the Supreme Court upheld rates duly
filed and approved by the now abolished Interstate Commerce Commission
(the “ICC”)15 against challenges under antitrust laws.16 Case law prior to
11

Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 311-12, (citing Keogh v. Chi. & Nw. Ry., 260
U.S. 156, 164-65 (1922)).
12
Id. at 315 (quoting Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,
369 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Minn. 1985)).
13
Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 19 (quoting Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub.
Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951)).
14
Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 962 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2004) (citing Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 801 A.2d 281, 287-88 (N.J.
2002)).
15
The Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.),
abolished the ICC and created the Surface Transportation Board to perform many
of the regulatory functions formerly performed by the ICC. See Friberg v. Kansas
City S. Ry. Co., 267 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2001).
16
E.g., Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 992 (9th Cir.
2000); In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., No. 08-1425, 2009 WL 3233529, at *2 (D.N.J.
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Keogh, however, establishes that the doctrine had its genesis in much
earlier cases addressing the role of the ICC following its creation by the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, also referred to as the Act to Regulate
Commerce.17 For example, the Eleventh Circuit in Taffet v. Southern Co.18
and the federal district court in McCray v. Fidelity National Title Insurance
Co.19 trace the doctrine back as far as the 1907 Supreme Court case of
Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.,20 in which the
rating system of the railway involved was challenged as being preferential,
unjust, and unreasonable.21 The railway in Texas & Pacific Railway Co.
defended on the basis that the rates at issue had been approved by the ICC.
In ruling in favor of the railway, although not referencing the filed rate
doctrine by name, the Court applied its underlying principles noting the
chaotic effect that would result if both the judiciary and the ICC were
allowed to address rate disputes.22
The U.S. Supreme Court in Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall,23
further referenced the 1913 case Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.
International Coal Co.,24 as an early filed-rate case. The coal company in
Pennsylvania Railroad sued the defending railway complaining that it
wrongfully denied the coal company certain rebates granted to other
shippers. The Supreme Court agreed that the railroad was bound by the
filed rate and illegally deviated from it by granting rebates to some.25
Nevertheless, the plaintiff was unable to adduce proof of damages based on
the rate differential because, as the Court reasoned, the plaintiff “[h]aving
paid only the lawful rate . . . was not overcharged, though the favored
Oct. 5, 2009); Munoz v. PHH Corp., 659 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2009);
In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., No. 2:08-MD-1000, MDL 1899, 2008 WL
2368212, at *3-4 (E.D. Tenn. June 06, 2008); Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 311.
17
Interstate Commerce Act of Feb. 4, 1887, Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). See Kevin M. Decker, The Filed-Rate
Doctrine: Leaving Regulation to the Regulators, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1351,
1353-56 (2008) (referencing cases predating Keogh involving the filed rate
doctrine).
18
Taffet v. S. Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1488 (11th Cir. 1992).
19
McCray v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322, 326 (D. Del.
2009).
20
Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 436 (1907).
21
Id. at 430.
22
Id. at 441.
23
Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981).
24
Penn. R.R. Co. v. Int’l Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184 (1913).
25
Id. at 197.
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shipper was illegally undercharged.”26
Other early Supreme Court decisions, such as Chicago & Alton
Railroad Co. v. Kirby,27 further laid the groundwork for the modern filed
rate doctrine.28 Kirby demonstrates that the filed-rate doctrine may apply to
complaints involving the provision of services, not just to the rates
themselves.29 Kirby involved a dispute between a shipper and a railroad
arising after horses failed to arrive as scheduled by expedited delivery via a
particular train. A railroad representative had promised the shipper a
deviation from regularly published rates that did not provide for that
expedited service. Even though upon contracting the shipper did not know
of the deviation, the Supreme Court refused to enforce the agreement,
stating that “[t]o guarantee a particular connection and transportation by a
particular train was to give an advantage or preference not open to all, and
not provided for in the published tariffs.”30
II.

THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THE KEOGH DECISION

Of course, not to be overlooked is the often cited Keogh31 decision,
which first applied the filed-rate doctrine in the context of antitrust.32 The
alleged antitrust violation in Keogh was that the defending railways had
illegally agreed upon shipping rates for excelsior and tow.33 The sole
26

Id. at 202.
Chi. & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155 (1912).
28
The U.S. Supreme Court also referenced Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94 (1915) as an early case applying the principles later to
become known as the “filed rate doctrine.” See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office
Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 222 (1998); Ark. La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 582 (1981). The
term “doctrine” was first used in conjunction with principles construing the effect
of filed rates in George N. Pierce Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 236 U.S. 278, 286
(1915).
29
See Kirby, 225 U.S. at 166; see also Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 U.S. at 223
(“Any claim for excessive rates can be couched as a claim for inadequate services
and vice versa.”).
30
Kirby, 225 U.S. at 166.
31
Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
32
See Prentice v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 500 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Wis. 1993)
(recognizing that Keogh first applied the filed rate doctrine in the antitrust context).
33
Keogh, 260 U.S. at 160. In the context of this case, “excelsior” is used to
mean a “fine curled wood shavings, used esp. for packing fragile items”.
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 403 (Merriam
Webster’s, Inc., 10th ed. 1994). “Tow” is used in this context to mean a “short or
broken fiber…that is used esp. for yarn, twine, or stuffing.” Id. at 1248.
27

380

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.2

defense was that the rates had been filed with and approved by the
Interstate Commerce Commission.34 The Supreme Court acknowledged
that the fact that the rates had been filed would not bar proceedings brought
by the federal government against the carriers.35 Expressing its concern as
follows, the Court, however, refused to allow the plaintiff to proceed with
an antitrust action for price fixing because allowing such actions would
result in unfairness and discrimination:
If a shipper could recover under section 7 of the Antitrust
Act for damages resulting from the exaction of a rate
higher than that which would otherwise have prevailed, the
amount recovered might, like a rebate, operate to give him
a preference over his trade competitors. It is no answer to
say that each of these might bring a similar action under
section 7. Uniform treatment would not result, even if all
sued, unless the highly improbable happened, and the
several juries and courts gave to each the same measure of
relief.36
Another factor influencing the Court involved the responsibility of
the ICC to address rates in the first instance. The Court rejected as
unworkable the suggestion that it suspend proceedings pending a later
determination of the discrimination issue by the ICC:
The powers conferred upon the Commission are broad. It
may investigate and decide whether a rate has been,
whether it is, or whether it would be, discriminatory. But
by no conceivable proceeding could the question whether a
hypothetical lower rate would under conceivable
conditions have been discriminatory, be submitted to the
Commission for determination. And that hypothetical
question is one with which plaintiff would necessarily be
confronted at a trial.37

34

Keogh, 260 U.S. at 160.
Id. at 162.
36
Id. at 163.
37
Id. at 164.
35
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The final factor addressed by the Keogh Court was the likely
impossibility of computing damages with any amount of accuracy.38 Since
the carriers were charging the legal rate, damages could not flow from the
amount the charges exceeded the legal rate.39 Additionally, had charges
been lowered, all competitors would have been entitled to have been put on
a parity with Keogh rendering speculative whether Keogh’s business would
have benefited at all by the lowering of rates.40
Over the years, acceptance of the Keogh decision diminished.41
Following the Second Circuit’s criticism of the filed-rate doctrine in
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff,42 an opinion authored by Judge
Henry J. Friendly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to address
the doctrine’s continuing validity.43 The petitioners in Square D claimed
that the defending motor carriers and a rating bureau engaged in illegal
price fixing and other activities in violation of section one of the Sherman
Act.44 The Supreme Court addressed the argument that developments in the
law undermined Keogh, including the rise of class actions, which arguably
relieved some concern regarding unfair rebates; the emergence of support
for treble damages; greater sophistication in evaluating damages; and the
development of procedures to stay judicial proceedings pending regulatory
action.45 Nevertheless, the Court refused to overrule Keogh finding
pertinent Congress’ failure to disturb the principles set forth in Keogh
during the intervening sixty-five years.46 The Court relied heavily upon the
fact that while Congress was clearly aware of the Keogh rule when it
passed the Reed-Bulwinkle Act,47 addressing rating systems of rail carriers,
and enacted the Motor Carrier Act of 1980,48 Congress did not overturn the
38

Id. at 164-65.
Id. at 165.
40
Keogh, 260 U.S. at 165.
41
See generally McCray v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322, 32627 (D. Del. 2009) (discussing the history of the doctrine and questions regarding
its continued validity).
42
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1347, 135254 (2d Cir. 1985), aff’d, 476 U.S. 409 (1986).
43
Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 417.
44
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
45
Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 423.
46
Id.
47
Reed-Bulwinkle Act, Pub. L. No. 80-662, 62 Stat. 472 (1948) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 10706 (2006)).
48
Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
39
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principles set forth in Keogh.49 According to the Supreme Court, “[i]f there
is to be an overruling of the Keogh rule, it must come from Congress,
rather than from this Court.”50
III.

EXTENSION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE TO THE
ENERGY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES

The principles underlying the filed rate doctrine, first spawned in
disputes involving the ICC, were well established in other utilities prior to
general recognition in the insurance industry. Courts addressing the role of
the filed rate doctrine in insurance disputes often glean guiding principles
from decisions involving other regulated industries.
The Supreme Court first applied the filed rate doctrine to the
electrical industry in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public
Service Co.,51 a case in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s
fraudulent acts let to the imposition of excessive rates in violation of the
Federal Power Act.52 Although the rates involved had been approved by the
Federal Power Commission, the plaintiff claimed that through a system of
an interlocking directorate and joint officers, its predecessor was
overcharged by the defendant. Refusing to accept that position and
upholding the authority of the Commission, the Supreme Court stated that
the complainant could claim “no rate as a legal right that is other than the
filed rate, whether fixed or merely accepted by the Commission, and not
even a court can authorize commerce in the commodity on other terms.”53
In rejection of a gas supplier’s breach of contract claim, the filed
rate doctrine was first applied by the Supreme Court in the natural gas
arena in Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall.54 The Supreme Court
recognized that pursuant to the filed rate doctrine, the supplier was
49

Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 418-20.
Id. at 424.
51
Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
52
Id. at 250 n.6 (The plaintiff relied on a provision of the act requiring that
rates be “just and reasonable.”).
53
Id.
54
Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 599 (1981). According to the Justice
Steven’s dissent, although earlier cases had marked the contours of the doctrine,
the case marked the first time the term “filed rate doctrine” had been used by the
Supreme Court. Id. at 599 (Stevens, J., dissenting). No mention was made of the
earlier case of George N. Pierce Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 236 U.S. 278 (1915),
cited in footnote 28, referencing “the doctrine of the conclusiveness of the filed
rates.” Id. at 286.
50
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forbidden to charge rates for its services other than those properly filed
with the appropriate regulatory authority and that the judiciary lacked
authority to impose a different rate.55 According to the Court, “under the
filed rate doctrine, when there is a conflict between the filed rate and the
contract rate, the file rate controls.”56
In American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Central Office
Telephone, Inc, a case often cited in disputes involving insurance, the
Supreme Court applied the filed rate doctrine in the telecommunications
context.57 The case originated when Central Office Telephone, Inc.
(“COT”), sued American Telephone and Telegraph Co. (“AT&T”) for
breach of contract and tortuous interference with contract following
problems encountered with AT&T’s provision of communication services
for resale. Among the allegations were that AT&T failed to deliver various
promised services and billing options in addition to those set forth in its
filed rates.58 AT&T defended on the basis that it was required by the
Communications Act to file tariffs containing all charges and
classifications and that COT’s lawsuit seeking damages based upon unfiled
criteria was barred by the filed rate doctrine.59 Recognizing the importance
of preventing unreasonable and discriminatory charges, the Supreme Court
applied the filed rate doctrine and dismissed the claims.60 The Court
recognized that discrimination may exist in the form of a lower price for a
service offered to some but not all, or in the form of enhanced services at a
price not offered to all.61 Supporting its decision, the Court cited cases
arising under the Interstate Commerce Act, including Chicago & Alton
Railroad Co. v. Kirby,62 referenced above, in which the Court refused to
enforce a shipper’s contract promising a service not contained in the
railroad’s filed tariffs.
55

Ark. La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 577-78 (majority opinion).
Id. at 582.
57
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel. Inc., 524 U.S. 214 (1998). This
case is often cited in disputes involving insurance. See, e.g., In re Title Ins.
Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Rios v. State Farm Fire
and Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 735 (S.D. Iowa 2007); Lumpkin v. Farmers
Grp., Inc., No. 05-2868 MA/V, 2007 WL 6996584 (W.D. Tenn. Apr 26, 2007);
Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (S.D. Ala. 1999).
58
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 U.S. at 220.
59
Id. at 221.
60
Id. at 223.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 224 (citing Chi. & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155, 163, 165
(1912).
56

384

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

IV.

Vol. 18.2

EXTENSION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE TO THE
INSURANCE INDUSTRY

The first insurance cases addressing the application of the filed rate
doctrine occurred in the latter 1980’s and 1990’s, with the majority decided
within the last decade. This seems rather late in view of the fact that the
doctrine had been applied for many years in other regulated areas. The
1986 decision of the Supreme Court in Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier
Tariff,63 reaffirming the validity of the doctrine, may have resulted in
increased attention to its applicability.
Although not referencing the term “filed rate doctrine,” the 1986
decision of Anzinger v. Illinois State Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange,64
was one of the first cases to apply the concepts underlying the filed rate
doctrine in the context of insurance. The plaintiff physicians in Anzinger
sought a refund of malpractice premiums collected pursuant to a rate
schedule approved by the Illinois Director of Insurance but found to be
excessive and unfairly discriminatory upon later judicial review.65 The
court refused to order a refund of the premiums believing that recognition
of a private right of action would interfere with authority granted to the
state’s department of insurance.66 The court recognized as follows that the
filed rates were the only rates that could be charged at the time the
premiums were paid:
[W]hen the agency or body sets the rates, these then are the
only lawful rates that can be charged and remain such until
overturned or set aside by a court . . . [T]here is no basis
63

Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986).
Anzinger v. Ill. State Med. Inter-Ins. Exch., 494 N.E.2d 655, 657 (Ill. App.
1986). Interestingly, the decision in Anzinger was issued on May 27, 1986, the
same day as the decision in Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff. See also
Prentice v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 500 N.W.2d 658, 663 (Wis. 1993) (applying the
doctrine to state antitrust claims against insurers); In re Empire Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Customer Litig. v. Weissman, 622 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994), aff’d
sub nom. Minihane v. Weissman, 226 A.D.2d 152 (N.Y. 1996) (applying the
doctrine to bar claims of fraud and breach of contract); Calico Trailer Mfg. Co. v.
Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. LR-C-93-717, 1994 WL 823554, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 12,
1994) (applying the doctrine to bar allegations of antitrust violations and other
state law claims). Courts in these insurance cases relied heavily on cases from
other industries approving application of the doctrine.
65
Anzinger, 494 N.E.2d at 656.
66
Id. at 658.
64
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for a refund under such circumstances if a rate was
subsequently set aside because the government agency had
determined that the initial rate was reasonable and that
only this rate could be charged.67
In attempting to avoid the effects of the filed rate doctrine,
plaintiffs may attempt to distinguish the insurance industry from other
regulated industries. For example, the plaintiff in Horwitz ex rel. Gilbert v.
Bankers Life and Casualty Co. argued against extending the filed rate
doctrine to insurance disputes claiming that it was only appropriate in areas
involving highly regulated and monopolistic activities, namely the shipping
and power industries.68 Recognizing, however, the lack of authority
supporting the plaintiff’s position, the court proceeded to apply the
doctrine.69 Similarly, in rejecting the plaintiff’s position that the filed rate
doctrine should be applied only to areas traditionally thought of as utilities,
the federal district court in Korte v. Allstate Insurance Co. stated that the
doctrine was “equally applicable to the insurance industry as to other
industries where a state agency determines reasonable rates pursuant to a
statutory scheme.”70
In applying the doctrine to a controversy involving homeowner’s
insurance, the court in Rios v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. noted that
while the doctrine’s roots lie in cases decided under the Interstate
Commerce Act, it has spread “across the spectrum of regulated utilities.”71
The following factors were referenced by the court as pertinent in
determining the filed rate doctrine’s application to a new area:
(1) the impact the court's decision will have on agency
procedures and rate determinations; (2) whether there is an
administrative agency to review the claim and provide a
remedy; (3) whether there is meaningful review of rate
increases; and (4) whether the damages are based upon the
difference between the filed rate and the rate that would
have been charged absent some alleged wrongdoing.72
67

Id. at 657.
Horwitz v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 745 N.E.2d 591, 601 (Ill. App. 2001).
69
Id. at 604.
70
Korte v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 647, 651 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
71
Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 734 (S.D. Iowa
2007) (quoting Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981)).
72
Rios, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 736 (citing Allan Kanner, The Filed Rate Doctrine
and Insurance Fraud Litigation, 76 N.D. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000)).
68
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In ruling that the doctrine should be applied in the insurance
industry, the South Carolina Supreme Court in Edge v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., further discussed rationale supporting the
doctrine as follows:
Courts which have adopted the filed rate doctrine have
given several reasons for doing so, including: (1)
preserving the agency's authority to determine the
reasonableness of rates; (2) recognizing the agency's
expertise with regard to that industry, whereas courts do
not; (3) allowing an action would undermine the regulatory
scheme because the statute allows for enforcement by the
appropriate state officers; and (4) allowing an action may
result in different prices being paid by victorious plaintiffs
than non-suing ratepayers, which violates the statutory
scheme of uniform rates.73
As case law has developed, acceptance of the filed rate doctrine in
the insurance arena is the norm rather than the exception. For example,
recognizing the number of cases supporting the doctrine, the court in
Richardson v. Standard Guaranty Insurance Co., stated that “[w]e, thus,
align our decision with the considerable weight of authority from other
jurisdictions that have applied the filed rate doctrine to ratemaking in the
insurance industry.”74 In support of its decision, the court relied on the
extensive regulation of the insurance industry and its perception that courts
are not institutionally suited to regulate insurance premium and benefit
rates.75 Similarly, in applying the filed rate doctrine in the context of
property insurance, the court in the recent case of Schilke v. Wachovia
Mortg. stated that “[n]umerous courts have held, contrary to Plaintiff's
contention, that the filed rate doctrine applies to the insurance industry.”76
Nevertheless, controversy regarding the application of the filed rate
73

Edge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 623 S.E.2d 387, 391-92 (S.C.

2005).
74

Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 963 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2004).
75
Id.
76
Schilke v. Wachovia Mortg., No. 09-CV-1363, 2011 WL 4501381, at *8
(N.D. Ill. Sep. 28, 2011) (citing Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 702
N.W.2d 898, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); Richardson, 853 A.2d at 964; Horwitz v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 745 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Anzinger v. Ill.
State Med. Inter–Ins. Exch., 494 N.E.2d 655 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)).
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doctrine in insurance cases continues. For example, in In re Title Insurance
Antitrust Cases, when confronted with a lack of case law on the subject in
that jurisdiction, the federal district court for the Northern District of Ohio
ruled that the filed rate doctrine should be applied in the insurance context
to bar claims for damages arising under Ohio state, as well as federal,
antitrust laws.77 On the other hand, a year later, in Clark v. Prudential
Insurance Co. of America, a federal district court in New Jersey recently
disagreed and ruled that Ohio courts would not apply the filed rate doctrine
to insurance disputes arising under Ohio law.78 Controversy regarding the
doctrine’s application is further illustrated by the recent conflicting
decisions of MacKay v. Superior Court79 and Fogel v. Farmers Group,
Inc.,80 involving application of the doctrine to property and casualty
insurance in California.
As discussed further in specific topics in this article, courts
refusing to apply the doctrine in the insurance context reference reasons
including concerns with federalism81 and perceived insufficiency of
administrative review.82 The court in Hanson v. Acceleration Life
Insurance Co. also raised the lack of opportunity for public input into rate
determinations in support of its decision rejecting application of the
doctrine to an insurance dispute.83
Furthermore, even after the doctrine is accepted in a jurisdiction in
one area of insurance, opponents may resist its extension into other areas.
For example, as set forth above, the Anzinger decision, arising in state court
in Illinois, applied the principles underlying the filed rate doctrine to deny
recovery to physicians who were overcharged for insurance. Later, in
Schilke v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB,84 a case based on diversity
jurisdiction and construing Illinois law, the plaintiff claimed that the
doctrine should not be extended to insurance disputes involving property.
77

In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 861-64 (N.D. Ohio

2010).
78

Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. Civ. 08-6197 (DRD), 2011 WL
940729, at *12-14 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2011).
79
MacKay v. Superior Ct., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
80
Fogel v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
81
See Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940, 945 (8th Cir. 2006).
82
See, e.g., Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992);
Blaylock v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1091 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
83
Hanson v. Acceleration Life Ins. Co., No. CIV A3-97-152, 1999 WL
33283345, at *4 (D. N.D. Mar. 16, 1999).
84
Schilke v. Wachovia Mortg., 705 F. Supp. 2d 932 (N.D. Ill. 2010), vacated
on other grounds, 758 F. Supp. 2d 549 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
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Citing a number of cases in support, the court recognized, however, that
application of the doctrine in the context of property insurance was
consistent with the weight of authority. 85 In support of its decision, the
court cited the goal of preventing discrimination among policyholders and
also the nonjusticiability strand of the doctrine placing authority for rates
with the department of insurance, not the court system.86
V.

THE RELATION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE TO THE
MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT

When considering claims against insurers, examination of the
interplay between the filed rate doctrine and the McCarran-Ferguson Act87
may be helpful. The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides in pertinent part that
“[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance…unless the Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance.”88 Certain exceptions involve the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act,
and the Federal Trade Commission Act to the extent that state law fails to
regulate the business of insurance.89
An example of the interplay between the two defenses is illustrated
in the case of Saunders v. Farmers Insurance Exchange involving alleged
discrimination in the provision of homeowners’ insurance.90 The court in
Saunders declined to apply the filed rate doctrine to the claims of
discrimination at issue but remanded the case for further consideration on
the basis that it could not be determined on the record presented whether
application of the federal anti-discrimination laws involved would impair
the state’s system of insurance rate regulation in violation of the McCarranFerguson Act.91
The defendants in Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance
85

Id. at 942 (citing Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 964
(N.J. Super. App. Div. 2004); Schermer v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 702
N.W.2d 898, 907 (Minn. App. Ct. 2005); Horwitz v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 745
N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. 2001); Anzinger v. Ill. State Med. Inter-Ins. Exch., 494
N.E.2d 655 (Ill. App. 1986)).
86
Schilke, 705 F. Supp. 2d at 942-43.
87
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2006).
88
Id. at § 1012(b).
89
Id.
90
Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2006).
91
Id. at 945-46. The ruling of the court in Saunders on the filed rate doctrine is
discussed further in Section XVII, B, infra.
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National Indemnity Insurance Co. also raised both the filed rate doctrine
and the McCarran-Ferguson Act as defenses.92 On the basis that the
plaintiffs sought to apply, not avoid, the filed rate, the court refused to find
that the filed rate doctrine barred the plaintiffs’ RICO claims involving
alleged overcharges for worker’s compensation insurance.93 In regard to the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, the defendants claimed that awarding the
plaintiffs treble damages under RICO for fraudulent departures from the
filed rates would “frustrate non-discrimination policies declared in state
insurance laws requiring insurers to collect the full amount of any
applicable filed rate.”94 The court, however, disagreed ruling that the
remedies available for fraud under RICO complemented, rather than
conflicted, with state regulations.95
Another case highlighting the fact that both the filed rate doctrine
and the McCarran-Ferguson Act should be considered as defenses in
insurance cases is In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases.96 The court in that
case ruled that the McCarran-Ferguson Act completely barred plaintiff’s
claims for both damages and injunctive relief although the court believed
that the filed rate doctrine standing alone would have allowed claims for
injunctive relief.97
Litigants in insurance cases involving interplay between federal
and state law should consider both the filed rate doctrine and the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, as either could provide grounds for dismissal.
Although both may involve the regulatory processes involved in the setting
of rates, the legal theories underlying the two defenses are distinct and
separate.
VI.

THE RELATION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE TO THE
STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

A theory referred to as the “state action doctrine” may bar an
antitrust claim if the defense can establish the state’s intent to replace
competition with state regulation and the state’s active supervision of the

92

Sandwich Chef of Tex. v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Ins. Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d
867, 874-77 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
93
Id. at 874-75.
94
Id. at 872.
95
Id. at 877.
96
In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
97
Id. at 877-78.
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conduct at issue.98 As recognized in Arroyo-Melecio v. Puerto Rican
American Insurance Co.,99 in order to justify state action immunity, “[t]he
state must manifest intent to intervene in the market, displacing antitrust
laws and must engage in active supervision of the challenged conduct.”100
The doctrine requires first that the challenged restraint on trade “be one
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy” and second
that the policy “be actively supervised by the State itself.”101
The court in In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust
Litigation recognized that the filed rate doctrine and the state action
doctrine constitute two independent bases for antitrust immunity.102 A
significantly lower standard of administrative review, however, is required
in regard to the filed rate doctrine as compared to the state action
doctrine.103 Because the standard of administrative supervision required for
application of the state action doctrine is higher, the filed rate doctrine
would likely result in a viable defense in a larger number of cases.
The plaintiffs in N.C. Steel, Inc. v. National Council on
Compensation Insurance presented a novel theory to the effect that the
filed rate doctrine was subsumed and made inapplicable by the state action
doctrine; that the second prong of the state action doctrine requiring active
state regulation was not met under the circumstances of that case; and that
their lawsuit was, therefore, viable.104 The court, however, refused to
follow the plaintiffs’ reasoning and instead applied the filed rate doctrine to
dismiss the claims.105 No cases were cited in support of the plaintiffs’
98

See N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 496 S.E.2d 369, 374
(N.C. 1998).
99
Arroyo-Melecio v. P.R. Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2005).
100
Id. at 71 (citing I AREEDA AND HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 221c (2d
ed. 2000)).
101
Id. at 71 (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980)).
102
In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 677 n.10 (E.D. Pa.
2009).
103
Arroyo-Melecio, 398 F.3d at 71; In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F.
Supp. 2d at 677 n.10; In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., No. CIV.A. 08-1425, 2009 WL
3233529, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 05, 2009).
104
N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 496 S.E.2d 369, 374 (N.C.
1998).
105
Id. On the basis that neither prong of the defense was met, another case
refusing to apply the state action doctrine to bar claims of anti-competitive activity
is State ex rel. Cooper v. McClure, No. 03-CVS-005617, 2004 WL 2965983, at
*10-11 (N.C. Super. Dec. 14, 2004), rev’d on other grounds, No. 03-CVS-005617,
2005 WL 3018635 (N.C. Oct. 28, 2005).
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position that the state action subsumed the filed rate doctrine, and other
cases do not hold as such.
VII.

FILED RATES V. FILED FORMS

The filed rate doctrine is more appropriately viewed as applying to
insurance rates, not insurance forms. For example, in Peachtree Casualty
Insurance Co., v. Sharpton, the Supreme Court of Alabama rejected the
insurer’s position that based on regulatory approval of its policy provisions,
the filed rate doctrine barred claims against it for uninsured motorist
protection. 106 The insurer had issued a policy excluding uninsured motorist
coverage for injuries incurred during the use of certain vehicles such as
motorcycles. The problem for the insurer was that the exclusion conflicted
with the Alabama statutory requirements for uninsured motorist
protection.107 Stating that no rate case was involved, the court refused to
apply the filed rate doctrine to bar the claims for uninsured motorist
protection.108 Similarly, in rejecting a “filed form doctrine” defense, the
court in Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. v. Banko observed that
no cases were cited indicating that regulatory approval of a form barred a
lawsuit over policy language.109
The background and history of the filed rate doctrine uphold the
position that it fails to bar complaints implicating forms. The justiciability
strand of the doctrine supports the belief that courts should not become
enmeshed in the rate-making process through attempting to retroactively
reallocate rates and determine what rate an agency would find appropriate
in place of an unlawful rate in relation to all interested parties.110
Complaints regarding forms are on a different footing and do not implicate
the same concerns.
The existence of at least one case supporting a filed form type of
doctrine, however, should be noted. In AMEX Assurance Co. v.
Caripides,111 the court upheld policy language contained in an insurance
106

Peachtree Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharpton, 768 So. 2d 368, 373 (Ala. 2000).
Id. at 372.
108
Id. at 373.
109
S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Banko, No. 8:06CV840T27EAJ, 2006 WL
2935281, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2006).
110
See Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 19 (2nd Cir. 1994);
Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 312 (Minn. 2006)
(citing Keogh v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 164-65 (1922)).
111
AMEX Assur. Co. v. Carpides, 179 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
aff’d, AMEX Assur. Co. v. Carpides, 316 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003).
107

392

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.2

policy against a claim that the policy violated state statutory requirements.
In addition to finding no conflict with the statute involved, the court noted
that “[a] line of cases on the ‘filed rate doctrine’ suggests that the Insurance
Department's review and approval of a policy is presumptively valid and
cannot be subsequently judicially challenged as unfair or violative of public
policy.”112 Both cases cited in support of the court’s statement, City of New
York v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,113 and Byan v. Prudential Insurance
Co. of America,114 however, addressed filed rates, not filed forms.115
VIII.

THE RELATION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW

During the evolution of the filed rate doctrine, issues involving the
interplay between federal and state law have surfaced. One such area
examined below involves the application of the doctrine to administrative
review performed by state, as opposed to federal, agencies. This is a
significant issue in the insurance area since the filing of insurance rates
with state agencies is the norm. Other issues involve the application of the
doctrine to claims based solely on state law, and the interplay between state
and federal law as applied to disputes.
A. APPLICATION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE TO RATES
REGULATED BY STATE AGENCIES
There is authority that the filed rate doctrine should only be applied
when rates are reviewed in conjunction with a federal regulatory system as
opposed to a state regulatory system. For example, the Montana Supreme
Court in Williams v. Union Fidelity Life Insurance Co.,116 refused to apply
the doctrine to an insurance dispute because the rates at issue were not set,
reviewed, or filed with a federal regulatory authority.117 Similarly, in

112

Id. at 319 n.5 (citing City of N.Y. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 693 N.Y.S.2d
139 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Byan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 662 N.Y.S.2d 44,
45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)).
113
City of N.Y. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 693 N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999).
114
Byan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 662 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997).
115
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 693 N.Y.S.2d at 140; Byan, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
116
Williams v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 123 P.3d 213 (Mont. 2005).
117
Id. at 219.
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Miletak v. Allstate Insurance Co.,118 a case involving an insurance premium
dispute, the court stated that “the doctrine does not directly apply to a
situation, as here, involving potential interference with rates set by a state
agency rather than a federal agency.”119
As discussed below, the better and more prevailing view, however,
is that the doctrine applies to rates reviewed by state insurance
departments. There seems to be no logical reason to limit application of the
doctrine to federal agency review only. In applying the filed rate doctrine to
state agency review, the court in Taffet v. Southern Co.,120 stated that
“where the legislature has conferred power upon an administrative agency
to determine the reasonableness of a rate, the rate-payer ‘can claim no rate
as a legal right that is other than the filed rate’.”121 According to the Taffet
court, that central principle of the filed rate doctrine “applies with equal
force” regardless of whether rate setting is done by a state or federal
authority.122
Recognizing the weight of authority supporting application of the
doctrine to rates authorized by state agencies, the court in McCray v.
Fidelity National Title Insurance Co.,123 stated that “we will preclude the
recovery of treble damages for a Sherman Act claim predicated on the
alleged excessiveness or otherwise unreasonableness of a rate filed with a
state administrative agency.”124 Other insurance cases finding that the filed
rate doctrine applies to state agency review include In re Title Ins. Antitrust
Cases,125 In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust Litigation,126 Allen v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,127 Schermer v. State Farm Fire &

118

Miletak v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. C 06-03778 (JW), 2010 WL 809579 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 05, 2010).
119
Id. at *4.
120
Taffet v. S. Co., 967 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1992).
121
Id. at 1494 (quoting Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341
U.S. 246, 251 (1951)).
122
Id.
123
McCray v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322 (D. Del. 2009).
124
Id. at 328
125
In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 861 (N.D. Ohio
2010).
126
In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 672 (E.D. Pa.
2009).
127
Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1228 (S.D. Ala.
1999).
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Casualty Co.,128 MacKay v. Superior Court,129 and Commonwealth ex rel.
Chandler v. Anthem Insurance Co.130
B. APPLICATION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE TO STATE LAW
CLAIMS
Assuming that state agency review supports application of the filed
rate doctrine, a separate issue is whether the doctrine applies to state law
claims as well as to claims made under federal law. Of course, as
recognized by the North Carolina Supreme Court in N.C. Steel, Inc. v.
National Council on Compensation Insurance, federal law applying the
filed rate doctrine is not controlling in a case involving violation of state
law.131 The doctrine, however, is often adopted and applied to state law
claims, as was the case in N.C. Steel, Inc. in response to a challenge to the
state’s workers’ compensation rating system.132
In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases provides a comprehensive
discussion of the court’s decision to apply the principles underlying the
filed rate doctrine to bar state law antitrust claims.133 Ohio courts had not
specifically ruled on whether the filed rate doctrine barred a suit for
damages brought by a private plaintiff under state law alleging, for
example, an antitrust violation.134 The court found persuasive, however,
Ohio Supreme Court authority barring regulated entities from charging
rates higher than those properly filed.135 According to the court, case law
applying that “corollary to the filed rate doctrine,” supported the conclusion

128

Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 312 (Minn.

2006).

129

MacKay v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 899 (Cal. Ct. App.

2010).

130

Commonwealth ex rel. Chandler v. Anthem Ins. Co., 8 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1999).
131
N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 496 S.E.2d 369, 374 (N.C.
1998). See also In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 673 n.7
(E.D. Pa. 2009) (holding state law is the overriding authority in determining if the
filed rate doctrine applies to state law claims).
132
N.C. Steel, Inc., 496 S.E.2d at 371.
133
In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 861-65 (N.D. Ohio
2010).
134
Id. at 861-65.
135
Id. at 862 (citing In re Investigation of Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 609
N.E.2d 156 (Ohio 1993)).
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that the Ohio Supreme Court would apply the filed rate doctrine to the state
antitrust claims involved.136
Another example of the doctrine’s application to state law claims
occurs in Amundson & Associates Art Studio, Ltd. v. National Council on
Compensation Insurance, Inc., in which the plaintiff argued that the filed
rate doctrine was a weak and discredited relic continuing to exist only at
the federal level.137 The court noted a California case cited by the plaintiff
as authority for the proposition that the doctrine should not apply at the
state law level.138 Nevertheless, recognizing the importance of preserving
the integrity of agency decision making, the court upheld application of the
doctrine to claims that state antitrust statutes were violated.139
C. APPLICATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW IN CONSTRUCTION OF
THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE
Although state law is controlling in relation to state law claims,140
courts addressing the doctrine’s application in such cases typically find
federal law relevant as well.141 In addressing solely federal antitrust claims,
the federal district court in In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust
Litigation also expressed the opinion that it could “fill in the interstices of
the doctrine by drawing on state law.”142 In support of that conclusion, the
court cited the United States Supreme Court decision of Kamen v. Kemper
Financial Services, Inc.143 In Kamen, the Court stated that“[t]he
presumption that state law should be incorporated into federal common law
is particularly strong in areas in which private parties have entered legal
relationships with the expectation that their rights and obligations would be
governed by state-law standards.”144
136

Id.
Amundson & Assocs. Art Studio, Ltd. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc.,
988 P.2d 1208, 1213 (Kan. App. Ct. 1999).
138
Id. at 1214 (citing Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993)).
139
Id. at 1215-16.
140
In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 673 n.7 (E.D. Pa.
2009).
141
See Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227-30
(S.D. Ala. 1999); Prentice v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 500 N.W.2d 658, 660-62
(Wis. 1993).
142
In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d at 673.
143
Id. (citing Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991)).
144
Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98.
137
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Finding pertinent the fact that the federal antitrust claims presented
involved application of the filed rate doctrine to a Pennsylvania regulatory
agency, the court in In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance found “especially
relevant” the treatment of the filed rate doctrine under Pennsylvania state
law.145 In reliance on Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust Litigation, the
court in Clark v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America likewise recognized
that in construing the filed rate doctrine, state law may be used to “fill in
the interstices” of federal common law.146
IX.

THE AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO PRIVATE
PLAINTIFFS

The foreclosure of damage claims under federal and state law
through application of the filed rate doctrine may result in a focus on future
injunctive relief. Jurisdictions vary in regard to the application of the filed
rate doctrine to claims for equitable relief. The Kansas Court of Appeals in
Amundson & Associates Art Studio, Ltd. v. National Council on
Compensation Insurance, Inc., a case involving alleged price fixing in
violation of state antitrust law, ruled that “[a]ny claim for injunctive or
equitable relief in this area is permissible by the government, not
individuals.”147 The court in Amundson relied upon a decision of the North
Carolina Supreme Court, N.C. Steel, Inc. v. National Council on
Compensation Insurance,148 a case in which the court refused to approve
injunctive relief for private plaintiffs asserting state law claims stemming
from charges imposed under the state’s workers’ compensation insurance
structure.149
Better reasoned cases, however, indicate that private plaintiffs may
proceed through injunctive relief in appropriate cases. Injunctive relief not
implicating agency authority or previously filed rating schedules does not
interfere with the twin concerns of the filed rate doctrine, justiciability and
nondiscrimination. Notably, the Supreme Court in Square D Co. v. Niagara
Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc. affirmed the ruling of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals that although the filed rate doctrine barred the private plaintiffs’
145

Pa. Title Ins., 648 F. Supp. 2d at 673.
Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 736 F. Supp. 2d 902, 912 (D.N.J.
2010) (quoting Pa. Title Ins., 648 F. Supp. 2d at 673).
147
Amundson & Assocs. Art Studio, Ltd. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc.,
988 P.2d 1208, 1217 (Kan. App. Ct. 1999).
148
See id. at 1215-16 (citing N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins.,
496 S.E.2d 369 (N.C. 1998)).
149
Id.
146
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claims for monetary damages, a remand was appropriate for a
determination as to whether the plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive
relief.150 The Supreme Court in Square D recognized the “critical
distinction” between absolute immunity from all antitrust scrutiny and a
prohibition against the private treble-damages remedy.151 According to the
Supreme Court, that distinction was highlighted by the Court of Appeal’s
remand on the issue of injunctive relief and the consent decree entered into
between the parties enjoining certain acts. On the issue of the availability of
injunctive relief, the Second Circuit in Square D further noted that the
defendants had not moved for dismissal in regards to the claim for an
injunction “a position well advised in light of Georgia v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co.,”152 an earlier Supreme Court case upholding the availability
of injunctive relief under the filed rate doctrine.153
Later case law generally acknowledges the availability of
injunctive relief at least insofar as the filed rate is not affected.154 For
example, in Saunders v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court’s dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief stating that “[o]n appeal, defendants
totally fail to support this seemingly unjustified expansion of the filed rate
doctrine.”155 Likewise, in Schilke v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, a case
150

Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 414

(1986).
151

Id. at 422 n.28.
Square D Co., 760 F.2d at 1364 (citing Ga. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439,
454-55 (1945)).
153
Although the state of Georgia was involved in Georgia v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., federal antitrust law was involved, and the state was not a federal
governmental litigant. 324 U.S. 439, 443 (1945). Even if, however, due to the
involvement of the state of Georgia, Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., loses
some effect as precedent regarding the availability of injunctive relief to private
litigants, the plaintiffs in Square D were certainly private litigants. Square D Co.,
760 F.2d at 1349.
154
See, e.g., Dolan v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 365 Fed. App’x 271, 276 (2d
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 261 (2010); Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440
F.3d 940, 944 n.1 (8th Cir. 2006); In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d
840, 865 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Schilke v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 705 F. Supp. 2d
932, 944-45 (N.D. Ill. 2010), vacated on other grounds, 758 F. Supp. 2d 549 (N.D.
Ill. 2010); In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 686 (E.D. Pa.
2009); see also Prentice v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 500 N.W.2d 658, 663 n.7 (Wis.
1993) (recognizing that the filed rate doctrine does not protect against private suits
seeking other than rate-related damages).
155
Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940, 944 n.1 (8th Cir. 2006).
152
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involving alleged wrongful kickbacks, the court refused to apply the
doctrine to bar a claim for injunctive relief that sought the public disclosure
of the portion of insurance premiums constituting commissions and
brokerage fees.156
The court in In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases distinguished
between allowable types of injunctive relief as opposed to types of
injunctive relief barred by the doctrine.157 The court acknowledged
Supreme Court precedent in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.158 and
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc.159 affirming the
continued viability of injunctive relief.160 The court found, however, that
the nonjusticiability strand of the doctrine barred injunctive relief that
would alter a filed rate or that would “displace the statutory scheme and
authority of the regulating agency to determine the reasonableness of
rates.”161 Accordingly, the court found that claims in the case seeking to
enjoin future collaboration between the defendants were allowed because
the relief sought could only affect future rates, not any rate already filed.162
On the other hand, the court ruled that the filed rate doctrine barred claims
seeking to prohibit the defendants from filing rates containing both
legitimate premium costs and fees from alleged kickbacks.163 The problem
in the court’s view was that rather than seek to enjoin the kickbacks
themselves, the plaintiffs sought an injunction addressing the way in which
rates were submitted, as a single (or all inclusive) rate.164 According to the
court, allowing such relief would be substituting the court’s judgment as to
how rate filings should be made for that of the state’s department of
insurance, a direct conflict with the nonjusticiability strand of the
doctrine.165 Likewise, in Dolan v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., a
case in which the plaintiffs requested that the court enjoin price-fixing and
156

Schilke v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 705 F. Supp. 2d 932, 944-45 (N.D. Ill.
2010) (citing Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 1998); Green v.
Peoples Energy Corp., No. 02C4117, 2003 WL 1712566, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28,
2003), vacated on other grounds, 758 F. Supp. 2d 549 (N.D. Ill. 2010)).
157
In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
158
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
159
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986).
160
In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 865.
161
Id. at 865-66 (citing Town of Norwood v. New Eng. Power Co., 202 F.3d
408, 420 (1st Cir. 2000)).
162
Id. at 865.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 865-66.
165
Id.
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the inclusion in rates of costs for kick-backs and other illegal charges, the
court stated that “[a]n injunction to remove particular costs from filed rates
is exactly the sort of relief the doctrine bars.”166
An apparent conflict in decisional law regarding the type of
injunctive relief available is illustrated by In re Pennsylvania Title
Insurance Antitrust Litigation.167 The court in that case expressed approval
of injunctive relief prohibiting the costs of illegal costs and kickbacks in
newly filed rates on the basis that the relief sought was exclusively
prospective and would not interfere with rates already on file.168 The
court’s decision is contrary, however, to the decisions of In re Title
Insurance Antitrust Cases and Dolan v. Fidelity National Title Insurance
Co., discussed above, expressing the opinion that the doctrine bars
injunctive relief affecting the inclusion of alleged kickbacks in rates. It
would seem that the better view is expressed in In re Title Insurance
Antitrust Cases and Dolan based upon justiciability concerns and the
accepted goal of the filed rate doctrine of avoiding involvement and
conflict with state regulatory authorities.
In any event, as recognized in the recent case of In re New Jersey
Title Insurance Litigation, an expansive request for injunctive relief could
present a problem in regard to the filed rate doctrine.169 The court in that
case refused to grant injunctive relief recognizing that the plaintiffs’
“broadly conceived request for injunctive relief” attacked previously filed
rates in addition to seeking prospective relief.170 Without attempting to
separate any allowable prospective relief from the perceived overly broad
request, the court stated that granting the requested injunctive relief would
interfere with the authority of the state’s insurance department.171
X.

THE EFFECT OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE ON
GOVERNMENTAL LITIGANTS

There is a lack of consensus in regard to the effect of the filed rate
doctrine on governmental litigants. The better and more prevalent view is
that the Supreme Court decisions of Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier
166

Dolan v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 365 F. App’x. 271, 276 (2d Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 261 (2010).
167
In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
168
Id. at 686.
169
In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., Consolidated Civil Action No. 08-1425, 2009
WL 3233529, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2009).
170
Id.
171
Id.
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Tariff Bureau, Inc., and Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.
uphold governmental enforcement actions.172 In recognizing rights of the
government to enforce the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court in Square D
quoted Keogh for the proposition that “[t]he fact that these rates had been
approved by the Commission would not, it seems, bar proceedings by the
Government.”173
Cases upholding the principle that the filed rate doctrine allows for
enforcement activity by the government include In re Title Insurance
Antitrust Cases, recognizing that the doctrine does not “prohibit the
Government from seeking civil or criminal redress;”174 Prentice v. Title
Insurance Co. of Minnesota, recognizing that the “filed rate doctrine does
not protect against suits by the government;”175 and Edge v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., recognizing that “[t]he filed rate
doctrine bars only collateral attacks brought by private parties and not
direct reviews in ratemaking cases or actions brought by a governmental
agency.”176
Nevertheless, decisions are not unanimous regarding application of
the filed rate doctrine to governmental enforcement efforts. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals in Commonwealth ex rel. Chandler v. Anthem Insurance
Companies, Inc. ruled that the filed rate doctrine barred an action brought
by the Attorney General of Kentucky insofar as it sought damages based on
alleged wrongdoing in violation of that state’s consumer protection law.177
The court primarily relied on its interpretation of federal precedent, not on
any type of more restrictive reading of the filed rate doctrine limited to that
state.178
172

Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 419
(1986); Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
173
Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 416 n.17 (quoting Keogh v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 162 (1922)).
174
In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 849 (N.D. Ohio
2010).
175
Prentice v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 500 N.W.2d 658, 663 n.7 (Wis. 1993).
176
Edge v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 623 S.E.2d 387, 391 (S.C. 2005);
accord Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 2006)
(approving statements made in Square D that the filed rate doctrine does not affect
governmental rights).
177
Commonwealth ex rel. Chandler v. Anthem Ins. Cos., Inc., 8 S.W.3d 48, 53
(Ky. Ct. App. 1999). The court, however, approved the Attorney General’s action
for injunctive relief or civil penalties as allowed by statute under the state’s
consumer protection law. Id. at 53-54.
178
Id. at 52.
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Another case implying that the filed rate doctrine may be applied to
bar actions brought by the government is State ex rel. Cooper v. McClure, a
case involving an action by the state of North Carolina against one of its
vendors. Rather than find that the filed rate doctrine was inapplicable to
actions instituted by the government, the court allowed the case to proceed
for reasons including its determination that an action against a state vendor
was not the type of action involving the typical concerns of the filed rate
doctrine.179
The majority of cases finding that the filed rate doctrine allows
governmental enforcement action set forth the better view. The court in In
re Title Insurance Cases characterized the doctrine as “a judicially created
restriction on remedies and standing under which private plaintiffs are
barred from suing for a damage recovery.”180 In rejecting the plaintiff’s
position that application of the filed rate doctrine would illegally extend
antitrust immunity, the court relied on its determination that the filed rate
doctrine allowed for governmental enforcement actions and for injunctive
relief.181 As the case makes clear, allowing governmental enforcement
action may prevent violators from escaping consequences of illegal action.
Additionally, governmental action does not raise the same concerns
regarding discrimination between similarly situated individuals as would a
private action by an individual plaintiff benefiting only that plaintiff.
XI.

THE EFFECT OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE ON
ENTITIES OTHER THAN INSURERS

Many cases assume without discussion that the filed rate doctrine
applies to entities other than insurers when complaints are made involving
rates filed with a state’s Department of Insurance. This is logical because
the filed rate doctrine applies to rates set or approved by a regulatory
agency, and there seems to be no reason to distinguish between insurers
and other entities. For example, without discussing the status of the
defendants, the court in Steven v. Union Planters Corp. applied the doctrine
to bar claims that the bank-affiliated defendants placed required hazard
insurance on plaintiff’s mortgaged property at an excessive premium
179

State ex rel. Cooper v. McClure, No. 03-CVS-005617, 2004 WL 296598, at
*11-12 (N.C. Super. Dec. 14, 2004), rev’d on other grounds, No. 03-CVS-005617,
2005 WL 3018635 (N.C. Super. Oct. 28, 2005).
180
In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 849 (N.D. Ohio
2010).
181
Id.
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enabling the defendants to receive wrongful kickbacks from insurers.182 As
recognized by the court in Steven, “[u]nder the filed rate doctrine, an
allegation that a forced placed premium is excessive, is barred as a matter
of law when the rate is declared reasonable by an independent entity.”183
Without further analysis of the status of the defendants, other courts have
also assumed the doctrine’s application to defendants other than insurers.184
A case specifically addressing the application of the doctrine to
defendants other than insurers is Roussin v. AARP, Inc., in which the
plaintiff claimed that AARP, a non-profit group targeting retirees,
improperly received an allowance from an insurer for reasons including its
sponsorship of the insurer’s policy offerings.185 Noting a lack of contrary
authority, the court applied the filed rate doctrine to bar the plaintiff’s
claims stating as follows:
Here, although Defendants did not file the rates, Roussin
[the plaintiff] indisputably seeks to challenge the
reasonableness of the rates. Because she is “seeking relief
for an injury allegedly caused by the payment of a rate on
file with a regulatory commission,” albeit indirectly, her
claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine.186

182

Steven v. Union Planters Corp., No. Civ.A. 00-CV-1695, 2000 WL
33128256, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2000).
183
Id. at *2.
184
See Alston v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 585 F.3d 753, 764 (3d Cir. 2009)
(applying the doctrine to the defending lender but finding that it did not bar claims
of illegal kickbacks); Hooks v. Am. Med. Sec. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV. 3:06cv71,
2008 WL 3911130 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2008) (applying the doctrine to bar claims
against a non-profit organization); Harrison v. Commercial Credit Corp., No.
CIV.A. 4:01CV151LN, 2002 WL 548281, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 29, 2002)
(finding that the doctrine barred claims against the defending lender’s employees);
Gipson v. Fleet Mortg. Grp., Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 691 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (applying
the doctrine to the defending lender but finding that it did not bar claims related to
a lender’s right to place insurance in such a manner as to cause its borrowers’
payment on unnecessary fees).
185
Roussin v. AARP, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 412, 416-19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15,
2009), aff’d, No. 09-4932-cv, 2010 WL 2101912, at *1 (2d Cir. May 26, 2010)
(stating that the affirmation was based on the district court’s “well-reasoned
opinion”).
186
Id. at 419 (quoting Porr v. NYNEX Corp., 660 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442 (App.
Div. 1997)).
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There is authority, however, distinguishing between insurers and
other entities in the application of the filed rate doctrine. In Richardson v.
Standard Guaranty Insurance Co., a case involving alleged fraud
committed in the sale of credit insurance policies, the court found that the
claims against the defendant CitiBank, which marketed and sold the
policies, should be viewed differently in relation to the filed rate doctrine
because Citibank was not an insurer and did not file rates.187 The court
found the filed rate doctrine would only apply to bar claims against such a
defendant if the defendant acted as an agent of the insurer.188
The better reasoned conclusion is that application of the filed rate
doctrine is unaffected by the status of the defendant. As recognized in
Roussin v. AARP, Inc., the pertinent inquiry is whether the claimed injury is
based on an approved rate, not the nature of the defending entity.189 The
primary concerns of the filed rate doctrine, nondiscrimination and the
avoidance of interference with agency rate making is unaffected by the
identity of the defendant.
XII.

APPLICATION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE TO
CLAIMS INVOLVING THE IMPROPER CALCULATION AND
APPLICATION OF RATES AND RESERVES, AND OTHER
ALLEGED
FAILURES
REGARDING
REGULATORY
REQUIREMENTS

A. CLAIMS THAT RATES VARIED FROM ALLOWABLE RATES
There is authority that the filed rate doctrine is inapplicable to
claims alleging that the rates charged exceeded filed rates. For example, in
Birmingham Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Council on Compensation
Insurance, Inc., the Supreme Court of Alabama found the doctrine
inapplicable to a claim that rates were assessed in excess of those approved
by the state’s department of insurance.190 Similarly, the court in Sandwich
Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance National Indemnity Insurance Co., refused
to apply the filed rate doctrine to bar a complaint regarding premiums
187

Richardson v. Standard Guaranty Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 969-70 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
188
Id. at 969 (citing Smith v. SBC Comm. Inc., 839 A.2d 850, 858 (N.J.
2004)).
189
See Roussin, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
190
Birmingham Hockey Club, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 827
So.2d 73, 83 (Ala. 2002).
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charged in excess of filed rates.191 The court reached its conclusion based
upon the logical principle that the purpose of the filed rate doctrine is to
prevent challenges to filed rates, not efforts to enforce rates on file.192
The filed rate doctrine was recently raised in a novel way in
Blackburn & McCune, PLLC v. Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc., a case in
which a law firm hired to provide services to insureds under legal insurance
plans sued claiming that the fees paid to the firm by the insurer varied from
the amount the insurer filed as expenses for such costs with the state.193
The law firm claimed that under the filed rate doctrine it was entitled to
recover the difference between what it was paid and the amount the insurer
allegedly represented to the state that it incurred in expenses for the
services.194 The court, however, determined that the filed rate doctrine is
intended to protect the relationship between an insurer and consumers, not
providers.195
B. CLAIMS THAT RATE CATEGORIES WERE IMPROPERLY APPLIED
Generally, courts have refused to apply the filed rate doctrine to
bar claims that filed rates were applied in an improper manner. For
example, in White v. Conestoga Title Insurance Co., Pennsylvania’s
intermediate court refused to apply the doctrine to bar the plaintiff’s claim
that, although the rate charged was a filed rate, it was the wrong rate.196
The court relied on the fact that the plaintiff sought to obtain a discounted
191

Sandwich Chef of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Ins. Co., 111 F.
Supp. 2d 867, 874-75 (S.D. Tex. 2000). On appeal, class certification was revoked,
however, the court recognized that a plaintiff’s knowledge of the imposition of a
rate other than the filed rate may be used to negate a claim of fraud. See Sandwich
Chef of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 205, 217 n.10 (5th
Cir. 2003).
192
Sandwich Chef of Tex., 111 F. Supp. 2d at 874 (citing Drew v. MCI
Worldcom Mgmt. Co., Inc., No. Civ. A.3: 99-CV-1355-D, 1999 WL 1087470
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 1999); Black Radio Network, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 44 F.
Supp. 2d 565, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
193
Blackburn & McCune, PLLC v. Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc., No. M200901584-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 2670816, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2010),
appeal denied, (Dec. 07, 2010).
194
Id. at *29.
195
Id. at *32.
196
White v. Conestoga Title Ins. Co., 982 A.2d 997, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2009),
appeal granted, 994 A.2d 1083 (Pa. 2010) (appeal granted on an issue pertaining
to class certification).
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rate to which she claimed entitlement, not challenge the insurance rates
themselves.197 A number of other insurance cases also recognize that the
filed rate doctrine is unavailable as a defense to bar claims involving the
calculation of rates.198
There is authority, however, supporting the application of the
doctrine to claims involving the assessment of rates. For example, after
adopting the filed rate doctrine in the jurisdiction, the South Carolina
Supreme Court in Edge v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
ruled that the doctrine barred claims that surcharges were improperly
imposed based upon wrongful determinations of fault made in regard to
motor vehicle accidents.199 On the other hand, the dissent in Edge strongly
and persuasively argued that the doctrine should not have been applied in
that situation because the case was not a rate case.200
The dissent recognized that the filed rate doctrine, first outlined in
Keogh, protects duly authorized and filed rates from collateral attack in
court.201 That was not the situation in Edge in which the plaintiffs
complained that they were charged the wrong rate among possible rates.
The dissent provided the following persuasive example in clarifying the
difference between a complaint that a lower rate should have been adopted,
which the filed rate bars, as opposed a complaint alleging the improper
assessment of a rate from among other possible rates, which the dissent
argued was allowable:
To distinguish this case from a “rate case,” it is perhaps
helpful to use the following illustration: If Plaintiff claims,
“in the exercise of discretion, the agency should have
adopted some lower rate instead of a rate of X,” then
Plaintiff is effectively asking the court to substitute its
discretion for the administrative agency’s. If instead, a rate
scheme authorizes a base rate of X, and further provides
197

Id. at 1007-08 (citing Charles v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., No. CIV.A.06
2362 JAG, 2007 WL 1959253 (D.N.J. July 3, 2007)).
198
See Randleman v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 2d 812, 823 (N.D.
Ohio 2006); Robinson v. Fountainhead Title Grp. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 2d 478, 487
(D. Md. 2006); Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 967 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
199
Edge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 623 S.E.2d 387, 392-93 (S.C.
2005).
200
Id. at 393 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
201
Id. at 393-94 (Toal, C.J., dissenting) (citing Keogh v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co.,
260 U.S. 156 (1922)).
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that, if certain additional conditions exist, then a rate of Y,
Plaintiff is free to argue that he does not meet the
requirements for issuance of the higher rate; Plaintiff is
merely disputing the rate's validity “as applied” to him.202
It seems that the dissent in Edge had the better argument that the
filed rate doctrine allowed claims that rates were improperly applied.203
The rationale behind the filed rate doctrine supports plaintiff rights in
regard to rate enforcement. For example, recognizing the purposes of the
filed rate doctrine to prevent price discrimination and to preserve the role
of agencies in approving reasonable rates, the court in Charles v. Lawyers
Title Ins. Corp. refused to apply the doctrine to bar enforcement of the
defendant’s filed rates.204 The plaintiffs claimed that the defending insurer
charged more than the allowable rating schedule it submitted. According to
the court in Charles, the defendant attempted “to turn this doctrine on its
head” by arguing that pursuant to the filed rate doctrine, the plaintiff’s
constructive knowledge of rates barred claims to enforce filed rates.205
Enforcement of filed rates does not result in discrimination against
policyholders nor does it interfere with agency decision making.
C. CLAIMS THAT RESERVES WERE IMPROPERLY SET
There is disagreement regarding whether the filed rate doctrine
bars claims regarding the improper setting of insurance reserves retained
for the payment of future claims. The North Carolina Court of Appeals in
Lupton v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of North Carolina found that the filed
rate doctrine barred claims alleging the existence of excessive reserves.206
By statute a regulated insurer in that state was required to retain a
percentage of certain gross annual collections from membership dues until
the reserve retained equaled three times the insurer’s average monthly
expenditures for claims and other expenses.207 Reserves, however, were
prohibited by statute from exceeding six times the amount of such average
202

Id. at 394 n.8 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 394 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
204
Charles v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., No. 06-2361 (JAG), 2007 WL
1959253, at *9 (D.N.J. July 3, 2007).
205
Id. at *6.
206
Lupton v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.C., 533 S.E.2d 270, 273 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2000).
207
Id. at 271 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-65-95(b) (2009)).
203
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monthly expenditures.208 In ruling that the filed rate doctrine barred claims
that the defendant accumulated excessive reserves, the court recognized
that the state’s Commissioner of Insurance initially approved the
defendant’s reserve amount and that, thereafter, the retention of reserves
was governed by statute.209 The court stated that the Commissioner had the
authority to recalculate approved rates, thereby affecting the amount of the
reserve and that “[a]ny allegation that Blue Cross accumulated an excessive
reserve requires the recalculation of approved rates.”210 According to the
court, “the plaintiffs cannot prove their claim without the rates set by the
Commissioner being questioned.”211
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, in Ciamaichelo v.
Independence Blue Cross, refused to apply the filed rate doctrine to dismiss
a complaint alleging the defendant’s wrongful accumulation of excessive
reserves.212 The plaintiffs in that case alleged that the defendant violated
the state’s nonprofit corporation law and breached contractual and fiduciary
duties through accumulating surplus funds for purposes inconsistent with
its non-profit status.213 Alleged violations included the use of excess funds
for possible acquisitions, mergers, conversions, benefits to officers and
directors, and investments in for-profit subsidiaries.214 The court stated that
it was unwilling, on preliminary objections, to rule that the complaint
amounted to only second-guessing an approved rate. Instead, the complaint
was viewed as raising the issue of whether the defendant “violated the
Non-Profit Law and committed breaches of contractual and fiduciary duties
in amassing a fund designated as surplus that was in amount, over and
208

Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-65-95(c) (2009)).
Id. at 273.
210
Id.
211
Lupton v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of North Carolina, 533 S.E.2d 270,
273 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins.,
496 S.E.2d 369, 374 (N.C. 1998)). The court did not address the fact that
apparently excessive reserves could be computed based on the prohibition that
reserves not exceed six times the amount of average monthly expenditures.
Subsection (d) of the statute at issue, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-65-95 (2009), however,
granted the Commissioner authority to increase reserves under certain
circumstances to more than six times average monthly expenditures. Although not
cited by the court, that section could conceivably have provided additional support
for the application of the nonjusticiability strand of the filed rate doctrine.
212
Ciamaichelo v. Independence Blue Cross, 909 A.2d 1211, 1217 (2006).
213
Id. at 1212-13 (citing Nonprofit Corporation Law of 1988, 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5101-10 (West 1995)).
214
Id. at 1213.
209
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above that necessary for IBC [the defendant] to operate properly, meet its
legal obligations, or secure its financial solvency . . . .”215 The court
rejected the reasoning that “allegations in a complaint that could lead to an
adjustment of an insurer’s approved rate invariably amount to a rate injury
claim.”216
While little case law exists on this issue, the goal of the filed rate
doctrine to avoid enmeshing courts in agency rate-making procedures
supports the application of the filed rate doctrine to claims regarding
insurance reserves.217 Typically, state departments of insurance disapprove
rates that are inadequate, unfairly discriminatory, or excessive, and oversee
reserves set aside for contingencies.218 The accumulation of excessive
reserves would necessarily involve rates because the remedy would likely
be a recalculation of premium from which reserves are obtained.219
Therefore, rates and reserves are inextricably intertwined. The better view
is that under the contours of the filed rate doctrine, issues involving
reserves, as well as rates, are within the province of state departments of
insurance.
D. CLAIMS OF UNMET REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
In Richardson v. Standard Guaranty Insurance Co., the court
addressed the defense that the filed rate doctrine barred the plaintiffs’
allegations that benefits and policy terms were inconsistent with governing
regulations of the state’s department of insurance.220 Specifically, the
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant violated state regulations by failing to
include refund provisions in policy terms, by failing to remit premium
refunds, and through use of a nonconforming form.221 The court determined
215

Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1218. The court declined to address whether the filed rate doctrine
would have applied if the complaint had specifically raised a rate injury claim.
Ciamaichelo v. Independence Blue Cross, 909 A.2d 1211, 1218 n.8 (2006).
217
See, e.g., Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1994)
(expressing the opinion that courts should not become enmeshed in the ratemaking process).
218
See Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 736 (S.D.
Iowa 2007); Ciamaichelo, 909 A.2d at 1216; Lupton v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of N.C., 533 S.E.2d 270, 273 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
219
See Lupton, 533 S.E.2d at 273.
220
Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 961 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. 2004).
221
Id. at 968.
216
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that “[r]ather than conflict with the doctrine, these alternative claims
actually assume the application of the filed rate and filed policy terms.”222
The court’s ruling is consistent with principles underlying the filed rate
doctrine and cases refusing to apply the filed rate doctrine as a bar to
claims seeking to recover charges imposed in excess of allowable filed
rates.
XIII.

THE EFFECT OF NONCOMPLIANT FILING

Litigants opposed to application of the filed rate doctrine may raise
the failure of insurers to meet administrative rate filing requirements. In
addressing the issue of improper filing, courts place importance on the
language of the statutory scheme involved. A crucial issue is whether the
applicable regulations provide that a rate failing to comply with filing
requirements is void. Assuming that improperly filed rates are not declared
void, a practitioner seeking to benefit from the filed rate doctrine would
likely rely upon the “technical defect” rule.223 As recognized by the court in
In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust Litigation, “the Supreme Court
has long held that technical or formal errors do not invalidate an otherwise
properly filed rate that sufficiently notices the rate to be charged.”224
Additionally, the court in In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases stated that
even if the rates in that case were improperly filed, “no statute voids those
filed and approved rates so as to preclude application of the filed rate
doctrine . . . .”225 Other cases applying the same reasoning include Dolan v.
Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. and In re Pennsylvania Title
Insurance Antitrust Litigation.226
On the other hand, if an improperly filed rate is declared void, then
there is no filed rate and no basis to rely upon the filed rate doctrine as a
shield. The court in In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust Litigation
stated that the U.S. Supreme Court in Security Services, Inc. v. K Mart

222

Id.
See Sec. Srvs., Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 511 U.S. 431, 442 (1994).
224
In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 678-79 (E.D. Pa.
2009) (citing Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Chi. & Erie R.R. Co., 235 U.S.
371, 375 (1914)).
225
In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp 2d 840, 861 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
226
Dolan v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 365 F. App’x 271, 273 (2d Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 261 (2010); In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp
2d at 679.
223
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Corp “delineated the scope of the properly filed requirement.”227 In that
case, following its bankruptcy, Security Services, as debtor-in-possession,
sued KMart for undercharges allegedly owed based on the difference
between the contract rate KMart paid for shipment and the tariff the carrier,
Security Services, had on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission.228
Security Services relied on its filed rate supported by a mileage guide,
purportedly filed by an agent, as the basis for mileage computation and
charges. Under applicable regulations, however, the rate filing was void
because of Security Service’s failure to remit costs for using the mileage
guide as its filing.229 As recognized by the Court, recovery may not be
based on “filed, but void, rates.”230 The Court referenced the filing as “an
incomplete tariff insufficient to support a reliable calculation of
charges.”231 Consistent with Security Services, the court in In re
Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust Litigation recognized that the filed
rate doctrine may be inapplicable in insurance cases if filing deficiencies
result in an inability to calculate a rate.232
XIV.

THE EXTENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW REQUIRED

Courts vary on the type of administrative review required to trigger
enforcement of the filed rate doctrine. Some courts find the type of review
process irrelevant, some require an active review process, and some find
the doctrine applicable so long as a process for administrative review is
available. Additionally, rebate systems may affect the effectiveness of
administrative review in regard to the filed rate doctrine.
The better view is that so long as a state department of insurance
retains authority to review and disapprove rates, the filed rate doctrine
should apply. Efforts by the judiciary to determine the extent and
effectiveness of administrative review would result in the very threat the
filed rate doctrine is designed to avoid, enmeshment of the courts in the
rate-making process. Of course, the filed rate doctrine should only have
application in situations in which administrative review is available. The
227

In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d at 678 (citing Security
Serv., Inc. v. KMart Corp., 511 U.S. 431, 440 (1994)).
228
See Sec. Servs., Inc., 511 U.S. at 434.
229
Id. at 436. As noted by Justice Ginsburg in dissent, “[t]he fee involved was
approximately $83.” Id. at 457 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
230
Id. at 444.
231
Id. at 443.
232
See Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d at 678 (citing In re
Olympia Holding Corp., 88 F.3d 952, 961-62 (11th Cir. 1996)).
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court in Clark v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America correctly recognized
that the filed rate doctrine is inapplicable if a rate is filed with an agency
with no authority to approve or reject it.233 Further rationale and authority
regarding these issues and the type of administrative review required is
discussed below.
A. THE POSITION THAT THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE
REGARDLESS OF MEANINGFUL ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
Recognizing that “[d]efining the contours of an agency’s review of
a filed rate is a task best left to the legislative branch,” the federal district
court in In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases, approved the application of
the filed rate doctrine even under the assumption that insurance filings
lacked meaningful regulatory oversight.234 In support of its decision, the
court relied upon Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, a case
in which the U.S. Supreme Court refused to require a hearing before the
ICC prior to the institution of rates as a prerequisite for application of the
doctrine.235 According to the court in In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases,
“it is the filing of the rates with the regulating agency that triggers the filed
rate doctrine not any minimum level of review undertaken by the
agency.”236
Based upon similar reasoning, and in reliance on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Square D, the court in In re Pennsylvania Title
Insurance Antitrust Litigation concluded that “as long as the regulatory
scheme requires the filing of rates with a government agency that has legal
authority to review those rates, the filed rate doctrine applies regardless of
the actual degree of agency review of those filed rates.”237 Other cases
reaching similar results include In re New Jersey Title Insurance Litigation,
where the court stated that “application of the filed rate doctrine does not

233

See Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. Civ. 08-6197 (DRD), 2011
WL 940729, at *14-15 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2011).
234
In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 855 (N.D. Ohio
2010).
235
See Square D Co v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 417
(1986).
236
In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d. at 852-53.
237
In re Pennsylvania Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 674-75
(E.D. Pa. 2009).
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depend upon meaningful agency review of filed rates”238 and Schilke v.
Wachovia Mortgage, FSB where the court found agency power to
disapprove rates sufficient for application of the filed rate doctrine.239
B. CASES FINDING ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
Finding the presence of adequate administrative oversight, some
courts stop short of stating that meaningful review is irrelevant for purposes
of the filed rate doctrine. For example, in McCray v. Fidelity National Title
Insurance Co., the court cited authority to the effect that meaningful
administrative review may be unnecessary for the doctrine’s application240
but found that the review process of Delaware, the jurisdiction involved,
was indeed “meaningful and competent.”241
The administrative scheme at issue in McCray was a “file and use”
system, whereby rates are filed with the appropriate administrative
authority and charged after their effective date unless agency objection is
made.242 Referencing the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in MontanaDakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Services Co. that parties “can
claim no rate as a legal right that is other than the filed rate, whether fixed
or merely accepted by the [regulatory body],” the court upheld application
of the filed rate doctrine to that type of system.243 The court in McCray
found persuasive the fact that neither the rating system involved in Keogh
nor the one at issue in Square D required prior regulatory approval before
going into effect.244 Other cases approving file and use systems to support
application of the filed rate doctrine include the Minnesota Supreme Court
decision of Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., Anzinger v.
Illinois State Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange, decided by the Illinois
Court of Appeals, and Horwitz ex rel. Gilbert v. Bankers Life and Casualty
238

In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., Consolidated Civil Action No. 08-1425, 2009
WL 3233529, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 05, 2009) (citing Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier
Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 417 n.19 (1986)).
239
See Schilke v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, 758 F. Supp. 2d 549, 560-61
(N.D. Ill. 2010).
240
McCray v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330 (D. Del.
2009) (citing Wegoland, Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 806 F. Supp. 1112, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 27 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1994)).
241
Id. at 330.
242
Id. at 325.
243
McCray, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 329 (quoting Mont.-Dakota Util. Co., 341 U.S.
at 251) (alteration in original)).
244
See id. at 329.
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Co., also decided by the Illinois Court of Appeals but applying Colorado
law.245
In an unpublished decision, citing Square D, the Second Circuit in
Dolan v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., stated that “[i]t is wellestablished that the doctrine applies to all filed rates, not merely those rates
investigated before their approval.”246
“Use and file” systems under which an insurer begins using rates
before they are filed for regulatory review have also supported application
of the filed rate doctrine. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Prentice v. Title Insurance Co. of Minnesota applied the filed rate doctrine
to a use and file system under which insurers were required to file rates
within thirty days after their effective date.247 Refusing to distinguish
between the doctrine’s application to use and file systems as opposed to file
and use systems, the court interpreted Supreme Court precedent as follows:
“Under Keogh, as interpreted by Square D, the existence of a regulatory
remedy bars a private rate-related suit for damages under the antitrust laws
regardless of whether the regulatory body approved the rates before or after
the rates became effective.”248 Noting that the state’s insurance
commissioner had authority to disapprove rates, the court recognized that
additionally granting courts authority over rates “would place insurers in a
procrustean bed where one rate must conform to the requirements of both
the Insurance Commissioner and a trier of fact.”249
C. CASES REQUIRING SIGNIFICANT ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
While some insurance cases indicate that the nature of the review is
not a critical concern,250 others require meaningful administrative review
prior to application of the filed rate doctrine. For example, in Rios v. State
245

See, e.g., Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 309
(Minn. 2006); Anzinger v. Illinois State Medical Inter-Ins. Exchange, 494 N.E.2d
655, 658 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Horowitz ex rel. Gilbert v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co.,745 N.E.2d 591, 605 (Ill. App. 2001).
246
Dolan v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 365 Fed. App’x. 271, 274 (2d Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 261 (2010) (citing Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff
Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 417 & n.19 (1986)),.
247
Prentice v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 500 N.W.2d 658, 662 (Wis. 1993).
248
Id.
249
Id. at 663.
250
See McCray v. Fid. Na’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330 (D. Del.
2009) (citing Wegoland, Ltd. v. Nynex Corp., 806 F. Supp. 1112, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1992)).
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Farm Fire & Casualty Co. the court recognized the necessity of
meaningful review as follows:
That is, without the ability to meaningfully regulate the
rates at issue, the rationale behind applying the filed rate
doctrine (rates approved by an agency are deemed to be per
se reasonable and nondiscriminatory) may not be
appropriate. For example, if a regulatory agency is so
powerless that it only rubber-stamps the rates filed, then it
may be inappropriate to apply the filed rate doctrine.251
Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.,252 addressing title insurance
rates in Arizona and Wisconsin, is often cited for the view that only
significant administrative review justifies application of the filed rate
doctrine.253 In finding that prior administrative approval of rates is
necessary for application of the filed rate doctrine, the court in Brown
relied on Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. v. Giannini, a case addressing
alleged state law antitrust violations in connection with the sale of fruit.254
The plaintiffs in Wileman Brothers claimed that the defendants conspired
to wrongfully enact heightened standards for maturity of fruit before it
could be marketed.255 The defendants in Wileman Brothers claimed that
they could not be held liable for the alleged violations because although the
Secretary of Agriculture did not affirmatively approve the standards at
issue, the Secretary tacitly approved them by failing to object as allowed by
regulation.256 Brown quoted with approval Wileman Brothers’
disagreement with that proposition as follows:
The mere fact of failure to disapprove, however, does not
legitimize otherwise anticompetitive conduct. . . .
[Nondisapproval] does not guarantee any level of review
251

Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 736 (S.D. Iowa
2007) (citing Hanson v. Acceleration Life Ins. Co., No. CIV A3-97-152, 1999 WL
33283345, at *4 (D.N.D. Mar. 16, 1999)).
252
982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992).
253
E.g., In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 854 (N.D. Ohio
2010); McCray, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 329; Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
721 N.W.2d 307, 317-18 (Minn. 2006).
254
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Giannini, 909 F.2d 332, 333-34 (9th Cir.
1990).
255
Id.
256
Id. at 337.
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whatsoever. . . . [T]here is no affirmative process of nondisapproval which can be relied upon fairly to evaluate a
committee’s regulations. Second, non-disapproval is
equally consistent with lack of knowledge or neglect as it
is with assent.257
In the Brown court’s view, the absence of meaningful review allowed
insurers to file any rates they wanted.258 The court in Brown did not address
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, in which the U.S.
Supreme Court approved application of the filed rate doctrine although
rates were not reviewed by the Interstate Commerce Commission prior to
their adoption.259
Other insurance cases have also referenced a concern with
perceived insufficiency in rate review in relation to application of the filed
rate doctrine.260 For example, in Richardson v. Standard Guaranty
Insurance Co., the court recognized that a criticism of the filed rate
doctrine is its application without the filed rates being rigorously examined
or challenged.261 Although finding the type of regulatory review at issue in
the case sufficient, the court stated, “as a general matter, underenforcement of ratemaking regulations may constitute a basis for a less
rigorous application of the filed rate doctrine.”262
Another case refusing to apply the doctrine to an insurance dispute
is Blaylock v. First American Title Insurance Co.,263 a federal district court
case in which the plaintiff homeowners sued providers of title insurance
complaining of kickbacks in violation of the Washington Consumer
Protection Act264 and the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.265

257

Brown, 982 F.2d at 393 (quoting Wileman Bros., 909 F.2d at 337-38).
Id. at 394.
259
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 417 (1986).
260
E.g., Blaylock v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1102-03
(W.D. Wash. 2007); Hanson v. Acceleration Life Ins. Co. No. CIV A3-97-152,
1999 WL 33283345, at *4 (D.N.D. Mar. 16, 1999); Richardson v. Standard Guar.
Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 964 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
261
Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 964 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2004).
262
Id.
263
Blaylock, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1102-03.
264
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.010-19.86.920 (1999 & Supp. 2012).
265
12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2006).
258
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In addition to criticizing the filed rate doctrine in general,266 the Blaylock
court noted that a factor supporting its decision was that title insurance
rates were subject to less comprehensive regulation than other insurance
rates in the state.267 According to the court, title insurance rates were
subjected “only to superficial regulation” with no requirement that they
receive any review by the insurance commissioner.268 Therefore, the court
left open an issue regarding the applicability of the doctrine to other forms
of insurance, such as property and casualty insurance, subjected to more
comprehensive regulation.
It is curious that the court in Blaylock did not cite another federal
district court decision arising in the Western District of Washington
decided the previous year, albeit an unpublished one, Heaphy v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., in which the court recognized
Washington’s adoption of the filed rate doctrine in the insurance
industry.269 The plaintiffs in Heaphy alleged that State Farm failed to
properly pay diminished value property damage claims on uninsured
motorist policies.270 Citing Hardy v. Claircom Communications Group,271
distinguished in Blaylock on the basis that it involved a rate set by a federal
agency in the telecommunications context,272 the court in Heaphy stated
that “[t]here is ample authority in this and other jurisdictions to the effect
that the reasonableness of a rate cannot be challenged where that rate was
required to be (and was) filed with a regulatory agency authorized to
review it.”273 Finding the doctrine applicable in the insurance arena, the
court proceeded to rule that while some claims would be allowed to
proceed, premium-based claims were barred by the filed rate doctrine.274

266

Blaylock, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 (stating that the doctrine has repeatedly
been called into question since its inception).
267
Id. at 1102-03. The more stringent regulatory procedures discussed by the
court for other types of insurance included property and casualty insurance. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.19.010 (2010); Blaylock, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1095-96.
268
Blaylock, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1102.
269
Heaphy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. C05 5404RBL, 2006 WL
278556, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2, 2006).
270
Heaphy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. C05-5404RBL, 2005 WL
2573340 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 12, 2005) (setting forth background information on the
claims).
271
Hardy v. Claircom Commc’ns, 937 P.2d 1128 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
272
Blaylock, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 n.8.
273
Heaphy, 2006 WL 278556, at *2 (citing Hardy, 937 P.2d 1128, 1131).
274
Id. at *3.
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D. THE EFFECT OF REBATES
In a dispute involving fees imposed in connection with the
provision of homeowners, automobile, and umbrella insurance, the
California Court of Appeals in Fogel v. Farmers Group, Inc. addressed the
effect of sections of the California Insurance Code allowing insurers to
rebate excess premiums to policyholders.275 Based on the rebate option, the
court expressed the opinion that the defending insurers were not required to
charge any certain rate and that the filed rate doctrine was therefore
inapplicable.276 According to the court, “even if the filed rate doctrine
applied in the context of a rate approved by a state regulatory agency
(defendants have pointed to no cases in which it was), it nevertheless would
have no application here.”277 The federal district court in the recent
unreported decision of Miletak v. Allstate Insurance Co. cited with
approval the reasoning of Fogel regarding the filed rate doctrine.278
Significantly, in MacKay v. Superior Court, a division of the
California Court of Appeals other than the division in Fogel disagreed with
Fogel in regard to the filed rate doctrine.279 Allegations in MacKay that
illegal criteria were considered in setting automobile insurance rates and
issues involving the availability of a private right of action implicated the
same chapter of the state’s insurance code as did the claims in Fogel.280
275

Fogel v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 75 (Ct. App. 2008)
(construing CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1420, 1860 (West 2005)).
276
Id. The primary basis of the complaint was that the defending insurers
charged excessive fees included in premium rates for acting as attorneys-in-fact for
the plaintiffs in regard to insurance transactions. Id. at 65-66.
277
Id. at 75. Several cases extending the doctrine to state administrative
review are cited in Section VIII of this article although a number were issued after
the 2008 Fogel decision.
278
Miletak v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. C 06-03778 JW, 2010 WL 809579, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2010).
279
MacKay v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893 (Ct. App. 2010). Fogel
was decided by Fourth Division of the Second District of the Court of Appeal
whereas MacKay was decided by the Third Division of the Second District.
280
In addition to sections of the state’s insurance code involving rebates, both
Fogel and MacKay construed sections of Chapter 9, Article 10 of the state’s
insurance code entitled “Reduction and Control of Insurance Rates” and the effect
of sections added by Proposition 103 approved by voters in 1988. CAL. INS. CODE
§§ 1861.01-1861.16 (2005); MacKay, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 903; Fogel, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 66-68. With some exceptions, the statutory scheme involved pertains to
insurance policies issued in the state including property and casualty policies. CAL.
INS. CODE § 1851 (2005).
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The court in MacKay found that the filed rate doctrine supported its
conclusion that there could be no tort liability for charging a rate approved
by the state’s department of insurance expressing disagreement with Fogel
“to the extent that it rejected the application of the filed rate doctrine to
California insurance rates.”281 The MacKay court did not see the rebate
system referenced in Fogel as a bar to application of the doctrine stating as
follows in regard to the rebate system:
We do not see this as a bar to the application of the filed
rate doctrine. Indeed, as a plan for rebating excess
premiums to policyholders “shall not be deemed a rating
plan or system,” the fact that an excess premium may be
rebated does not in any way impact the controlling fact
that, once a rating plan has been approved, the insurer may
charge no other rate.282
Of courts, rates higher than the filed rate would be barred. The
court in MacKay, however, did not address the effect of the rebate system
resulting in insureds paying less than the rate initially filed and approved.
Regulatory authorities are concerned with inadequate as well as excessive
rates because inadequate rates may lead to insufficient funds with which to
pay claims.283 An issue exists as to whether a possible lack of
administrative oversight regarding rebates and reserves reduces concerns
regarding the justiciability strand of the filed rate doctrine involving the
preservation of agency authority.284 An interesting note is that the court in
Fogel cited, but did not analyze, a section of the state’s code providing that
savings may be returned to subscribers “whenever such returns do not
constitute an impairment of the assets or reserves required to be
maintained.”285 Presumably, this section would provide a method by which

281

MacKay, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 910.
Id. at 910 n.18 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 1860 (West 2005)). Property and
casualty insurers in California operate under a prior approval system whereby rates
must be approved by the state’s insurance commissioner prior to use. See Fogel, 74
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 66 (construing CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(c) (2005)).
283
See In re N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Muhl, 684
N.Y.S.2d 312 (App. Div. 1999).
284
See Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 738 (S.D.
Iowa 2007) (recognizing the filed rate doctrine’s application if a court decision
would impact agency procedures and rate determinations).
285
Fogel, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 75 (citing CAL. INS. CODE § 1420 (West 2005)).
282
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rebates could be policed, thus providing support for application of the filed
rate doctrine.
XV.

ISSUES OF FRAUD AND INEQUITY

Should the filed rate doctrine be disregarded when claims are based
on fraud or inequity directed toward either policyholders or the
administrative agency involved? The majority of insurance cases hold that
claims of fraud do not prevent application of the doctrine. For example, the
court in Richardson v. Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. reasoned that the
doctrine “precludes fraud claims because it operates on the presumption
that the plaintiff had knowledge of the filed rates and, thus, could not
reasonably rely upon the regulated entity's misrepresentations or omissions
of material facts.”286 Some courts, as discussed below, clarify that the filed
rate doctrine bars claims of fraud only if rates are specifically implicated.
While refusing judicial intervention in the face of fraudulent
conduct may seem inequitable, application of the doctrine in such cases
avoids discrimination among policyholders and interference by the
judiciary in agency affairs. As acknowledged in Rios v State Farm Fire and
Casualty Co., in regulatory matters of federal law, the Supreme Court
recognizes that the filed rate doctrine “may seem harsh in some
circumstances”287 but accepts that result in order to prevent courts from
upsetting agency authority.288 Consideration should also be given to the fact
that policyholders subjected to fraud may have redress through the agency
system in the form of rebates or premium deductions granted to all
similarly situated policyholders.289
A. CASES FINDING THE DOCTRINE NOT BARRED BY ALLEGATIONS OF
FRAUD OR INEQUITY
The federal district court for the District of Delaware in McCray v.
Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. relied on Third Circuit precedent in
the telecommunications industry in stating “that there is no fraud-in-the286

Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955, 962 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2004) (citing Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 801 A.2d 281, 286 (N.J. 2002)).
287
Rios, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (quoting AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc.,
524 U.S. 214, 223 (1998)).
288
Id. at 739-40 (citing H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 492 (8th
Cir. 1992)).
289
See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 491 (8th Cir. 1992).
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rate-setting exception to the filed rate doctrine.”290 Similarly, the federal
district court in In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases broadly stated that
“[e]ven assuming as true that the rates submitted by the Defendant were
fraudulent or the product of unlawful conduct, the filed rate doctrine still
applies to bar Plaintiffs' claim for damages.”291
In refusing to find an exception to the doctrine based upon alleged
commission of fraud upon the regulating authority, the court in Gipson v.
Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. stated that “by far” the majority of courts
considering the issue have refused to find a fraud exception.292 The court in
Korte v. Allstate Ins. Co. also recognized that the doctrine applies to claims
of fraud “with courts rejecting the idea that there is a fraud exception to its
application.”293 Pointing out that equity does not rule the day when the filed
rate doctrine is at issue, the court in Dolan v. Fidelity National Title Ins.
Co. stated that a court should not consider “‘the culpability of the
defendant’s conduct or the possibility of inequitable results’ when applying
the doctrine.”294 Several other insurance cases also apply the filed rate
doctrine to claims involving either allegations of fraud or inequitable
conduct.295
290

McCray v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322, 332 (D. Del.
2009) (citing AT&T Corp. v. JMC Telecom, L.L.C., 470 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir.
2006)).
291
In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 857 (N.D. Ohio
2010).
292
Gipson v. Fleet Mortg. Grp., Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 691, 705 (S.D. Miss.
2002) (citing Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir.1994);
Taffet v. S. Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1488-90 (11th Cir. 1992); H.J. Inc., 954 F.2d at
494; Marco Supply Co. v. AT&T Commc’ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 434, 436 (4th Cir.
1989)).
293
Korte v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 647, 650 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (citing
Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Transp.
Data Interchange, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 920 F. Supp. 86, 89-90 (D. Md. 1996).
294
Dolan v. Fid. Nat’l. Title Ins. Co., No. 08-CV-00466 (TCP)(WDW), 2009
WL 3934153, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d
46, 58 (2d Cir. 1998)) aff’d, 365 Fed. App’x 271 (2d Cir. 2010).
295
E.g., Roussin v. AARP, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 412, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009),
aff’d, No. 09-4932-CV, 2010 WL 2101912 (2d Cir. May 26, 2010); In re N.J. Title
Ins. Litig., No. 08-1425, 2009 WL 3233529, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2009); Hooks v.
Am. Med. Sec. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:06CV71, 2008 WL 3911130, at *5-6
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2008); Alexander v. Washington Mut., Inc., No. 07-4426,
2008 WL 2600323, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2008); Anderson v. City Fin. Co., No.
Civ.A. 3:02CV1074LN, 2003 WL 21788947, at *4 n.9 (S.D. Miss. July 14, 2003);
Bender v. Friedman's Inc., No. Civ.A. 4:02CV509LN, 2003 WL 21497487, at *2
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Additionally, although not an insurance case, H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., a RICO case from the
telecommunications industry, is significant in regard to the relation
between fraud and the filed rate doctrine.296 In response to allegations that
agency officials accepted bribes in regard to rate setting, the court in H.J.
Inc. ruled as follows that even improper activity on the part of agency
officials did not prevent application of the doctrine:
It is true that the Supreme Court has not considered the
question of whether the filed rate doctrine applies when
plaintiffs complain that the regulatory agency itself was
involved in the alleged fraudulent conduct. We are
convinced, however, that the underlying conduct does not
control whether the filed rate doctrine applies. Rather, the
focus for determining whether the filed rate doctrine
applies is the impact the court's decision will have on
agency procedures and rate determinations.297
In rejecting the position that the filed rate doctrine should be
disregarded because the court was not asked to engage in ratemaking, the
court in H.J. Inc. noted that damages could only be determined by
measuring the difference between approved rates and rates that should have
been approved absent the alleged wrongful conduct.298 Making such a
determination would, by definition, involve the court in ratemaking
procedures.

n.2 (S.D. Miss. May 30, 2003); Strong v. First Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 202 F.
Supp. 2d 536, 545 (S.D. Miss. 2002); Kirksey v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 114
F. Supp. 2d 526, 529 (S.D. Miss. 2000); Uniforce Temp. Pers., Inc. v. Nat’l
Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1503, 1511-12 (S.D. Fla. 1995), aff’d on
other grounds, 87 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1996); Horowitz ex rel. Gilbert v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 745 N.E.2d 591, 605 (Ill. App. 2001); Commonwealth ex rel.
Chandler III v. Anthem Ins. Co’s., Inc., 8 S.W.3d 48, 53 (Ky. App. 1999); Stepan
v. Edina Realty Title, Inc., No. A07-0578, 2008 WL 2020434, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2008); Byan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 662 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (App. Div.
1997); In re Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield Customer Litig., 622 N.Y.S.2d 843,
848 (Sup. Ct. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Minihane v. Weissman, 640 N.Y.S.2d 102
(App. Div. 1996).
296
H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1992).
297
Id. at 489.
298
Id. at 494.
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B. CASES CLARIFYING THAT THE DOCTRINE APPLIES TO RATERELATED FRAUD ONLY
The court in Rios v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. clarified that
the filed rate doctrine bars only rate-related allegations of fraud.299 The
court discussed the history of and the reasoning behind the doctrine as well
as its relationship in regard to challenges to services. The court recognized,
for example, that the doctrine is implicated when a claim for excessive
rates is couched as a claim for inadequate services.300 In regard to the
applicability of the filed rate doctrine, the court further stated that the label
placed on a claim, such as fraud, is not the appropriate issue and that
instead the “focus for determining whether the filed rate doctrine applies is
the impact the court’s decision will have on agency procedures and rate
determinations.”301
The dispute in Rios stemmed from State Farm’s policy regarding
the timing of payments for roof repair. In the states involved, State Farm’s
initial policy was that it would pay only for a roof overlay when damage
was initially incurred,302 withholding payment for full replacement cost
until an entirely new roof was actually in place. If a policyholder did not
fully replace a damaged roof within a specified time period, the
policyholder never got full replacement cost reimbursement.303 Later,
however, for marketing purposes, State Farm decided to pay the full
replacement cost “upfront” when the damage was incurred and issued
policies to that effect.304 After incurring significant unexpected losses, State
Farm attempted to remove the upfront payment provision from policies.305
Of course, outstanding policies retained the provision, and regulatory
approval was required before State Farm could legitimately revert to the
earlier policy provisions.306 The plaintiffs alleged that State Farm continued
to sell the upfront endorsement policies, although never intending to honor
them, and that State Farm fraudulently reverted to the two-part payment
system without obtaining regulatory approval.307
299

Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727 (S.D. Iowa 2007).
Id. at 735.
301
Id. at 737 (quoting H.J. Inc., 954 F.2d at 489).
302
A roof overlay involves laying new roof shingles on top of existing roof
shingles. Rios, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 731.
303
Id.
304
Id. at 731-32.
305
Id. at 732.
306
Id.
307
Id.
300
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Under the theory of fraudulent inducement, damages in the form of
rescission and disgorgement of premiums for the upfront endorsement were
sought by the class of plaintiffs who had not actually sustained roof
damage.308 The court in Rios recognized that the plaintiffs could sue for
“damages by having been deprived of benefits which were promised, and
were consistent with the filed rate, but were not delivered.”309 The court
found, however, that the damages sought, return of the premiums paid for
the upfront endorsement, would necessarily and plainly “challenge the rates
previously approved by the Commission[er].”310 In other words, the
plaintiffs’ problem was that their damages could only be measured by
comparing the difference between the rates the Commissioner approved
with the ones that allegedly should have been approved without the upfront
endorsement.311 The court in Rios further discussed the need for and
application of the filed rate doctrine in relation to the plaintiffs’ claims as
follows:
While Plaintiffs argue that the Court would not be involved
in any rate making or be required to second guess the rate
making agency because they merely seek the full return of
all premiums for the Upfront Endorsement, the Court
disagrees . . . . As stated above, to appropriately measure
Plaintiff’s and Class I members’ damages, the Court would
first have to determine the premiums paid for the Upfront
Endorsement provision (as opposed to the premiums paid
for the entire homeowner's policy), and then the Court
would have to “second guess” what rate the Commissioner
would have charged for each relevant Class Period for the
homeowners’ policies less the Upfront Endorsement
provision.312
According to the court, the relief sought by the plaintiffs “falls squarely

308

Rios, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 733.
Id. at 739 (quoting Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955,
967 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2004)).
310
Id. at 738 (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 493 (8th
Cir. 1992)).
311
Id. at 739 (citing Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981); H.J.
Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 494 (8th Cir. 1992)).
312
Rios, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 739 (citations omitted).
309
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within the filed rate doctrine.”313
Another case closely examining the filed rate doctrine in
connection with allegations of wrongdoing, including fraud, is American
Bankers’ Insurance Co. of Florida v. Wells, a case in which the Supreme
Court of Mississippi addressed claims that the defending lender and insurer
improperly profited from insurance the lender purportedly obtained to
protect its security interest in automobiles sold to the claimants.314 The
court in Wells distinguished between allegations of wrongdoing committed
in connection with performance of a contract as opposed to claims
challenging policy rates. In finding that the claimants sought some
premium-related damages barred by the doctrine, the court noted that one
of the central allegations of the case was that the lender obtained a credit
protection policy with excessive rates and provisions slanted in favor of the
lender.315 The court also recognized that the actual damages claimed by the
plaintiffs closely paralleled the premium charges imposed.316 In remanding
the case, the court provided the following instructions to the trial judge.
We remand this case to the trial court for a new trial with
directions that Wells and Oliver [claimants] be limited to
recovery for damages (if any) resulting from tortious
conduct in the performance, rather than the rates and terms,
of the contract in question. The trial judge should also be
careful, however, to prevent the jury from imposing
liability based upon the rates of the policies in question
which are subject to oversight by the Department of
Insurance in the exercise of its statutory mandate.317
Following are claims in Wells that the court found arguably fell
outside the ambit of the filed rate doctrine:
Backdating and charging for insurance coverage that
was worthless because no damage had occurred during
the period.
313

Id. (quoting H.J. Inc., 954 F.2d at 492). The court noted an unresolved
issue, however, involving the state law to be applied to the proposed nationwide
class and its effect on the application of the filed rate doctrine. Id. at 740.
314
Am. Banker’s Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Wells, 819 So. 2d 1196 (Miss. 2001).
315
Id. at 1204.
316
Id.
317
Id. at 1205 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
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Requiring and charging for automobile insurance
based upon an incorrect amount owed.
Improperly requiring repossession of damaged
vehicles.
Committing fraud by basing premiums on an
inaccurate time period and improperly adding
surcharges to premiums.318
C. THE EFFECT OF A FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
After addressing both the nondiscrimination and the
nonjusticiability strands of the doctrine, the court in Lentini v. Fidelity
National Title Insurance Co. of New York found the filed rate doctrine
inapplicable to claims that the defendant, through its agent, wrongfully
failed to disclose the availability of discounted rates for insurance to which
plaintiffs were allegedly entitled.319 Regarding the nonjusticiability strand
of the doctrine involving the conclusiveness of agency decision making, the
court recognized that the plaintiff was simply attempting to require that the
defendant adhere to the approved rates.320 In regard to the
nondiscrimination strand of the doctrine, the court stated that the plaintiff
318

Id. at 1204-05. Interestingly, the court in Wells referenced another
Mississippi Supreme Court decision decided the same year, Am. Bankers Ins. Co.
of Fla. v. Alexander, 818 So. 2d 1073 (Miss. 2001), overruled on other grounds by
Capital City Ins. Co. v. G.B. "Boots" Smith Corp., 889 So. 2d 505 (Miss. 2004),
which seemed to take a stronger position regarding justification for disregard of the
filed rate doctrine in the face of allegations of fraud. See Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of
Fla., 818 So.2d at 1083-85. The Wells court distinguished Alexander on the basis
that Alexander was reviewed on an interlocutory appeal rather than after a trial on
the merits. The court in Wells believed the evidence presented at trial established
that certain claims were based on excessive premiums in violation of the filed rate
doctrine. Wells, 308 So.2d at 1205 n.2. The dissent in Wells, however, was of the
opinion that Alexander established that the filed rate doctrine failed to bar the
claims at issue in the case involving breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, and fraud. Id. at 1211 (McRae, J., dissenting).
319
Lentini v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y., 479 F. Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn.
2007).
320
Id. at 301 (citing Randleman v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 2d
812 (N.D. Ohio 2006)); Zanagara v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 423 F. Supp. 2d
762, 776 (N.D. Ohio 2006), vacated on other grounds, No. 1:05CV731, 2006 WL
825231 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2006) (previous order vacated based on an issue
involving subject matter jurisdiction)).
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was seeking to enforce the filed rate, not obtain a lower rate than that
charged to other consumers.321 Of course, whether the defendant had a duty
to disclose the information at issue was a question of fact for the jury.322
The point of the court’s ruling was that the filed rate doctrine did not bar
the plaintiff from proceeding with proof.
Another case finding that allegations of nondisclosure fell outside
the ambit of the filed rate doctrine is Chambers v. Union National Life
Insurance Co., an unreported federal district court decision.323 In that case
the court refused to apply the doctrine to bar claims that the defendants
wrongfully failed to tell the plaintiff insureds that their policies contained
waiver of premium provisions for the disabled.324 The result of these cases
seems correct because the rate enforcement aspect of the doctrine is not
served by allowing circumvention of rates by defendants.
XVI.

CHARGES OUTSIDE THE BASIC RATE – INSTALLMENT
PAYMENTS,
RENEWALS, AND OTHER FEES AND
CHARGES

A. INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS
There is authority to the effect that disputes involving contractual
provisions by which insureds, for a fee, may pay insurance premiums by
installment are not affected by the filed rate doctrine. For example, in
Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Romo, the plaintiffs
claimed that by virtue of the filed rate doctrine, the only lawfully
prescribed charges were those filed with the state’s department of insurance
and that because the defending insurers did not file installment payment
plan fees, the fees were illegal.325 The court, however, found in favor of the
defendants ruling that the statutes at issue did not require the filing of
installment plan charges rendering moot the argument regarding the filed
rate doctrine.326 The case raises the issue, however, of whether the filed rate
doctrine would bar judicial relief in regard to installment fees in a state
requiring the filing of such fees.
321

Lentini, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
Id. at 301.
323
Chambers v. Union Nat’l Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 301CV452WS, 2002
WL 32397267 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 29, 2002).
324
Id. at *4.
325
Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Romo, 250 S.W.3d 527, 533 (Tex.
App. 2008).
326
Id. at 538.
322
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The court in Lapenna v. Government Employees Insurance Co. an
unreported federal district court decision, also found that the filed rate
doctrine failed to bar claims regarding the improper assessment of
installment payments.327 According to the court, “the filed rate doctrine is
inapplicable here because this dispute centers on installment fees, which
are distinct from premium rates.”328 The installment payment charges at
issue in Lapenna were governed by statute,329 and there was no indication
that the state required the filing of fees for installment payments with the
state department of insurance.
B. RENEWALS
In Hooks v. American Medical Security Life Insurance Co., the
court refused to accept the plaintiffs’ position that the filed rate doctrine
was inapplicable to claims of excessive premium charges for policy
renewals.330 The court recognized that, by statute, readjustment of the
premium rate was allowed based on an insurer’s “experience thereunder,”
and that the phrase “experience thereunder” referred back to initial rate
filings.331 The court, therefore, reasoned that any decision regarding
renewal rates would have to refer back to the initial rates; and that the filed
rate doctrine applied as a bar because “[t]he plaintiffs cannot prove their
claim without the rates set by the Commissioner being questioned.”332
The plaintiffs in Hooks also claimed that the defendants wrongfully
increased premiums by retaining portions of membership fees.333 The
plaintiffs thought the membership fees at issue were to be paid to another
organization they believed they had joined in order to obtain group rates.334
The court, however, determined that the claim was barred by the filed rate
doctrine because the doctrine prohibits the recovery of damages measured
by comparing the approved rate and the rate that would have been charged

327

Lapenna v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., No. 8:05-cv-904-T-24MSS, 2007 WL
4199580 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2007), aff’d, 316 F. App’x 894 (11th Cir. 2009).
328
Id. at *2 n.3.
329
Id. at *3-4.
330
Hooks v. Am. Med. Sec. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:06cv71, 2008 WL 3911130
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2008).
331
Id. (construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-51-80(g) (2009)).
332
Id. at *5 (citing Lupton v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.C., 533 S.E.2d
270, 273 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)).
333
Id.
334
Id. at *6.
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absent the alleged improper conduct.335
The Hooks court referenced Euclid Insurance Agencies, Inc. v.
American Association of Orthodontists,336 cited by the plaintiffs,
recognizing that the court in that case “found that a claim for breach of
contract for failing to adjust rates pursuant to the contract was not
precluded by the filed rate doctrine.”337 The court, however, did not discuss
that theory further on the basis that the plaintiffs in Hooks had not raised a
breach of contract claim.338 Hooks raises the issue of whether in some cases
by artful pleading, a litigant may be able to avoid the effects of the filed
rate doctrine.
C. OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE FEES
The Supreme Court of Texas in Mid-Century Insurance Co. of
Texas v. Ademaj approved the assessment of a fee outside the insurer’s
filed rates imposed to cover the costs of a state anti-theft program.339 The
state’s insurance commissioner had specifically authorized the imposition
of the charge340 and had promulgated a rule under which insurers were not
required to include the fee in rate filings.341 The plaintiffs claimed that the
fee was wrongfully imposed because it was not included in premium rates
filed with the state.342 Although acknowledging that the filed rate doctrine
was applied in the state,343 the court recognized the absence of authority
that charges validly approved by the commissioner would be barred by the
doctrine and upheld the imposition of the fee.344 The plaintiffs in Ademaj
did not assert the filed rate doctrine as it is generally understood—as a bar
to challenges of approved rates. The case illustrates, however, the various
ways in which the doctrine may be asserted.

335

Id.
Euclid Ins. Agencies, Inc. v. Am. Assoc. of Orthodontists, No. 95 C 3308,
1997 WL 548069 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1997).
337
Hooks, 2008 WL 3911130, at *5 n.6.
338
Id.
339
Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2007).
340
Id. at 620.
341
Id. at 624 (citing 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 5.205(b) (1992)).
342
Id. at 625.
343
Id. (citing Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 216-17 (Tex.
2002)).
344
Id.
336
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XVII. APPLICATION OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE IN
SPECIFIC AREAS
While the filed rate doctrine is not limited to specific realms, it
does seem to appear more frequently in relation to certain types of claims.
Following is a discussion of the doctrine as applied to antitrust claims,
discrimination claims, alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act,345 breach of contract claims, and to allegations
regarding the wrongful receipt of kickbacks or unearned premiums—all
areas in which the doctrine is commonly raised.
A. RESTRAINT OF TRADE AND ANTITRUST CLAIMS
The filed rate doctrine arises frequently in conjunction with claims
of antitrust and restraint of trade violations in the insurance industry. For
example, in Allen v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. the court recognized
that the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ claims was that the defending insurers
concertedly and in restraint of trade agreed not to offer homeowners’
insurance coverage in coastal areas unless a percentage-based hurricane
deductible was allowed.346 In ruling that the claims were barred for reasons
including the filed rate doctrine, the court recognized that the doctrine
“prohibits a party from recovering damages measured by comparing the
filed rate and the rate that might have been approved absent the conduct in
issue.”347 The court further set forth its reasoning as follows:
Allowing the plaintiffs to circumvent the established
statutory process for approval of insurance rates by
allowing the Court to become enmeshed in the rate-making
process would undermine Alabama's current regulatory
regime, which, through its statutory administrative
remedies, is designed to be self-policing. If this Court
strikes the hurricane deductible, thereby increasing
coverage under the policies, that necessarily affects a
decrease in the defendants' effective rates and disturbs the
commissioner's rate-making authority. Therefore, pursuant
345
346

18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1230 (S.D. Ala.

1999).

347

Id. at 1227 (quoting Calico Trailer Mfg. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 155
F.3d 976, 977 (8th Cir. 1998)).
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to the filed-rate doctrine, this Court concludes that
plaintiffs' claims challenging the unlawfulness of the
defendants' rate filing, which include the hurricane
deductible, are due to be dismissed.348
Many other cases have also relied on the filed rate doctrine in dismissing
claims of antitrust violations arising under federal and state law,349 although
there is contrary authority.350
The following sections address exceptions in the insurance field
that have been claimed in relation to application of the doctrine in antitrust
cases. Of course, as discussed in Section V of this article, litigants in
insurance cases involving interplay between state and federal law should
consider the impact of the McCarran-Ferguson Act351 as well as the filed
rate doctrine.
1. Issues Involving Alleged Non-Rate Anticompetitive Activity
Citing In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litigation,352 the
court in the insurance case of In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance Antitrust
348

Id. at 1229.
E.g., Winn v. Alamo Title Ins. Co., 372 F. App’x 461, 462-63 (5th Cir.
2010); Dolan v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 365 F. App’x 271, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2010);
In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 890 (N.D. Ohio 2010); In re
N.J. Title Ins. Litig., No. 08-1425, 2009 WL 3233529, at *2-4 (D.N.J. Oct. 5,
2009); Uniforce Temp. Pers., Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 892 F.
Supp. 1503, 1511-12 (S.D. Fla. 1995), aff’d on other grounds, 87 F.3d 1296, 1301
(11th Cir. 1996); Calico Trailer Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., LR-C-93-717,
1994 WL 823554, at *1-2, *8 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 12, 1994); Amundson & Assocs. Art
Studio, Ltd. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 988 P.2d 1208, 1213, 1216-17
(Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (applying the doctrine to claims arising under state antitrust
claims); N.C. Steel, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., 496 S.E.2d 369, 372
(N.C. 1998) (applying the doctrine to state antitrust claims); Prentice v. Title Ins.
Co. of Minn., 500 N.W.2d 658, 659, 663-64 (Wis. 1993) (applying the filed rate
doctrine to antitrust action arising under state law).
350
See Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1992).
Brown is discussed in detail in Section XIV C. of this article, addressing the type
of administrative review required for imposition of the doctrine. See supra pp. 4248.
351
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2006).
352
In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 680 (E.D. Pa.
2009) (citing In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144,
1159-61 (3d Cir. 1993)).
349
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Litigation recognized that the Third Circuit has “carved out a non-rate
anticompetitive activity exception” to the filed rate doctrine's preclusive
effect in antitrust actions. Under that exception, the filed rate doctrine does
not apply to situations, such as that occurring in Lower Lake Erie, in which
it was found that the defendants acted to inhibit lower cost competitors
from entering the shipping market following technological advances
enabling shipment of iron ore by means other than rail.353 Specifically, the
railroads illegally conspired and acted to prevent the movement of iron ore
by trucking through, for example, restricting the lease and sale of railroadowned dock property.354 The plaintiffs contended that absent the
conspiracy, they would have paid lower costs for the transportation of iron
ore.355 Addressing the fact that rates were filed with the ICC, the court in
Lower Lake Erie explained the non-rate activity exception to the filed rate
doctrine as follows:
We recognize that the success of anticompetitive non-rate
activity would coincidentally implicate rates promulgated
under the jurisdiction of the ICC. It is fully consistent with
Keogh [v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co], however,
to accept these rates as lawful and nonetheless to conclude
that through non-rate activities, particularly the restriction
on the sale or lease of dock space and the refusal to deal
with potential competitors, the railroads effectively
retarded entry of lower cost competitors to the market. The
instrument of damage to the steel companies was the
absence of the lower-cost combination. In contrast, the
Supreme Court in Keogh made it clear that “the instrument
by which Keogh is alleged to have been damaged is rates
approved by the Commission.”356
The court in Lower Lake Erie recognized that “[i]t was the railroads’
hindering the development of the market which defines this antitrust
litigation.”357
353

See Lower Lake Erie, 998 F.2d at 1159-61; In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust
Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d at 680 (citing Bar Techs., Inc. v. Conemaugh & Black Lick
R.R. Co., 73 F. Supp. 2d 512, 518 (W.D. Pa. 1999)).
354
Lower Lake Erie, 998 F.2d at 1152-53.
355
Id. at 1154.
356
Id. at 1159 (quoting Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 161
(1922)).
357
Id. at 1160.
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On the other hand, the court in In re Pennsylvania Title Insurance
Antitrust Litigation cited Utilimax.com, Inc. v. PPL Energy Plus, LLC358 as
an example of the type of situation to which the non-rate anticompetitive
activity exception is inapplicable.359 In Utilimax the plaintiff, a retail
supplier of electricity, claimed that the defendant, through its monopolistic
position, exerted undue market influence over the wholesale electricity
market enabling it to charge excessive rates.360 The court in Utilimax
distinguished Lower Lake Erie on the basis that the dispute in Lower Lake
Erie dealt with activities wholly separate from rates.361 The Ultimax court
was of the opinion that the plaintiff, in simply claiming that the defendant
“exploited its market position by raising its rates,” failed to allege non-rate
anticompetitive activity and, therefore, the filed rate doctrine barred the
claims.362
The court in In re Pennsylvania Title found that the alleged
wrongdoing in that case fell closer to market exploitation, which the
Ultimax court considered rate-related, than market exclusion, which the
Lake Erie court considered non-rate related. The determining factor in the
court’s opinion was that the plaintiffs challenged the rates themselves, not
activity separate from the rates.363 This exception to the filed rate doctrine
is not frequently referenced in insurance cases. As the doctrine continues to
develop, it would not be unexpected for plaintiffs to focus on non-rate
activities in an effort to avoid the effects of the doctrine.
2. The Impact of “Price Squeeze” Cases
The plaintiffs in McCray v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co.
claimed that the filed rate doctrine was inapplicable to claims of price
fixing in relation to insurance rates because the insurance regulatory regime
involved was insufficiently comprehensive.364 Specifically, the plaintiffs
358

378 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2004).
In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 680 (E.D. Pa.
2009) (citing Utilimax, 378 F.3d at 308).
360
Utilimax, 378 F.3d at 306.
361
Id. at 308.
362
Id. Although finding it inapplicable, the court in Ultimax also referenced a
competitor exception to the filed rate doctrine. The reasoning for such a rule is that
competitors are not the intended beneficiaries of rate regulation. Id. at 307. That
exception has not been analyzed in insurance cases.
363
In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig., 648 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
364
McCray v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 322, 330 (D. Del.
2009).
359
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complained that the regulations failed to provide claimants with monetary
relief for rates initially accepted by the state’s department of insurance but
later found to be unreasonable or fraudulent.365 According to the plaintiffs,
their claims fell into a type of “regulatory lacuna” counseling against the
application of the filed rate doctrine.366 The court noted that the plaintiffs
primarily relied on “price squeeze” cases in support of their argument.367
The court in Borough of Lansdale v. PP & L, Inc., a case arising in
the electric industry cited by the McCray court,368 explained that a price
squeeze case generally involves a defending monopolist who supplies the
plaintiff at one level, such as at the wholesale level; competes with the
plaintiff on another level, such as at retail; and then seeks to destroy the
plaintiff by charging the plaintiff a higher wholesale price than other retail
customers.369 The court in Borough of Lansdale recognized that when no
one regulatory agency has complete jurisdiction over the rating system at
issue in a price squeeze claim, the filed rate doctrine is inapplicable.370 On
the basis that two agencies were involved in the rating system at issue, the
court refused to apply the filed rate doctrine to bar the plaintiff’s price
squeeze claims stating that application of the doctrine would result in “no
mechanism to reiew overall ratemaking and its potential anticompetitive
effects.”371
The court in McCray correctly reasoned that the situation presented
in that case did not qualify for any such exception stating: “The plaintiffs’
claim falls into no regulatory lacuna. There is but one regulatory authority
here . . . and it is fully empowered to regulate the one rate at issue here that
involves title insurance premiums.”372 The court, however, stopped short of
ruling that a price squeeze situation involving, for example, competing
regulatory authority would fail to qualify as an exception to the filed rate
365

Id.
Id.
367
Id. (citing Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1176 (8th Cir.
1982); City of Mishawaka v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314, 1321 (7th Cir.
1977)).
368
McCray, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 330-31 (citing Borough of Lansdale v. PP & L,
Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 730, 736 (E.D. Pa. 2007)).
369
Borough of Lansdale v. PP & L, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 730, 735 (E.D. Pa.
2007).
370
Id. at 742. The court, however, recognized the existence of contrary
authority on the issue of whether the filed rate doctrine bars price squeeze claims
implicating the jurisdiction of more than one set of rate regulations. Id. at 736.
371
Id. at 742.
372
McCray, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
366
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doctrine.
3. Allegations of Illegal Boycotts
Claims of boycott are typical in the antitrust arena although there is
little case law addressing the relationship between boycotts and the filed
rate doctrine. The court in Arroyo-Melecio v. Puerto Rican American
Insurance Co. refused to apply the filed rate doctrine to bar allegations that
private insurers, who allegedly benefited from the placement of
compulsory insurance with a state-created agency, engaged in a boycott to
punish an insurance broker for aiding in the private placement of
compulsory insurance.373 Quoting the First Circuit decision of Town of
Norwood v. New England Power Co. for the proposition that “[t]he law on
the filed rate doctrine is extremely creaky,”374 the court stated that “[w]e
think that boycott has little to do with the filed rate doctrine, a famously
complex and sometimes criticized set of rules.”375 In reaching its
conclusion, the court focused on aspects of the filed rate doctrine
prohibiting contractual agreements or other claims seeking rates different
from those reflected in agency filings, not activity associated with
boycotts.376 Arguably, however, because agency procedures and rate
determinations would be affected, if the gravamen of a claim is that
excessive rates were charged due to a boycott, the filed rate should be
applicable in jurisdictions recognizing its application in the insurance
arena.377

373

Arroyo-Melecio v. P.R. Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 56, 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2005).
Id. at 73 (quoting Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co., 202 F.3d
408, 420 (1st Cir. 2000)).
375
Arroyo-Melecio, 398 F.3d at 73. See also In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore
Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1159 (3d Cir. 1993).
376
Arroyo-Melecio, 398 F.3d at 73 (citing Town of Norwood v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 217 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2000)).
377
See, e.g., Roussin v. AARP, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 412, 416-17 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (recognizing that because the plaintiff was actually complaining of rates, the
filed rate doctrine applied to claims styled as breach of fiduciary duties and gross
negligence), aff’d, 379 F.App’x 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2010); Rios v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 735 (S.D. Iowa 2007) (refusing to countenance
avoidance of the doctrine through styling a claim for excessive rates as a claim for
inadequate service).
374
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B. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PROTECTED CATEGORIES
Cases of unlawful discrimination in the area of insurance may
involve claims of “redlining” involving allegations that a defendant refused
to insure properties located in districts with a high population of
minorities.378 Plaintiffs have also alleged the subjection of minorities to
illegal discrimination through the use of credit scores to set insurance
rates.379 Plaintiffs in cases alleging discrimination have had varying degrees
of success when confronted with the filed rate doctrine defense. Based on
the following case law, depending on the jurisdiction involved, it seems
that plaintiffs may fare better in regard to avoiding the effects of the filed
rate doctrine when proceeding under federal law and also when proceeding
under broad based anti-discrimination laws as compared to antidiscrimination regulations specifically impacting insurance.380
1. Authority that the Filed Rate Doctrine Bars Discrimination
Claims
Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., decided by the
Minnesota Supreme Court, involved a class action alleging that a surcharge
imposed on older homes was racially discriminatory and a form of
redlining.381 The plaintiffs sued on the basis of a Minnesota statute
prohibiting the charge of differential rates for homeowner’s insurance
solely because of the age of the structure but allowing rating standards
based on the age of components of the residence, such as the electrical
system, affecting the risk of loss.382 The plaintiffs alleged that the rate
differential was illegally based on home age rather than electrical system
age, as claimed by the defending insurer.383 Upholding the filed rate
378

See, e.g., Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 721 N.W.2d 307 (Minn.

2006).

379

See, e.g., Lumpkin v. Farmers Grp., Inc., No. 05-2868 Ma/V, 2007 WL
6996584 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 26, 2007).
380
Compare Schermer, 721 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 2006) (applying the doctrine
to bar claims under state laws specifically prohibiting discrimination in the
provision of home owner’s insurance), with Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440
F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2006) (refusing to apply the doctrine to bar claims under federal
anti-discrimination laws).
381
Schermer, 721 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 2006).
382
The court referred to the statute involved, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.20
(West 2011), as the “anti-redlining” statute. Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 309.
383
Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 309.
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doctrine, the court ruled that the claims were barred even assuming the
truth of the plaintiffs’ allegations.384
In discussing exceptions to the filed rate doctrine, the court in
Schermer referenced Saunders v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,385 an
Eighth Circuit decision discussed further below, for the proposition that
“where a rate filed with a state regulatory agency violates a federal
antidiscrimination statute, the federal statute predominates under the
Supremacy Clause and the filed rate doctrine is inapplicable.”386 The
Schermer court did not specifically express agreement or disagreement
with the holding in Saunders. An issue exists, however, as to whether the
court in Shermer would have ruled differently had a claim under federal
anti-discrimination law been raised as opposed to a claim under state law
specifically addressing insurance rates. Additionally, the court in Schermer
recognized that the plaintiffs in that case had not filed a claim under the
Minnesota Human Rights Act387 thereby leaving open the issue of whether
the filed rate doctrine would have applied in that instance.388
2. Authority that the Filed Rate Doctrine is Inapplicable to
Discrimination Claims
In Saunders v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, plaintiffs sued
numerous insurers under the federal Fair Housing Act389 and under
Sections 1981390 and 1982391 of the Civil Rights Acts, alleging race
discrimination in connection with the provision of homeowners’ insurance
coverage.392 The court stated that on the record involved, state regulation of
insurance rates did not support applying the filed rate doctrine to bar
damage claims arising under federal civil rights statutes.393 In reliance on
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,394 the court

384

Id. at 319.
Saunders v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 440 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2006).
386
Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 317 (citing Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440
F.3d at 944-45).
387
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363A.01-41 (2011).
388
Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 317 n.6.
389
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2000).
390
Id. § 1981 (2012).
391
Id. § 1982.
392
Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2006).
393
Saunders, 440 F.3d at 943.
394
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
385
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distinguished Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.395 and
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc.,396 stating that in
those cases the Supreme Court “harmonized two federal statutes with
competing purposes, the Sherman Act and the Interstate Commerce Act,
whereas here the Supremacy Clause tips any legislative competition in
favor of the federal anti-discrimination statutes.”397
A perplexing issue acknowledged by the court in Saunders
involves the effect of the number of decisions applying the filed rate
doctrine based on rates filed with state regulatory agencies to bar, for
example, federal RICO and antitrust claims.398 The court distinguished
those cases as follows based on an issue of standing:
But RICO and the Sherman Act require a plaintiff to prove
injury to “his business or property.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
Thus, the no-injury principle of Keogh applies to deprive a
RICO or antitrust plaintiff of standing under federal law to
challenge a filed rate that must be charged under state law.
But standing to sue under federal anti-discrimination
statutes such as the Fair Housing Act is far broader. See
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 93
S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972).399
No other cases have been located adopting the court’s reasoning
regarding standing.400
A case in which the filed rate doctrine was raised in an unusual
context in regard to a discrimination claim is Lyons v. First American Title
Insurance Co.401 The plaintiffs in Lyons claimed that the defendant
395

Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986).
397
Saunders, 440 F.3d at 944.
398
See id. at 944 (citing Texas Commercial Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., 413
F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2005); Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.
1994); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1992); Taffet v. S.
Co., 967 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1992)).
399
Saunders, 440 F.3d at 944.
400
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), quoted by
Saunders, involved the standing of tenants who were not themselves denied
housing to enforce rights under federal law prohibiting housing discrimination. Id.
at 211. The filed rate doctrine was not at issue.
401
Lyons v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. C09-4156(PJH), 2009 WL 5195866
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2009).
396
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discriminated against minority homeowners in the provision of
insurance.402 The defendant relied on a section of the state’s code providing
that acts taken pursuant to authority conferred by the rate regulation section
of the state’s code failed to provide grounds for civil proceedings.403 The
plaintiffs countered with the claim that the defendants actually relied on the
filed rate doctrine, a theory that had been discredited.404 The court found
the plaintiffs’ argument unpersuasive, stating that the filed rate doctrine is
“traditionally employed as a bar to actions in the antitrust context, not the
discrimination context.”405
In a case involving allegations of race discrimination in connection
with the use of credit scoring information to set rates, the Fifth Circuit in
Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp. addressed the effect of the filed rate doctrine in
dicta in an interlocutory appeal primarily involving the application of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act406 to federal anti-discrimination statutes.407
Although noting that it was not required to address the issue because it was
initially raised during the appeal, the court found the defendant’s filed rate
argument unpersuasive, expressing the opinion that application of antidiscrimination laws would not supplant the state rate controls at issue.408
Likewise, in Lumpkin v. Farmers Group, Inc.,409 the court refused to find
the plaintiff’s claims of racial discrimination based on the use of credit
scores in pricing homeowners’ insurance barred by the doctrine, stating that
“[w]here consumers do not challenge the reasonableness of the insurance
rates…the filed rate doctrine does not apply.”410

C. CLAIMS UNDER THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS ACT
The filed rate doctrine may provide a basis upon which to oppose
claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
402

Id. at *2.
Id. at *5 (citing Cal. Ins. Code 12414.26 (West 2005)).
404
Id. at *5.
405
Id. at *7.
406
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1994).
407
Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2003).
408
Id.
409
No. 05-2868(Ma/V), 2007 WL 6996584 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 26, 2007).
410
Lumpkin, 2007 WL 6996584 at *8 (citing Zangara v. Travelers Indem. Co.
of Am., 423 F. Supp. 2d 762, 775 (N.D. Ohio 2006)).
403
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(“RICO”)411 allegedly impacting a state’s insurance rating system.
Prevailing on the doctrine as a defense to a RICO claim, however, is not a
certainty. For example, in addressing defenses under the McCarranFerguson Act and the filed rate doctrine to RICO claims, the federal district
court in the recent case of In re American Investors Life Insurance Co.
Annuity Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, stated that “[t]hese
arguments raise difficult issues, the outcome of which is uncertain.”412 The
logical conclusion is that RICO claims in the insurance industry would be
analyzed in the same manner as other theories with the filed rate doctrine
applying in situations in which the insurance rating system is implicated.
1. Authority Applying the Doctrine to RICO Claims
Two unpublished federal court decisions from the Southern District
of New York applied the filed rate doctrine to bar RICO claims in the
insurance industry. In In re EVIC Class Action Litigation, the plaintiffs
sued on various theories complaining about insurance charges imposed by
United Parcel Service, Inc.413 Based on the filed rate doctrine, the court
dismissed a number of counts, including RICO claims, alleging damages
during the time period that the defendant was required to file tariffs with
the ICC.414 Similarly, the court in Fersco v. Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield
of New York found that the filed rate doctrine barred plaintiffs’ RICO
allegations that the defendant obtained approval of its rates through the use
of fraud.415 The court relied heavily upon Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX
Corp.,416 involving RICO claims in the telecommunications industry, for
the proposition that there is no fraud exception to the filed rate doctrine.417
In rejecting the argument that consideration of the rate-making process was
411

18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
In re Am. Inv. Life Ins. Co. Annuity Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 263
F.R.D. 226, 242 (E.D. Pa. 2009), enforced in part, 695 F. Supp. 2d 157 (E.D. Pa.
2010). The court made the quoted statement in connection with the approval of a
proposed class action settlement without further analysis of the filed rate doctrine.
Id.
413
In re Evic Class Action Litig. v. United Parcel Serv., Nos. 00-CIV3811(RMB), 02-CIV-2703(RMB), M-21-84(RMB), MDL-1339, 2002 WL
1766554, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2002).
414
In re EVIC Class Action Litig., 2002 WL 1766554 at *5-7.
415
Fersco v. Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield of N.Y., No. 93 Civ. 4226 (JFK),
1994 WL 445730, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1994).
416
Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1994).
417
Fersco, 1994 WL 445730, at *2 (citing Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 21).
412
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not needed in order to determine if fraud was the basis for the challenged
rate increase, the court stated that ascertaining damages and determining a
reasonable rate “are hopelessly intertwined.”418
A number of insurance cases indicate in dicta that the filed rate
doctrine applies to RICO claims.419 For example, although not a RICO
case, the court in Allen v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. cited with
approval Taffet v. Southern Co.,420 a RICO case arising in the electric
industry, for the proposition that the filed rate doctrine applies even if the
regulated entity defrauded the regulatory agency to obtain a filed rate.421
Additionally, although disapproving the application of the filed rate
doctrine to claims of discrimination, the Eighth Circuit in Saunders v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange referenced with approval cases from other
industries applying the doctrine to alleged RICO violations.422
2. Authority Refusing to Apply the Doctrine to RICO Claims
The federal district court for the Southern District of Florida in In
re Managed Care Litigation addressed claims asserted under RICO that
through misrepresentations and omissions contained in advertising,
marketing, and membership materials, managed care insurers manipulated
the meaning of the term “medical necessity” when encouraging plaintiffs to
enroll in managed care organizations (MCO’s).423 The defendants asserted
that the plaintiffs’ use of wire and mail fraud as a predicate act was
foreclosed by the filed rate doctrine. The court, however, refused to apply
418

Id. (quoting Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 21).
See, e.g., Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir.
2006); Jader v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 975 F.2d 525, 527 (8th Cir. 1992);
Gipson v. Fleet Mortg. Grp., Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 691, 705 (S.D. Miss. 2002);
Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1228 (S.D. Ala. 1999);
Morales v. Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1418 (S.D. Fla. 1997);
Amundson & Ass’n Art Studio, Ltd. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 988 P.2d
1208, 1213 (Kan. App. 1999); Kentucky ex rel. Chandler v. Anthem Ins. Cos., 8
S.W.3d 48, 53-54 (Ky. App. 1999).
420
Taffet v. Southern Co, 967 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1992).
421
Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (citing Taffet,
967 F.2d at 1494-95).
422
Saunders, 440 F.3d. at 944 (citing Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27
F.3d 17 (2d Cir.1994); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1992);
Taffet v. S. Co., 967 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1992)).
423
In re Managed Care Litigation, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1334-35. (S.D. Fla.
2001).
419
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the doctrine stating as follows:
The filed rate doctrine does not apply to the present case
because these states do not appear to conduct
administrative oversight in the extensive manner typical of
situations implicating the doctrine. For example, unlike
utility customers, MCO subscribers (or their employers)
presumably have some flexibility to search for varying
amounts of coverage at various rates other than a flat rate
set by a regulatory regime.424
The court also noted that even if the doctrine applied, the plaintiffs did not
challenge the rate structure itself.425 Notably, the court did not entirely
foreclose application of the filed rate doctrine in all RICO cases.
D. BREACH OF CONTRACT
Courts adopting the filed rate doctrine in the insurance area seem in
agreement that it is applicable to breach of contract actions implicating the
filed rate.426 For example, the plaintiff in Kirksey v. American Bankers
Insurance Co. of Florida, claimed that he was charged more than the
amount to which he contractually agreed to pay for personal property
insurance.427 The court, however, found the claim barred stating that
“[p]laintiff's argument that the contract . . . should control is of no
consequence since the filed rate controls.”428 The court recognized that
while it “might disagree with the amount that is allowed for this type of
insurance, it has no power or authority to set legislative policy of the State
of Mississippi, to usurp the duties and responsibilities of the Mississippi
Department of Insurance.”429 Similarly, the court in Rios v. State Farm Fire
424

Id. at 1344.
Id.
426
See, e.g., Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727 (S.D.
Iowa 2007); Allen v. State Farm Fire & Cas.Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (S.D. Ala.
1999); Korte v. Allstate Ins. Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 647, 652 (E.D. Tex. 1999); In re
Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield Customer Litig., 622 N.Y.S.2d 843 (App. Div.
1994), aff’d sub nom. Minihane v. Weissman, 640 N.Y.S.2d 102 (App. Div. 1996);
Stutts v. Travelers Indem. Co., 682 S.E.2d 769 (N.C. App. 2009).
427
Kirksey v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 114 F. Supp. 2d 526 (S.D. Miss.
2000).
428
Id. at 530.
429
Id.
425
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& Casualty Co. recognized that “[o]nce the rates are filed and approved,
the ‘rights as defined by the [rate] cannot be varied or enlarged either by
contract or tort of the [regulated entity]’.”430
There is case law to the effect, however, that the filed rate doctrine
does not bar claims regarding either interpretation of or enforcement of a
contract of insurance consistent with the filed rate. For example, although
finding some of the plaintiff’s claims barred by the filed rate doctrine, the
court in Horwitz ex rel. Gilbert v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.
disregarded the doctrine in relation to a breach of contract claim involving
the interpretation of ambiguous language.431 The language at issue involved
the number of times the plaintiff’s premium could be increased yearly.432
Similarly, although finding some of the plaintiff’s claims barred by
the filed rate doctrine, the court in Richardson v. Standard Guaranty
Insurance Co. allowed others to proceed.433 The court found that the
doctrine barred claims that the defendants misrepresented the costs and
benefits to be received from the purchase of the policies at issue. The
court’s reasoning was that under the filed rate doctrine, the plaintiff was
presumed to have knowledge of the filed rates and also that the doctrine
required the conclusion that the plaintiff had suffered no ascertainable
loss.434 The court recognized, however, that the plaintiff could proceed on
claims that the defending credit card issuers breached the terms of credit
insurance policies. Allowable claims included that the defendants
misconstrued contractual provisions in order to minimize benefits, failed to
make timely payments, miscalculated premiums, and ignored cancellation
notices.435 The court explained its ruling as follows:
There is nothing about the filed rate doctrine which would
preclude a consumer from suing for damages on a claim
that the insurer breached the policy as written. While the
doctrine precludes a claim for damages which would
indirectly cause the application of rates different from the
430

Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 735 (quoting
Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry, 260 U.S. 156, 160 (1922)).
431
Horwitz v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 745 N.E.2d 591, 606 (Ill. App. 2001)
(defendant conceded that the filed rate doctrine did not apply to the claim focusing
on ambiguities in the insurance contract itself).
432
Id.
433
Richardson v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 853 A.2d 955 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 2004).
434
Id. at 967.
435
Id.
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filed rates, and would also preclude plaintiff from seeking
relief, whether equitable or legal, for having been misled
by unconscionable sales practices which caused plaintiff to
enter into a contract consistent with the filed rate, the filed
rate doctrine does not preclude a consumer from suing for
damages by having been deprived of benefits which were
promised, and were consistent with the filed rate, but were
not delivered.436
Other insurance cases also express the opinion that the doctrine
allows actions to enforce contractual provisions not conflicting with filed
rates.437 A case reaching an interesting result on a motion for partial
summary judgment involving a contractual dispute is Euclid Insurance
Agencies, Inc. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists.438 The insurer in that
case raised the filed rate doctrine as a defense to the claim that it had failed
to honor a contractual agreement to make “adjustments…over time based
on experience and actuarial calculations.”439 The court, however, stated that
although the reasonableness of the rates and the fact that they were
governed by regulatory agencies “may be factors in deciding this issue,
they are not dispositive.”440 Noting that no statute or case had been cited
prohibiting the insurer’s ability to fulfill its commitment, the court ruled
that the issue of whether the insurer complied with the agreement by
appropriately adjusting rates was one for the jury.441 The court did not
expand upon how it believed rates should be used as factors in deciding
such a dispute.
E. Claims Involving Kickbacks or Unearned Premiums
Plaintiffs complaining of kickbacks paid by insurers to lenders for
the placement of insurance on mortgaged properties have sued under
436

Id.
See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., No. CIV.A. 022108, 2005 WL 2106580, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2005); Randleman v. Fid. Nat’l
Title Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 2d 812, 823 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Beller v. William Penn
Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 778 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84-85 (App. Div. 2004).
438
Euclid Insurance Agencies, Inc. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, No. 95
C 3308, 1998 WL 60775, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 1998).
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Id.
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various legal theories. As set forth below, cases conflict on whether the
filed rate doctrine bars such claims. Perhaps the better view is that while
the filed rate doctrine bars claims for damages based on filed rates that are
purportedly excessive, it would not prevent injunctive relief prohibiting the
payment of future kickbacks not affecting current rates. Such action would
not unreasonably interfere with the nonjusticiabilitystrand of the doctrine or
result in discrimination among policyholders. It should also be noted that,
depending on the jurisdiction involved, plaintiffs may fare better if relief is
sought under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (hereinafter
“RESPA”).442
1. The Filed Rate Doctrine Applied to Bar Claims
In Schilke v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, the plaintiff filed various
state law claims, including fraud, against the defending insurer.443 The
plaintiff complained of undisclosed fees in the form of kickbacks paid by
the insurer to plaintiff’s bank in connection with the forced placement by
the bank of hazard insurance on mortgaged property.444 Referencing its
concern with preserving agency authority, the court found plaintiff’s claims
for money damages barred by the filed rate doctrine.445 The court noted that
plaintiff’s allegations of illegality in relation to the kickbacks did not
interfere with application of the doctrine.446
Similarly, the court applied the filed rate doctrine in Roussin v.
AARP, Inc., to bar claims that AARP improperly received an allowance for
its sponsorship of insurance plans.447 The plaintiffs claimed that the filed
rate doctrine was inapplicable because the complaint involved gross
negligence and a breach of fiduciary duties, not the filed rate.448 The court
disagreed, however, stating that “[i]t has repeatedly been held that a
consumer's claim, however disguised, seeking relief for an injury allegedly
caused by the payment of a rate on file with a regulatory commission, is
viewed as an attack upon the rate approved by the regulatory
442

12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2006).
Schilke v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 758 F. Supp. 2d 549 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
444
Id. at 561. The bank was contractually entitled to purchase insurance at the
plaintiff’s expense because the plaintiff failed to maintain insurance on the
property. Id.
445
Id.
446
Id. at 561-62.
447
Roussin v. AARP, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 412 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2009),
aff’d, 379 Fed. App’x 30 (2d Cir. 2010).
448
Id. at 414.
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commission.”449 The court was persuaded that the plaintiff was seeking
recovery based on the difference between what she paid in premiums and
what she contended she should have paid – the type of accounting barred
by the filed rate doctrine.450
In Morales v. Attorneys’ Title Insurance Fund, Inc., the federal
district court applied the filed rate doctrine to bar class action claims that
the defending insurers violated RESPA451 through the use of kickbacks and
fee splitting with mortgage brokers, lenders, and other agents. The court
found the doctrine applicable even assuming the correctness of the
plaintiffs’ position that the proper measure of damages was the return of all
premiums paid, not damages measured by the difference between the actual
rate and the rate charged.452 Stating that “the class action nature of the
proceeding in no way affects the important concerns of agency authority,
justiciability, and institutional competence,” the court in Morales dispensed
with the plaintiffs’ position that class actions reduce concerns of
discrimination thereby negating the need for the filed rate doctrine.453
According to the court, the plaintiffs had no legal right to pay anything but
the promulgated rates; they had no injury; and, therefore, they lacked
standing to complain.454 As set forth below, not all courts agree with the
Morales decision.
2. The Filed Rate Doctrine Found Inapplicable
Noting disagreement with Morales v. Attorneys’ Title Insurance
Fund, Inc., discussed above, the Third Circuit in Alston v. Countrywide
Financial Corp.,455 declined to apply the doctrine to bar claims of illegal
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Id. at 416 (quoting Porr v. NYNEX Corp., 230 A.D.2d 564, 660 (App. Div.

1997)).
450

Id. at 416-17.
Morales v. Att’ys Title Ins. Fund, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1418 (S.D. Fla. 1997);
12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2006).
452
Morales, 983 F. Supp. at 1428.
453
Id. (quoting Wegoland, 27 F.3d at 22).
454
Id. at 1429. Although the plaintiff did not name lenders as defendants, the
court in Steven v. Union Planters Corp., No. 00-cv-1695, 2000 WL 33128256
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2000) likewise applied the filed rate doctrine to bar claims
under RESPA that the defending bank-related defendants improperly received
kickbacks from the plaintiff’s property insurer.
455
585 F.3d 753 (3d Cir. 2009).
451
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kickbacks under RESPA.456 The court in Alston was of the opinion that the
plaintiffs challenged illegal kickbacks or fee splitting, not the fairness of
rates.457 In support of its decision, the court quoted Kay v. Wells Fargo &
Co.458 as follows:
Statutes like RESPA are enacted to protect consumers from
unfair business practices by giving consumers a private
right of action against service providers. Plaintiffs may not
sue under the veil of RESPA if they simply think that the
price they paid for their settlement services was unfair.
Alternatively, plaintiffs bringing a suit under RESPA may
allege a violation of fair business practices through the use
of illegal kickback payments. The filed-rate doctrine bars
suit from the former class of plaintiffs and not the latter.459
The court in Alston further cited the following four factors in
support of its decision: (1) The measure of damages was set by RESPA, so
there was no need to second guess rates; (2) All consumers affected were to
be protected by RESPA, not just those bringing suit; (3) Congress intended
that RESPA apply to mortgage insurance; and (4) RESPA, as a remedial
statute, should be construed broadly.460 The court concluded by stating that
it was clear that the plaintiffs challenged defendant Countrywide’s
allegedly wrongful conduct, “not the reasonableness or propriety of the rate
that triggered that conduct.”461
Another case leaving open the possibility that claims brought under
RESPA may survive application of the filed rate doctrine is Schilke v.
Wachovia Mortgage, FSB.462 The court in Schilke relied on the filed rate
doctrine in dismissing state law claims for damages made against the
defending insurer in relation to alleged wrongful kickbacks. The court,
however, distinguished Alston on the basis that the plaintiff was not “suing
456

12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2006); Alston, 585 F.3d at 764 (expressing
disagreement with Morales).
457
Alston, 585 F.3d at 764 (citing Alexander v. Wash. Mut., Inc., No. 08-8043,
2008 WL 2600323, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2008); Kay v. Wells Fargo & Co., 247
F.R.D. 572 (N.D. Cal. 2007)).
458
Kay v. Wells Fargo & Co., 247 F.R.D. 572, 576 (N.D. Cal.2007).
459
Alston, 585 F.3d at 764 (quoting Kay, 247 F.R.D. at 576).
460
Id.
461
Id. at 765.
462
Schilke v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 758 F. Supp. 2d 549, 562 (N.D. Ill.
2010).
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under RESPA or any other federal law stemming from Congressional intent
to circumvent the filed rate doctrine.”463
Additionally, the court in Gipson v. Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc.
refused to apply the file rate doctrine to bar a complaint that the defending
lender wrongfully entered into an arrangement with an insurer by which the
lender received fees and commissions recouped from borrowers through
the payment of higher insurance premiums.464 The plaintiff claimed that by
doing so, the lender breached its contract and also violated its duty of good
faith and fair dealing. In refusing to apply the filed rate doctrine, the court
stated that the challenge was “not so much a challenge to the rate itself as it
is to the lender’s right under the lending contract to place insurance in such
a manner as to cause its borrowers’ payment of unnecessary fees.”465
XVIII. THE FUTURE OF THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE
What about the future of the filed rate doctrine? At the federal
level, Congress has taken no action to abrogate the doctrine. Additionally,
the U.S. Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case involving the
filed rate doctrine, Dolan v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co.,466 which
is not surprising in view of the Court’s pronouncement in Square D Co. v.
Niagara Frontier Tariff that “[i]f there is to be an overruling of the Keogh
rule, it must come from Congress, rather than from this Court.”467
As previously mentioned, ongoing disagreement regarding the
doctrine’s application in the insurance arena is illustrated by the recent
cases of In re Title Insurance Antitrust Cases468 and Clark v. Prudential
Insurance Co. of America469 reaching conflicting decisions regarding
application of the doctrine to claims arising under Ohio state law.470

463

Id. at 560.
Gipson v. Fleet Mortg. Grp., Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 691 (S.D. Miss. 2002).
465
Id. at 707. The court in Gipson did, however, apply the doctrine to bar a
claim that the defending insurer illegally obtained rates through committing fraud
on the state’s department of insurance. Id. at 703.
466
365 Fed. App’x 271 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 261 (2010).
467
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 408, 424
(1986).
468
702 F. Supp. 2d 840 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
469
Clark v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. Civ. 08-6197 DRD, 2011 WL
940729 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2011).
470
Compare In re Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 861-65
(adopting the filed rate doctrine in regard to claims under Ohio state law), with
464
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Disagreement regarding the doctrine is further illustrated by the conflicting
decisions of MacKay v. Superior Court471 and Fogel v. Farmers Group,
Inc.,472 involving the application of the filed rate doctrine to property and
casualty insurance in California.
An issue, however, on which consensus could likely be reached is
the importance of the doctrine in the area of insurance law. For example,
although the parties had provided notification of a tentative settlement, the
MacKay court exercised its discretion to issue an opinion stating that one
reason for doing so was that the issues “are of major importance to both
insurers and policy holders in California and are clearly of continuing
public interest and are likely to recur.”473 Although the filed rate doctrine
was not the only issue considered by the court, it was a significant matter
addressed in depth.474
A review of cases cited in this article illustrates the large number
decided in the last few years as well as the fact that many courts have
struggled with the interpretation and the application of the doctrine. A
primary difference in rationale seems to occur between courts expressing
the opinion that the doctrine applies to bar claims whenever a rate must be
consulted in order to determine damages versus courts that allow claims to
continue so long as the claims themselves do not implicate the filed rate.475
Clark, 2011 WL 940729 at *12-14 (rejecting application of the filed rate doctrine
to claims arising under Ohio state law).
471
MacKay v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
472
Fogel v. Farmers Group, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
473
MacKay, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 912 n.21.
474
Id. at 910-11.
475
Compare H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 1992)
(stating that the underlying conduct does not control whether the doctrine applies
and that the appropriate focus is the impact the court’s decision would have on
agency procedures and rate determinations), In re Pa. Title Ins. Antitrust Litig.,
648 F. Supp. 2d 663, 680 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (finding that plaintiffs complaint of
kickbacks actually went to rates), Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp.
2d 727, 735 (S.D. Iowa 2007) (recognizing that the filed rate doctrine extends to
complaints about services as well as to complaints about rates), Morales v.
Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1418, 1429 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(recognizing that complaints regarding kickbacks and fee splitting actually went to
the state’s rate structure), and Uniforce Temp. Pers., Inc. v. Nat’l Council on
Comp. Ins., Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1503, 1511-12 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (recognizing that the
filed rate doctrine barred claims that the defendants forced the plaintiff into the
assigned risk market), aff’d on other grounds, 87 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1996), with
Arroyo-Melecio v. Puerto Rico Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 56, 73 (1st Cir. 2005)
(expressing the opinion that the doctrine fails to bar any action which might
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Another basic difference in outlook is expressed in cases construing the
doctrine as applied to claims of illegal discrimination in violation of federal
law based on criteria such as race.476
The issue of administrative review and action may be another
fertile ground for litigation. As discussed in Section XIV of this article,
many courts have discussed the type of administrative review required for
application of the doctrine. Interestingly, however, in determining whether
the doctrine should be applied, neither litigants nor the courts have delved
into the enthusiasm with which state agencies have taken action against
alleged wrongdoing. Of course, that would involve quite an undertaking
and large amounts of discovery. Additionally, obtaining such proof in and
of itself may impact the nonjusticiability strand of the doctrine involving
the principle that courts should refrain from interfering with the affairs of
agencies entrusted by the legislative branch with authority over rate
issues.477
Considering the number of cases construing the filed rate doctrine
in the insurance arena in the last few years coupled with the significant
disagreement in existence regarding the specific contours of the doctrine, it
appears that the filed rate doctrine will be a significant source of future
litigation. Issues impacted by the doctrine are far reaching with puzzling
and complex disputes involving the role of state departments of insurance,
the interests of insurers, and the rights of consumers.

“arguably and coincidentally implicate rates”), Alston v. Countrywide Fin. Corp.,
585 F.3d 753, 764 (3d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the plaintiffs did not directly
challenge any rate and refusing to apply the doctrine); In re Managed Care Litig.,
150 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (refusing to apply the doctrine as a
bar and recognizing that the plaintiffs did not challenge the rate structure per se),
and Ciamaichelo v. Independence Blue Cross, 909 A.2d 1211, 1218 (Pa. 2006)
(rejecting the position that allegations that could lead to an adjustment of an
insurer’s rate “invariably amount to a rate injury claim”).
476
Compare Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 307 (applying the doctrine to claims of
race discrimination), with Saunders, 440 F.3d at 940 (refusing to apply the
doctrine to claims of race discrimination).
477
See, e.g., Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 19 (asserting that courts should not
become enmeshed in the rate-making process).

A JURISPRUDENTIAL SURVEY OF BAD FAITH
CLAIMS IN THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CONTEXT AND A CALL FOR A UNIFIED
STATUTORY REMEDY
STEVEN PLITT*
***
The article advocates for an exclusive unified remedial approach
to insurer bad faith claims in the worker’s compensation context as
opposed to a mixed statutory and common law approach. The article
considers the various jurisprudential positions on common law bad faith
causes of action. The article then details the legislative response to the
bad-faith cause of action, with a focus on legislation designed to make the
Worker’s Compensation Act the exclusive remedy for bad faith misconduct
by insurers. The judicial response to this legislation is also highlighted.
The article then focuses on legislative attempts to impose penalties on
insurers as a deterrent to insurer misconduct. Lastly, the article proposes
in detail a unified approach utilizing an administrative adjudicatory system
that benefits from knowledgeable and experience triers of fact. The article
proposes keeping the current statutory framework in place but with an
escalating scale of penalties for insurer misconduct that would be coupled
with a requirement that insurers keep records of complaints filed against
them, as well as penalties assessed against them, for improper claims
handling. The penalties would then be escalated according to an insurer’s
penalty experience rating.
***
The issue of whether a specific Workers’ Compensation Act
precludes common-law tort actions for an insurer’s bad faith conduct in
mishandling a claim for benefits has arisen in many American
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jurisdictions.1 The issue has been resolved in different ways; the results
depend upon the particular facts alleged, the elements of the tort of
common-law bad faith within the jurisdiction, and the exclusivity and
penalty provisions of the relevant Workers’ Compensation Act. The courts
are almost equally divided on this issue. There has been minimal scholarly
commentary analyzing the competing legal viewpoints which populate the
debate regarding the proper forum for resolving unfair claim handling
committed in the workers’ compensation context.
A large number of courts have held that common-law bad faith
actions are barred by the exclusivity provisions2 of a particular Workers’
Compensation Act.3 Still other courts have recognized actions for conduct
1

One court has observed that the tort of workers’ compensation bad faith
arises when an insurance company or a self-insured employer intentionally fails to
process or pay a claim without a reasonable basis for such action and the carrier
either knows or it is being unreasonable or fails to conduct an investigation
adequate to determine whether its conduct was reasonable. See Rowland v. Great
States Ins. Co., 20 P.3d 1158, 1166 n.5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
2
The exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Acts are
designed to balance the interests of both employers and employees. On the one
hand the employer assumes liability for “accidental” injuries to employees
regardless of fault and, on the other hand, the employer is relieved of the
possibility of large damage verdicts which may jeopardize the future of the
employer’s business. See Gunter v. Mersereau, 491 P.2d 1205, 1206-07 (Or. Ct.
App. 1971) (motivating philosophy behind workmen's compensation acts is that
loss arising from accidents in industry should be distributed between employer and
consumer as cost of production); Woolsey v. Panhandle Refinery Co., 116 S.W.2d
675, 676 (Tex. 1938) (workers’ compensation objective is to do away with issues
of negligence, unavoidable accident, and contributory negligence, and to fix
amount recoverable free from uncertainty). Generally, under the exclusivity
provisions of the Act employees are not barred from bringing actions for
intentional torts against their employer, but if the employee elects to pursue a claim
under the Act the employee may waive his cause of action for the intentional tort.
See, e.g., Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. 1980) (intentional
tort action waived by proceeding under Act from injuries derived in course of
employment); H.L. Hutton & Co. v. District Court of Kay County, 398 P.2d 530,
534 (Okla. 1965) (election of remedy waives other claims).
3
See, e.g., Garvin v. Shewbart, 442 So. 2d 80 (Ala. 1983) (provision for
circuit court action provides remedy for negligent or bad faith failure to pay
medical expenses); Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of New York, Inc., 526
P.2d 37 (Alaska 1974), overruled by Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Cos., 556 P.2d 525
(Alaska 1976) (20 percent penalty for late payment of benefit installments provides
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constituting bad faith although the tort was not characterized as such.4 As
an example, a plurality of jurisdictions that have precluded a bad faith
cause of action have nevertheless recognized that certain other commonlaw tort actions, particularly actions for intentional infliction of emotional
distress,5 can be maintained against a workers’ compensation insurer.6

remedy for negligent or bad faith delay); Sandoval v. Salt River Project Agric.
Impr. & Power Dist., 571 P.2d 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (Act provides procedures
in event of failure to provide benefits); Cervantes v. Great American Ins. Co., 140
Cal. App. 3d 763, 189 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1983) (10 percent penalty for unreasonable
delay in payment is exclusive remedy for willful and intentional, as well as
negligent delay); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Whitworth, 442 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1983) (penalty and attorney fee provisions are exclusive remedies for bad
faith); Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 866 (Ill. 1983) (50 percent
penalty for unreasonable or vexatious delay remedies insurer’s malicious deception
or outrageous conduct); Harned v. Farmland Foods, Inc., 331 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa
1983) (statutory procedure for resolving dispute over treatment constitutes
exclusive remedy); Hormann v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 837 (Kan.
1984) (8 percent interest when carrier refuses to pay without just cause or excuse is
remedy for intentional refusals); Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 507 S.W.2d 526
(Tex. 1974) (self-help and administrative procedures provide sole relief for
insurer's negligence).
4
See, e.g., Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1974); Gibson
v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220 (Me. 1978); Broaddus v. Ferndale
Fastener Division, 269 N.W.2d 689 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
5
The standard of proof for an intentional tort in the workers’ compensation
context can be very difficult to satisfy. As an example, a tort claim against a
workers’ compensation insurer alleging a bad faith failure to pay an insurance
claim is barred by the exclusivity provisions of Alabama’s Workers’
Compensation Act. Stewart v. Matthews Indus., Inc., 644 So. 2d 915 (Ala. 1994)
(citing ALA. CODE §§ 25-5-11, -52, -53 (1975); Farley v. CNA Ins. Co., 576 So. 2d
158 (Ala. 1991); Garvin, 442 So. 2d at 80; Oliver v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 548 So.
2d 1025 (Ala. 1989); Nabors v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 489 So. 2d 573 (Ala. 1986);
Moore v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 468 So. 2d 122 (Ala. 1985); Waldon v. Hartford
Ins. Group, 435 So. 2d 1271 (Ala. 1983). Although the Alabama Supreme Court
has held that a claim alleging bad faith failure to pay an insurance claim –in the
context of a workers’ compensation claim –is barred by the exclusivity provisions
of the Act, the court has also recognized that the tort of outrageous conduct or
intentional infliction of emotional distress can occur in a workers’ compensation
setting. See, e.g., Farley, 576 So. 2d at 158; Garvin, 442 So. 2d at 80. The Court in
Garvin v. Shewbart observed:
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The [Workers’ Compensation] Act is designed to
compensate those who are injured on the job and provides
immunity from common law suits for those employers and
carriers who come within the Act. A suit seeking recovery under
the tort of outrageous conduct does not seek compensation [or]
medical benefits for the original on-the-job injury. The
connection with the physical injury that gave rise to the original
workmen’s compensation claim is tenuous. The conduct giving
rise to the tort of outrageous conduct in the context of this kind
of case can be more accurately characterized as mental assault
than as failure to pay compensation or medical benefits even
though it may arise in a failure to pay context. Conduct
constituting the tort of outrageous conduct cannot reasonably be
considered to be within the scope of the Act. When the employer
or carrier’s conduct crosses the line between mere failure to pay
and intent to cause severe emotional distress, the cloak of
immunity is removed.
Garvin, 442 So. 2d at 83 (emphasis added).
Under Alabama law, the tort of outrageous conduct or intentional infliction of
emotional distress involves “extreme and outrageous conduct” by one who
“intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another.” American
Road Service Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361, 365 (Ala. 1980). In order to present a
case of outrageous conduct, the plaintiff must show that the conduct was “so
outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized society.” Id.; see also Bearden v. Equifax Services, 455 So. 2d 836 (Ala.
1984); Strickland v. Birmingham Bldg. & Remodeling, 449 So. 2d 1242 (Ala.
1984); Cates v. Taylor, 428 So. 2d 637 (Ala. 1983).
The severe emotional distress required for the tort of outrage requires
the following:
The emotional distress . . . must be so severe that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Any recovery
must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances,
liability ensuing only when the conduct is extreme. By extreme
we refer to conduct so outrageous in character and so extreme in
degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
society.
Am. Road Serv. Co., 394 So. 2d at 365 (citations omitted).
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Some courts recognize tort actions for bad faith outside of the
relevant Workers Compensation Act.7 Other jurisdictions have held that
statutory penalty provisions, although available, do not constitute exclusive
remedies for insurer bad faith.8
This article will explore the utility of a modified statutory approach
to unfair claim handling practices in the workers’ compensation context.
Part I of the article surveys the competing jurisprudential viewpoints on
whether to allow a common-law bad faith cause of action. The debate
among these courts center upon the legislative intent regarding the scope of
a particular Workers’ Compensation Act exclusivity provision. A small
number of courts have straddled the issue and determined that their state’s
Workers’ Compensation Act provided only partial immunity through
exclusivity for most routine delays in payment of compensation benefits
alleged to have been withheld in bad faith while permitting a common law
bad faith tort action where egregious and willful misconduct is involved. A
few courts have adopted a breach of contract theory regarding bad faith
misconduct in the workers’ compensation context. Each of these competing
theories is surveyed in Part I.
Part II of the article briefly discusses legislative intervention
following judicial recognition of a common-law bad faith tort action.
Legislative intervention, overturning the judicial recognition of the tort, has
met with mixed success.
Part III of the article discusses statutory penalties and deterrents.
There is wide variation of severity and scope in state workers’
The outrageous conduct must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
Farley, 576 So. 2d 158.
6
See Garvin, 442 So. 2d at 80; Stafford, 526 P.2d at 37; Sandoval, 571 P.2d at
706 (tortious conduct as breaking and entering not immunized); Unruh v. Truck
Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063 (Cal. 1972); Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 So.
2d 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (statute provides exceptions for intentional
assault and automobile accidents); Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 866
(Ill. 1983) (penalty might not be exclusive remedy in Unruh-like facts); Paradissis
v. Royal Indem. Co., 507 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1974) (willful torts such as fraud or
outrageous conduct not within exclusivity bar of Texas Act).
7
See, e.g., Hollman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1983)
(under South Dakota law); Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257 (Mont.
1980); Coleman v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220 (Wis. 1979).
8
See, e.g., Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1974) (20
percent penalty for late payment not exclusive remedy); Gibson v. Nat’l Ben
Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220 (Me. 1978) (similar ruling).
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compensation penalty statutory remedies. Courts have reached mixed
conclusions on whether a particular state’s penalty provision provides
adequate deterrence to prevent insurer misconduct.
Part IV of the article analyzes the statutory unification of bad faith
remedies through increased penalties and the maintenance of exclusivity. It
is the thesis of this article that an exclusive unified remedial approach to
insurer bad faith is preferable to a combination of statutory and commonlaw remedies. An effective unified remedial approach would utilize the
administrative apparatus in current use which benefits from a
knowledgeable trier of fact. The current statutory approach would be
supplemented with a significant penalty system coupled with measures to
require the annual record-keeping of penalty experience rating. Statistics
regarding findings of misconduct could be used to assess greater penalties
and would permit insurance company executives to understand the true cost
of improper claim handling practices.
I.

JURISDICTIONAL SURVEY ON WHETHER TO ALLOW OR
REJECT COMMON-LAW BAD FAITH IN THE WORKERS’
COMPENSATION CONTEXT.

Courts are almost evenly divided over the issue of whether a
workers’ compensation insurer may invoke the employer’s immunity from
suit in the workers’ compensation context against charges that the insurer
committed bad faith in its handling of an employee’s compensation claim.9
Set forth below are the four principle viewpoints on this issue.
9

The following courts held that the workers’ compensation insurer is entitled
to immunity: Alabama (Stewart, 644 So. 2d at 915; Oliver v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
548 So. 2d 1025 (Ala. 1989)); Arkansas (Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 852
S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1993); Johnson v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 536 S.W.2d 121 (Ark.
1976)); California (Goetz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 710 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1983)
(interpreting California law); Stoddard v. Western Employer’s Ins. Co., 245 Cal.
Rptr. 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)); Connecticut (DeOliveira v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
870 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2005)); District of Columbia (Hall v. C&P Telephone Co.,
793 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1986), reh’g denied, 809 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1987));
Georgia (Bright v. Nimmo, 320 S.E.2d 365 (Ga. 1984); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Davis, 320 S.E.2d 368, 370 (Ga. 1984)); Idaho (Van Tine v. Idaho State Ins. Fund,
889 P.2d 717 (Idaho 1994)); Illinois (Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d
866 (Ill. 1983); Perfection Carpet, Inc. v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 630 N.E.2d
1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)); Indiana (Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327
(Ind. 1992); Borgman v. State Farm Ins. Co., 713 N.E.2d 851 (Ind. Ct. App.
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1999)); Kentucky (Coker v. Daniel Const. Co., 664 F. Supp. 1079 (W.D. Ky.
1987), aff’d, 848 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1988); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 712 S.W.2d
340 (Ky. 1986); General Acc. Ins. Co. v. Blank, 873 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. Ct. App.
1993)); Louisiana (Bergeron v. North American Underwriters, Inc., 549 So. 2d 315
(La. 1989); Banes v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 544 So. 2d 700 (La. Ct. App.
1989)); Massachusetts (Kelly v. Raytheon, Inc., 563 N.E.2d 1372 (Mass. App. Ct.
1990); Boduch v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 528 N.E.2d 1182 (Mass. App. Ct.
1988)); Minnesota (Denisen v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 360 N.W.2d 448 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985)); Missouri (Young v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 588 S.W.2d 46 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979)); Nebraska (Ihm v. Crawford & Co., 580 N.W.2d 115 (Neb.
1998)); New Mexico (Chavez v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 547 F.2d 541 (10th Cir.
1977); Cruz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 889 P.2d 1223 (N.M. 1995)); New York
(Burlew v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 472 N.E.2d 682 (N.Y. 1984)); Pennsylvania
(Winterberg v. Transp. Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 318 (3rd Cir. 1995); Fry v. Atl. States Ins.
Co., 700 A.2d 974 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)); Rhode Island (Cianci v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 659 A.2d 662 (R.I. 1995)); South Carolina (Cook v. Mack’s Transfer &
Storage, 352 S.E.2d 296 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986)); Utah (Savage v. Educators Ins.
Co., 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 1995); Gunderson v. May Dept. Stores Co., 955 P.2d 346
(Utah Ct. App. 1998)); Washington (Wolf v. Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., 782 P.2d
203 (Wash. 1989)).
The following courts allowed common-law bad faith claims against workers’
compensation insurers: Arizona (Hayes v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 872 P.2d 668 (Ariz.
1994); Franks v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 718 P.2d 193 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985));
Colorado (Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985)); Connecticut
(Carpentino v. Transport Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 556 (D. Conn. 1985), but see
DeOliveira, 870 A.2d 1066 (where the court held that bad faith actions are not
available, except under the intentional act exception to exclusivity)); Delaware
(Correa v. Pa. Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co., 618 F. Supp. 915 (D. Del. 1985); Pierce v.
Int’l Ins. Co. of Ill., 671 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1996)); Hawaii (Hough v. Pacific Ins.
Co., Ltd., 927 P.2d 858 (Haw. 1996)); Iowa (Reedy v. White Consol. Indus., Inc.,
503 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 1993); Boylan v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d
742 (Iowa 1992), reh’g denied, (Oct. 23, 1992)); Minnesota (Kaluza v. Home Ins.
Co., 403 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 1987), but see Hastings v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos.,
404 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)); Mississippi (S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Holland, 469 So. 2d 55 (Miss. 1984)); Montana (Brewington v. Employers
Fire Ins. Co., 992 P.2d 237 (Mont. 1999); Spadaro v. Midland Claims Service,
Inc., 740 P.2d 1105 (Mont. 1987); Birkenbuel v. Montana State Comp. Ins. Fund,
687 P.2d 700 (Mont. 1984)); Nevada (Falline v. GNLV Corp., 823 P.2d 888 (Nev.
1991)); North Carolina (Johnson v. First Union Corp., 496 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App.
1998), on reh’g, 505 S.E.2d 808 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)); Ohio (Balyint v. Ark. Best
Freight System, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 417 (Ohio 1985)); Oklahoma (Sizemore v. Cont’l
Cas. Co., 142 P.3d 47 (Okla. 2006)); South Dakota (Hollman, 712 F.2d 1259,
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The following principles regarding liability for delayed payment
can be gleaned from the decisions in those jurisdictions which have
rejected a common-law tort of bad faith. First, without significant analysis,
courts have found that their state’s exclusive remedy statute forecloses a
common-law bad faith tort. Second, a cause of action generally will not
arise from delayed payment of a workers’ compensation claim unless the
insurer or self-insured employer has committed offenses greater than mere
delay of payment. Third, the existence of a penalty for late payment of
claims generally indicates that the legislature intended to expand a statute’s
exclusive remedy provision to bar bad faith claims arising from delayed
payment.10 Fourth, even where the statutory penalties do not adequately
aff’d, 752 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1985)); Texas (Aranda v. Ins. Co. of North America,
748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988), aff’d, 833 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), reh’g
denied, (June 18, 1992); Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Marshall, 724 S.W.2d 770
(Tex. 1987); Escajeda v. Cigna Ins. Co. of Texas, 934 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Ct. App.
1996)); Wisconsin (Coleman, 273 N.W.2d 220; Messner v. Briggs & Stratton
Corp., 353 N.W.2d 363 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984)).
10
Some courts have concluded that the exclusivity principle is manifest
through the penalty award provisions in the Workers’ Compensation Act. See, e.g.,
Cain v. Nat’l Union Life Ins. Co., 718 S.W.2d 444, 444 (Ark. 1986) (rejecting
workers’ compensation claim for late payment because statutes provide remedies
for late payment); Hormann v. N. H. Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 837, 840 (Kan. 1984)
(denying independent claim for tortious behavior because statute providing
penalties provided exclusive remedy); Kelly, 563 N.E.2d at 1374-75 (dismissing
claim for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress for failure to
compensate because workers' compensation laws provided exclusive remedy of
statutory penalties); Wood v. Union Elec. Co., 786 S.W.2d 613, 614 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990) (denying claim for recovery of work-related medical expenses because
penalty provision provided exclusive remedy); Dunlevy v. Kemper Ins. Grp., 532
A.2d 754, 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (holding that penalty in statute for
failure to pay compensation benefits provided sole remedy); Messner, 353 N.W.2d
at 368 (dismissing claim for bad faith denial of workers’ compensation because
penalty provision provided exclusive remedy). See also Michael A. Rosenhouse,
Annotation, Tort Liability of Worker’s Compensation Insurer for Wrongful Delay
or Refusal to Make Payments Due, 8 A.L.R. 4th 902 (1981).
In Dunlevy, the Court held that New Jersey’s Workers’ Compensation Act
provided the exclusive remedy for an insurance company’s intentional conduct in
failing to provide benefits. The Court observed that the New Jersey Legislature
recognized the need to impose sanctions when the party responsible for providing
benefits unreasonably or negligently failed to do so. It provided the specific
remedy of penalties in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-28.1. Had the New Jersey
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compensate the employee for damages caused by late payments, the
imposition of a penalty reveals a legislative intent to preempt common-law
causes of action.11
One commentator has observed: “[w]hether one views the workers’
compensation system as a well-oiled, humming engine of adequate
lawmakers intended common-law redress also to be available for intentional
conduct in failing to provide benefits, the Court found that the Legislature could
have readily done so in the manner of N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 34:15-8. In essence, the
Court found the specific nature of New Jersey’s remedial legislation for failure of
an employer to pay required benefits as its rationale for sustaining the exclusivity
in face of common-law actions for redress.
In Flick v. PMA Ins. Co., 928 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2007), the Court
reaffirmed its prior ruling that New Jersey’s Workers’ Compensation Act’s
exclusive remedy provisions foreclosed a common-law tort action for bad faith.
The Court observed that the New Jersey Legislature specifically envisioned that
there would be situations in which an employer or its insurance carrier would
“unreasonably or negligently delay” providing compensation to an injured worker
entitled to compensation benefits. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-28.1 imposes a 25%
penalty on amounts due plus any reasonable legal fees incurred as a result of such
delays or refusals.
11
A few jurisdictions have allowed bad faith claims despite the existence of
statutory penalties. In general, these jurisdictions have based their conclusions on
two factors: the failure of the relevant statutes to identify specific penalties for bad
faith or injurious delay of payment, and a failure to provide penalties to adequately
compensate employees for the real harm suffered as a result of delayed payments.
See, e.g., Gibson, 387 A.2d at 220; Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 210; Coleman, 273
N.W.2d at 220.
In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985), Travelers argued
that the penalty provisions in the Workers’ Compensation Act provided claimants
with a remedy for an insurer’s misconduct. See 3 COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-44-106
(1973). The Act provides that “[i]f any insurance carrier intentionally, knowingly,
or willfully violates any of the provisions of articles 40 to 54 of this title, the
commissioner of insurance, on the request of the director, shall suspend or revoke
the license or authority of such carrier to do a compensation business in this state.”
Id. The Court noted that while such conduct on the part of the insurer was risky for
any insurer to engage in, the statute did not provide any remedy for the individual
injured thereby. Savio, 706 P.2d at 1266. Citing other penalty provisions, (see 3
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-53-124, 8-53-126, 8-53-127, 8-53-129 (1973) (repealed by
Laws 1990, H.B.90-1160, § 77, eff. July 1, 1990)), while they serve to deter
conduct which violates the Workers’ Compensation Act, the penalty statutes did
not provide any direct remedy to employees who may claim injuries from the same
conduct which is proscribed by the penalty provisions.
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compensation, or a conglomerate of discordant parts meting out rough
justice, the exclusivity principle, which mandates workers' compensation as
the virtual sole means of compensation for work-related injuries, serves as
the system’s cornerstone.”12
A. THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY BAR
Some commentators have adopted an inflexible view of the
exclusive remedy principle. These commentators hold that “the exclusive
remedy principle mandates, which the compensation system holds, sway
over all workers’ compensation-related causes of action, whether they
relate to the injury, or sound in tort or contract law.”13 This is reflected in
Professor Larson's rejection of a bad faith tort in his renowned treatise:
It seems clear that a compensation claimant cannot
transform a simple delay in payments into an actionable
tort by merely invoking the magic words “fraudulent,
deceitful and intentional” or “intentional infliction of
emotional distress” or “outrageous conduct.” [sic] in his
complaint. The temptation to shatter the exclusiveness
principle by reaching for the tort weapon whenever there is
a delay in payments or a termination of treatment is all too
obvious, and awareness of this possibility has undoubtedly
been one reason for the reluctance of courts to recognize
this tort except in cases of egregious cruelty or venality.14
“The exclusivity principle is the great fence that seeks to enclose
all work-related tort-like injuries. The overriding fear is that the exclusivity
principle will begin to disintegrate, with each new application of judicial
gloss forcing the law to ‘become honeycombed with independent and
conflicting rulings of the courts.’”15 Were this to occur, the objective of the

12

Joel E. Fenton, The Tort of Bad Faith in Iowa Workers’ Compensation Law,
45 DRAKE L. REV. 839, 847 (1997).
13
Id. at 848.
14
Id. at 848 (citing 6 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW §
68.34(c), at 13-229 to 13-230 (1997)).
15
Fenton, supra note 12, at 848 (citing Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 342 P.2d
976, 979 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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Legislature in enacting Workers’ Compensation Acts and the whole pattern
of workers’ compensation could thereby be partially nullified.16
One California court has observed:
In these days of ever shrinking judicial resources, the
plaintiff’s bar would be well advised to heed these rules [re
exclusive jurisdiction of the WCAB] and to concentrate its
energy on securing swift and simple compensation for the
injured employee in the forum which has exclusive
jurisdiction over the claims. Its continual efforts to make
end-runs around the exclusivity provisions of the workers’
compensation system would be more appropriately
addressed to the Legislature . . . .17
The jurisprudence of Kentucky, Connecticut, Rhode Island,
Louisiana, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts provide good examples of state
jurisdictions where the courts have held that the exclusivity provisions of
the state’s Workers’ Compensation Act bar a common-law tort of bad faith
because the insurer is immunized.
Kentucky’s exclusive remedy statute in the Workers’
Compensation Act is set forth in KY. REV. STAT. § 342.690(1). The
Kentucky exclusive remedy statute grants immunity for liability arising
from common-law and statutory claims, meaning those claims which could
not be pursued in the courts of the Kentucky Commonwealth.18 The
Kentucky Supreme Court has observed that the grant of exclusive
immunity was part of the bargain provided by the Act whereby employers
are made strictly liable to their employees for compensation for workrelated injuries. The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that the statute
continues by specifically extending the immunity to the employer’s
workers’ compensation insurance carrier:
The exemption from liability given an employer by this
section shall also extend to such employer’s carrier and to
all employees, officers or directors of such employer or
16

Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 342 P.2d 976, 980 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
Caplan v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 220 Cal. Rptr. 549, 550 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) (citing United States Borax & Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. Rptr.
155, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)).
18
Ky. Emp’rs Mut. Ins. v. Coleman, 236 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Ky. 2007).
17
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carrier, provided that the exemption from liability given an
employee, officer or director or an employer or carrier
shall not apply in any case where the injury or death is
proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked physical
aggression of such employee, officer or director.19
The effect of KY. REV. STAT. § 342.690(1) is to shield a covered
employer and its insurer from any other liability to a covered employee for
damages arising out of a work-related injury.20 The Kentucky courts have
found that the immunity granted by the statute is “[e]xtensive, ranging from
disputes over the payment of injuries of the employee to allegations of
tortious conduct related to dealing with the workers’ compensation claim
itself.”21
In DeOliveira v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., the Connecticut Supreme
Court held that Connecticut would not recognize a common-law cause of

19

Coleman, 236 S.W.3d at 13.
Coleman, 236 S.W.3d at 13 (emphasis added); Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Reker, 100 S.W.3d 756, 760 (Ky. 2003). See also Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 712
S.W.2d 340, 341 (Ky. 1986) (“[T]he Workers’ Compensation Act provides an
exclusive remedy and consequently bars an employee’s tort action for separate
damages due to the untimely payment of benefits.”); Reker, S.W.3d at 759
(reaffirming this principle rejecting a civil lawsuit alleging bad faith in the
workers’ compensation context for a violation of Kentucky’s Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act, KY. REV. STAT. § 304.12-230, as being barred by the
exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation statute); Reker, S.W.3d
at 762 (reasoning that the Workers’ Compensation Act provided administrative
remedies for a delay in payment or failure to pay: “[T]he the statutory scheme of
the Workers’ Compensation Act . . . provides[s] civil remedies for an employee
who is injured by an employer’s ‘bad faith’ refusal to settle or to make payments
when due.”) (alteration in the original); KY. REV. STAT. § 342.040(1) (West 2008)
(allowing for the imposition of interest at the rate of 18% upon an ALJ finding that
a “[D]enial, delay, or termination in payment of income benefit was without
reasonable foundation.”).
21
Coleman, 236 S.W.3d at 14; Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Blank, 873 S.W.2d 580,
582-83 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the Act precludes suit against the carrier
for alleged violation of the Consumer Protection Act and the UCSPA); Zurich Ins.
Co. v. Mitchell, 712 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Ky. 1986) (holding that the Act precludes a
civil action against the insurance carrier for failure to pay medical expenses under
either a common law “bad faith” theory or under the tort of outrage theory); Brown
Badgett, Inc. v. Calloway, 675 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1984).
20
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action for bad faith handling of a workers’ compensation claim.22 Central to
the Court’s ruling was the conclusion that the statutory penalties within
Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act demonstrated a legislative
intent to confine the available remedies to those provided by the relevant
penalty statutes.
The Court began its analysis of the issue by addressing the
exclusivity provision in Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act.23
Connecticut’s Act provided a number of statutory penalties against insurers
for improper delay in providing benefits.24 The Legislature had vested in
the Commission the jurisdiction to hear employee complaints and award
interest, attorney’s fees, and penalties for improper claim handling.25 A
$500 penalty for “undue” delay in adjusting a claim is provided for within
the Connecticut Act, together with provisions for the awarding of
attorney’s fees and interest to the claimant if it was determined that the
insurer unreasonably contested liability or delayed payment.26 The Act also
provided a 20% penalty when an insurer failed to make timely payments
pursuant to an award or voluntary agreement.27 The Court in DeOliveira
found that the existence of the statutory penalty provisions revealed both a
legislative awareness of the serious problems injured workers faced when
insurers acted in bad faith, and a legislative solution to those problems “In
other words, by providing remedies for such conduct, the legislature
evinced its intention to bar a tort action for the same conduct proscribed
and penalized under the act.”28 The Court found that a recognition of a bad
faith cause of action would “usurp” the legislative function.29 The Court
noted that Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act, which was carefully
balanced between rights and remedies, limited but also guaranteed that
benefits would be timely paid without regard to fault.
The Court in DeOliveira bolstered its legislative intent analysis by
examining the Workers’ Compensation Act’s legislative history. The Court
focused on legislative testimony between 1979 through 1993 (when the Act
22

DeOliveira v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 870 A.2d 1066, 1070-71 (Conn. 2005).
Id. at 1071 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-284(a) (West 1961)).
24
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-288(b), 31-295 (West 1961).
25
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-300 (West 1961).
26
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-288(b), 31-295(c), 31-300 (West 1961).
27
DeOliveira, 870 A.2d at 1072 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-303
(West 1961)).
28
Id. at 1073.
29
Id. at 1074.
23
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underwent major revisions) which described the “horrific circumstances”
that resulted from bad faith claims handling as evidence that the legislature
was fully aware of those type of problems and that the solution they
fashioned through the adoption of various statutory penalty provisions was
the legislature’s response to the problem. The Court concluded that “[t]he
legislature clearly was aware of the scope and nature of this problem and
presumably crafted the remedies that it deemed fit.”30 Based upon this
legislative history, the Court in DeOliveira found that bad faith claims
handling was clearly a “[r]isk contemplated by the compensation bargain”
and therefore fell within the Act’s exclusive remedy provisions.31 The
Court also found that the various statutory penalties for undue or
unreasonable delay were “[b]road enough to encompass the bad faith
processing of a workers’ compensation claim,32 thus preempting a
judicially created common-law cause of action.33
In Cianci v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,34 the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island held that the exclusivity provisions of Rhode Island’s Worker’s
Compensation Act applied to any suit against an employer’s workers’
compensation insurer.35 The Court held that the Worker’s Compensation
Act provided an efficient mechanism permitting employees and the insurer
to resolve disputes relating to work-related injuries and medical payments
in a timely manner.36 An employee covered under the Act has no commonlaw right of action against the insurer because the Act expressly addressed
such claims and thus immunized the insurer from liability.
Under Louisiana law, no civil common-law cause of action for an
insurer’s arbitrary refusal to pay medical expenses in an accident covered
30

Id. at 1073-74.
Id. at 1076.
32
Id. at 1077.
33
Contra Boylan v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Iowa
1992) (“We conclude that it is unlikely that the legislature intended the penalty
provision in section 86.13 to be the sole remedy for all types of wrongful conduct
by carriers . . . .). See also id. at 744 (referencing other Iowa Supreme Court
decisions holding that statutory penalties did not exclude independent bad faith
actions); Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 388, 396-97 (Iowa 2001).
34
Cianci v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 659 A.2d 662, 688 (R.I. 1995).
35
Contra Lopes v. G.T.E. Products Corp., 560 A.2d 949, 951 (R.I. 1989)
(holding that there was no intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provisions of
the Act); Coakley v. Aetna Bridge Co., 572 A.2d 295, 296 (R.I. 1990) (holding the
same).
36
Cianci, 659 A.2d at 669.
31
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by workers’ compensation is allowed.37 The sole remedy for arbitrary
failure to pay workers’ compensation benefits is the recovery of penalties
and attorney’s fees under LSA-R.S. § 23:1201.2.38 The crucial inquiry is
whether the insurer had an articulable and objective reason to deny benefits
at the time it took action.39 In order to reasonably controvert a claim, the
insurer must have some valid reason or evidence upon which to base the
denial of benefits.40
Under LSA-R.S. § 23:1032, an employee’s exclusive remedy
against his employer for injuries suffered in the course and scope of his
employment lies within the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. The
Louisiana courts have held that the exclusivity statute manifested the
following legislative intent: “The rights and remedies herein granted . . .
shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee . . .
against his employer[.]”41 The statute provides an exception for employees
injured as a result of an “intentional act” on the part of their employers.42
In order to constitute an intentional act within the meaning of LSA-R.S. §
23:1032, the employer must have consciously desired the physical result of

37

Bergeron v. North Am. Underwriters, Inc., 549 So. 2d 315 (La. 1989).
Id. at 315; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1201(F) (1989) (stating that
under Louisiana’s workers’ compensation statutes, penalties and attorney’s fees are
recoverable if the employer or insurer fails to commence payments of benefits
timely or to pay continued installments or medical benefits timely, unless the claim
is reasonably controverted); Jackson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 868 So. 2d 813, 820
(La. Ct. App. 2004) (holding Louisiana’s penalty and attorney’s fees statute is
designed to discourage indifference and undesirable conduct by insurers and are
essentially penal in nature); Cooper v. St. Tammany Parish School Bd., 862 So. 2d
1001, 1008-10 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that although the Worker’s
Compensation Act is to be liberally construed under Louisiana law in regards to
benefits, penal statutes generally are to be strictly construed in Louisiana).
39
McLin v. Indus. Specialty Contractors, Inc., 851 So. 2d 1135, 1144 (La.
2003).
40
Brown v. Texas-LA Cartage, 721 So. 2d 885, 890 (La. 1998).
41
Banes v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 544 So. 2d 700, 704 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
42
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032.A.(1)(a) (1995) (Louisiana’s exclusivity
statute). But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032.B (1995) (“Nothing in this
Chapter shall affect the liability of the employer, or any officer, director,
stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal to a fine or penalty
under any other statue or the liability, civil or criminal, resulting from an
intentional act.” (emphasis added)).
38
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his act or have known that that result was substantially certain to follow
from his conduct.43
43

Yousufali v. Southland Corp., 467 So. 2d 191, 193 (La. Ct. App. 1985);
Courtney v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 385 So. 2d 391, 392-93 (La. Ct. App. 1980)
(stating under Louisiana law, “intentional acts” is to be interpreted as the
equivalent of intentional torts. Thus the only statutory exception to worker’s
compensation as a remedy is for intentional torts); Banes, 544 So. 2d at 705
(stating Louisiana courts have held that the Legislature has expressly concerned
itself not only with assuring compensation to the injured workers, but with policing
the procedures under which the claims are made and paid); id. at 705 (holding
LSA-R.S. §§ 23:1201(E) and 23:1201.2 [now codified in LSA-R.S. § 23:1201 (F),
(I), (J)] provide that penalties and attorney’s fees are awarded to a claimant who is
denied worker’s compensation coverage when such denial is arbitrary, capricious
and without probable cause) (alteration in the original); Mott v. River Parish
Maint., Inc., 432 So. 2d 827, 832 (La. 1983) (holding a violation of the statutes
alone are not per se an intentional act that would result in the employers tort
liability even if injuries sustained by the employee because of the violation);
Physicians and Surgeons Hosp. v. Leone, 399 So. 2d 806, 807-08 (La. Ct. App.
1981) (holding damages for emotional and mental anguish arising from an
insurer’s failure to pay an employee’s medical benefits is covered by the
exclusivity remedy of the Workers’ Compensation Act penalties. Thus, a worker’s
compensation insurer of the employer is immune from a tort proceeding). See also
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032.B (1995) (Louisiana’s exclusivity statute
permitting a civil cause of action for civil or criminal intentional acts). In Boudoin
v. Bradley, 549 So. 2d 1265 (La. Ct. App. 1989), the Court considered whether an
employee could maintain an action in tort for intentional infliction of emotion
distress against the employer’s workers’ compensation insurer. It was alleged that
the employee’s benefits were termination by the insurer in order to place the
employee in a position of having to financially accept the insurer’s settlement offer
even though the offer was unreasonably low. The Court found that to recover
damages for the intentional infliction of mental distress, the employee was required
to prove that the insurer damages for the intentional infliction of mental distress,
the employer was required to prove that the insurer either actively desired to bring
about mental anguish or realized to a virtual certainty that it would occur. The
Court noted that recovery in such cases had generally been limited to instances of
outrageous conduct. Steadman v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 362 So. 2d 1144,
1145-46 (La. Ct. App. 1978). By “outrageous” it is meant conduct “so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Having recognized
this standard, the Court in Boudoin noted that the Workers’ Compensation Act
provisions for penalties and attorney’s fees were part of the legislative compromise
which governed the rights of employees and employers in work-related accidents.
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In Kuney v. PMA Ins. Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
addressed a claim for damages arising from an insurer’s bad faith failure to
pay workers’ compensation benefits.44 The Court utilized the following
rationale to hold that Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act provided
the claimant’s sole remedy:
Reduced to its essence, the appellee’s claim is that the
insurance company wrongfully delayed his receipt of
compensation benefits. This is clearly a matter pertaining
to a workers’ compensation claim and must therefore be
adjudicated within the framework of the statute, which, as
To allow recovery in tort against a compensation insurer under a standard less than
that articulated by the Louisiana Court in Steadman would upset the balance struck
by this compromise by permitting tort damages where the legislature has
determined that an administrative penalty is the plaintiff’s appropriate remedy.
Boudoin, 549 So. 2d at 1267. The Court in Boudoin cited with approval Professor
Larson’s treatise on workers’ compensation law:
It seems clear that a compensation claimant cannot transform a
simple delay in payments into an actionable tort by merely
invoking the magical words “‘fraudulent, deceitful and
intentional” or “intentional infliction of emotional distress” or
“outrageous” conduct in his complaint. The temptation to shatter
the exclusiveness principle by reaching for the tort weapon
whenever there is a delay in payments or a termination of
treatment is all too obvious, and awareness of this possibility has
undoubtedly been one reason for the reluctance of courts to
recognize this tort except in cases of egregious cruelty or
venality.
One final factor may be noted that has figured in many of these
cases: the presence in the statute of an administrative penalty
for the very conduct on which the tort suit is based. A majority
of the courts have taken the view that this evidences a legislative
intent that the remedy for delay in payments, even vexatious
delay, shall remain in the system in the form of some kind of
penalty.
Id. at 1268 (emphasis added) (citing 2A LARSON,
COMPENSATION LAW § 68.34(c) (1987), at 13-145).
44
Kuney v. PMA Ins. Co., 578 A.2d 1285, 1286-87 (Pa. 1990).
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stated above, has specific remedies for such a grievance. . .
. It is fruitless to argue that the appellee has nevertheless
failed to receive full indemnification for the injury he
suffered through the insurance company’s allegedly
fraudulent handling of his claim. Benefits payable under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act are normally the limit
of a worker’s recovery even though compensatory
damages in a tort action might be much higher. . . . We
have long recognized that the adequacy of [workers’]
compensation [awards] is solely a matter for the
legislature.45
Similarly, in Kelly v. Raytheon, Inc., the insurer refused to pay a
workers’ compensation award until the trial court issued a contempt
order.46 The Massachusetts Court of Appeals held that, however egregious
the insurer’s delay of payment, its obvious bad faith “adds nothing of
substance to the claim that the delay was not justified.”47 Thus, the Court
reasoned that: “the exclusivity provisions of [the Massachusetts workers’
compensation statute], in conjunction with the . . . penalties for delayed
payments, reveal a legislative intent that the remedies [for delayed
payment] should remain within the system and should be exclusive of all
other common law and statutory remedies. . . . [T]he touchstone of [this]
claim is the delay in the payment of benefits, and . . . [even] the
extraordinary duration and intensity of the dispute between the parties is
inadequate to overcome the plain legislative scheme.”48

45

Id. at 1287. In Cook v. Mack’s Transfer & Storage, 352 S.E.2d 296, 299
(S.C. Ct. App. 1986), the Court observed: “The Act itself provides for speedy
adjudication of all controversies over the processing of an injured worker’s claim
for benefits. If the dispute concerns an alleged wrongful denial of statutory
benefits, the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.
Whether the denial is willful, in bad faith, negligent, or the result of a good faith
difference is immaterial to the question of the Commission’s exclusive
jurisdiction.” The Court in Cook held that because a remedy existed under South
Carolina statute, the injured worker had no right to bring a common-law action in
the courts.
46
563 N.E.2d 1372, 1373 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990).
47
Id. at 1374.
48
Id. at 1374-75.
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B. COMMON-LAW BAD FAITH ALLOWED
A central viewpoint of those courts which have allowed a
common-law tort of bad faith in the workers’ compensation context is that
a cause of action that reaches the status of an intentional tort is not within
the purview of the exclusive remedy provisions of their state’s Act because
the exclusive remedy provisions are only designed to insulate the employer
against common-law liability for the ordinary hazards of employment. A
“bad faith” workers’ compensation claim requires the insurer to indulge in
intentional misconduct which places it outside the framework of a state’s
workers’ compensation system. Thus, the insurance company, by its own
conduct, abandons the defense that a claimant’s exclusive remedies arise
under the workers’ compensation framework when the insurer commits bad
faith.
A bad faith cause of action is a fault-based tort and does not arise
under workers’ compensation laws even when the state’s workers’
compensation framework provides the basic relationship between the
parties for the action.49 These courts have concluded that a bad faith claim
does not arise under their state’s workers’ compensation law merely
because an independent fault-based tort occurs in that context. The courts
of Iowa, Hawaii and South Dakota provide examples of this approach.
In Boylan v. American Motorists Ins. Co., the Iowa Supreme Court
recognized a bad faith cause of action by an employee against the insurance
carrier in delaying or failing to pay compensation benefits.50 The lawsuit
brought by the employee alleged that American Motorists Insurance
Company delayed and then terminated weekly wage and medical benefits
in bad faith causing an aggravation of the employee’s work-related
injuries.51 The trial court analogized the claim brought by the employee to
third-party bad faith suits which Iowa courts did not recognize and,
therefore, dismissed the claim.52 However, the Iowa Supreme Court
reversed. Referring to Iowa’s Workers’ Compensation Act, where penalties
may be assessed when benefits are unreasonably delayed or denied, the
Iowa Supreme Court declared that the Act mandated an obligation to
furnish medical and hospital supplies to an injured employee as well as to

49

Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 16 F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 1994).
489 N.W.2d 742, 742 (Iowa 1992).
51
Id.
52
Id.
50
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provide temporary disability or healing period benefits.53 The Court found
that these statutory obligations ran from the insurance company to the
employee directly making the employee’s claim analogous to a first party
bad faith lawsuit, which Iowa did recognize.54 In so holding, the Boylan
Court recognized that an implied contract existed between the workers’
compensation insurer and the injured employee.55
The Court in Boylan disregarded the penalty provision under Iowa
statute for the insurer’s wrongful conduct in the administration of
benefits.56 The Court in Boylan concluded that it was “unlikely that the
legislature intended the penalty provision in [IOWA CODE] section 86.13 to
be the sole remedy for all types of wrongful conduct by carriers with
respect to administration of workers’ compensation benefits.”57 The Court
reached this conclusion for the following reasons: (1) looking at the terms
of the penalty provision, “it provides applies only to delay in
commencement or termination of benefits;”58 (2) the penalty provision did
not contemplate the “willful or reckless acts” necessary for a bad faith
cause of action, but only negligent conduct;59 (3) the penalty provision did
not provide a remedy “for delay or failure to pay medical benefits;”60 and
(4) other jurisdictions had held that a common-law bad faith action was not

53

Id. at 743.
Iowa first recognized first party bad faith in Dolan v. AID Ins. Co., 431
N.W.2d 790, 790 (Iowa 1988). However, in Long v. McAllister, 319 N.W.2d 256,
262 (Iowa 1982), the Iowa Supreme Court refused to recognize a bad faith cause of
action permitting a third-party to recover against the tortfeasor’s liability insurer
for failing to settle a liability claim against the insured.
55
489 N.W.2d at 743. The Dolan Court also emphasized that a contractual
relationship existed between the insurer and insured. 431 N.W.2d at 794. The
insurer in Dolan was found to have a duty to act in the best interest of the insured
because of its insurance contract with the insured. Id. Applying this duty to the
facts of Boylan, the Supreme Court found that American Motorists Ins. Co., whose
contract was with the employer, had a duty to act in good faith to the employee
who was not a party to the insurance contract. 489 N.W.2d at 744.
56
See IOWA CODE § 86.13 (1991); Boylan, 489 N.W.2d at 744.
57
Boylan, 489 N.W.2d at 744.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
54
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precluded by “[p]enalty provisions for mere delay in payment or improper
termination of benefits.”61
The Hawaii courts permit a cause of action for insurer bad faith in
the workers’ compensation context.62 In Hough v. Pacific Ins. Co., Ltd., the
Court held “[b]y its plain language, HRS § 386-5, and indeed, the entire
workers’ compensation scheme, applies only to ‘work injuries.’”63 In
Hough the plaintiff filed a claim for, inter alia, bad faith and intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress against his previous
employer’s workers’ compensation insurer for injuries allegedly incurred in
the handling of his claim for benefits. The Court ruled that “[b]ecause
Hough's common-law tort claims do not ‘arise under’ HRS Chapter 386,
the director of labor and industrial relations does not have original
jurisdiction under HRS § 386-73.” 64 Additionally, the Court found that the
relevant statutory language under Hawaii’s Workers’ Compensation Act
did not reasonably envision emotional and physical suffering allegedly
61

Id. The Boylan Court’s interpretation of legislative intent is questionable.
The Court’s reasoning that IOWA CODE § 86.13 applied only to delay in
commencement or termination of benefits and not to delays at other times would
appear to frustrate the purpose of § 86.13. Just as the Court concluded that “it
[was] unlikely that the Legislature intended the penalty provision . . . to be the sole
remedy” for delays in payment, it is equally unlikely that the Iowa Legislature
intended to award penalties only for damages in commencement or termination of
benefits. Id. There is no rational basis to make the distinction between the two
types of payments and the court did not attempt to make such a distinction. The
Court’s conclusion that the penalty provision did not provide a remedy “for delay
or failure to pay medical benefits” is also flawed because section 86.13 does apply
to delay or termination of benefits inasmuch as it does not list specific benefits. See
IOWA CODE § 86.13 (1991); Boylan, 489 N.W.2d at 744. Section 86.13 is broad
enough to provide a penalty for all types of benefits allowable under the Workers’
Compensation Act. Finally, the Court’s reasoning that the penalty provision
“contemplates negligent conduct rather than the willful or reckless acts” required
for a bad faith action can be questioned. Boylan, 489 N.W.2d at 744. Certainly the
fact that the Iowa Legislature adopted a penalty of “fifty percent of the amount of
benefits that were unreasonably delayed or denied” was a substantial penalty to
deter wrongful conduct. IOWA CODE § 86.13 (1991). Moreover, if the Iowa
Legislature had intended to allow a common-law cause of action, the Legislature
could have statutorily provided for a bad faith cause of action.
62
Hough v. Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., 927 P.2d 858, 869-70 (1996). Hawaii’s
exclusivity statute is HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-5 (1993).
63
Hough, 927 P.2d at 865.
64
Id. at 867.
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caused by an insurer’s outrageous and intentional denial of medical
benefits and disability payments as an injury arising out of and in the
course of employment.65
The South Dakota courts have recognized a cause of action for bad
faith in the workers’ compensation context. The South Dakota courts
follow a two-prong test in cases of alleged bad faith failure to pay by a
workers’ compensation carrier:
[F]or proof of bad faith, there must be an absence of a
reasonable basis for denial of policy benefits and the
knowledge or reckless disregard [of the lack] of a
reasonable basis for denial, implicit in that test is our
conclusion that the knowledge of the lack of a reasonable
basis may be inferred and imputed to an insurance
company where there is a reckless disregard of a lack of a
reasonable basis for denial or a reckless indifference to
facts or to proofs submitted by the insured.
Under these tests of the tort of bad faith, an insurance
company, however, may challenge claims which are fairly
debatable and will be found liable only where it has
intentionally denied (or failed to process or pay) a claim
without a reasonable basis.66
In Hein v. Acuity, the South Dakota Supreme Court discussed the
unique contours of a bad faith cause of action in the workers’ compensation
context:
65

Id. at 866. See also Catron v. Tokio Marine Mgmt., Inc., 978 P.2d 845, 84950 (1999). Under Hawaii law, a bad faith cause of action against a workers’
compensation insurer is originally cognizable in court and does not fall within the
original jurisdiction of the director under HAW. REV. STAT. §386. Jou v. Nat’l
Interstate Ins. Co. of Hawaii, 157 P.3d 561, 567 (Haw. Ct. App. 2007). A workers’
compensation insurance carrier has a duty to act in good faith in dealing with
workers’ compensation claimants, and a breach of this duty gives rise to a cause of
action in tort for insurer bad faith. Wittig v. Allianz, 145 P.3d 738, 743 (Haw. Ct.
App. 2006); See also Hough, 927 P.2d at 869-70. A reasonableness standard
governs bad faith claims in Hawaii. Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d
334, 347 (Haw. 1996).
66
Walz v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 556 N.W.2d 68, 70 (S.D. 1996) (citing
Champion v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 399 N.W.2d 320, 324 (S.D. 1987)).
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Customarily, bad faith litigation can be classified as either
first- or third-party bad faith. Third-party bad faith is
traditionally based on principles of negligence and arises
when an insurer wrongfully refuses to settle a case brought
against its insured by a third-party. Third-party bad faith
exists when an insurer breaches its duty to give equal
consideration to the interests of its insured when making a
decision to settle a case.
First-party bad faith, on the other hand, is an intentional
tort and typically occurs when an insurance company
consciously engages in wrongdoing during its processing
or paying of policy benefits to its insured. In these cases,
the parties are adversaries, and therefore, an insurer is
permitted to challenge claims that are fairly debatable.
However, a frivolous or unfounded refusal to comply with
a duty under an insurance contract constitutes bad faith.
Wrongful conduct toward an employee claimant by the
employer’s insurer in a workers’ compensation case does
not fit the traditional definition of either first- or third-party
bad faith. A bad faith claim related to workers’
compensation is not based on an insurer’s refusal to settle
its own insured’s suit as in third-party cases, but exists
when an insurer breaches its duty to deal in good faith and
fairly when processing a workers’ compensation claim.
And, unlike first-party bad faith, the claimant, not the
insured employer, brings the action against the insurer.
Nonetheless, it is within the first-party bad faith context
that multiple jurisdictions, including South Dakota,
recognize a bad faith cause of action based on an insurer’s
conduct in a workers’ compensation case. . . .
[T]here exists a key difference between bad faith in a
workers’ compensation action and bad faith in a traditional
first-party insured-insurer relationship.
In workers’
compensation cases, the claimant is not the insured. In true
first-party claims, there exists a contractual relationship,
whereby the insurer has accepted a premium from its
insured to provide coverage. Under those circumstances,
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we recognized . . . that bad faith can extend to situations
beyond mere denial of policy benefits.
Nonetheless, in a dispute between a workers' compensation
claimant and the employer's insurer, no contractual
relationship exists. . . . Bad faith arising out of workers’
compensation proceedings does not have the necessary
attribute of a traditional first-party bad faith claim, i.e., a
contractual relationship.67
A bad faith action cannot proceed once the South Dakota
Department of Labor has determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to
benefits.68 Thus, claimants must exhaust administrative remedies.
C. PARTIAL IMMUNITY
A few courts have found that their state’s workers’ compensation
statutes grant immunity to insurers for routine bad faith delay claims but
allow a common-law tort action where extreme misconduct is involved.69
This approach has been utilized by the courts in Alaska70 and Florida.71 As
an example, in Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of New York, Inc., the
Alaska Supreme Court held that ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155 was enacted
67

Hein v. Acuity, 731 N.W.2d 231, 235-36 (S.D. 2007) (internal citations
omitted).
68
Zuke v. Presentation Sisters, Inc., 589 N.W.2d 925, 930 (S.D. 1999) (citing
Jordan v. Union Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1031 (D. S.D. 1991)).
69
See, e.g., McCutchen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 699 F. Supp. 701, 711 (N.D.
Ind. 1988) (holding insurer’s mockery of claimant while repeatedly refusing to pay
psychiatric treatment claims rose to the level of a separate tort committed during
claim settlement and was not barred by workers’ compensation statute); Cont’l
Cas. Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 567 So. 2d 1208, 1219 (Ala. 1990) (stating delay of
payment cannot give rise to tort actions unless delay is “so outrageous in character
and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as utterly intolerable in a civilized society”); Young v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 492 A.2d 1270, 1279 (Md. 1985) (holding claimant’s stated cause
of action when she alleged insurance carrier forced her to submit to psychiatric
exam for sole purpose of making her abandon her claim or commit suicide).
70
Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y., 526 P.2d 37, 43-44 (Alaska
1974).
71
Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., 905 So. 2d 84, 95 (Fla. 2005).
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by Alaska’s Legislature to cover situations where the employer or insurer
negligently, or willfully, failed to make timely compensation payments to
claimants.72 However, the Court held that ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155,
Alaska’s penalty statute, was not intended to operate as the exclusive
remedy for all intentional wrongdoings.73 In those circumstances where
there has been tortious conduct that goes beyond the bounds of untimely
payments, the Court in Stafford held that exclusive immunity from suit
provided by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act is lost.74
The Court in Stafford observed that normally an insurer must
investigate claims in order that the compensation scheme of payments for
actual injuries will be properly administered. However, intentional torts
committed in connection with the investigation of claims and payments
thereof are not protected.75 In Stafford, the claimant alleged that
Westchester did more than delay in making benefit payments; claimant
asserted that Westchester intentionally and maliciously misled him about
his right to compensation and discouraged him from exercising his rights,
resulting in emotional injury. The Court in Stafford held that these types of
allegations, if proven, could form the basis of an independent bad faith tort
action.
The Court in Stafford adopted the rationale of the California
Supreme Court in Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch.76 The Alaska Supreme Court’s
observation of the Unruh decision was that the Unruh Court had reasoned
that the insurer obtained immunity by being the alter ego of the employer,
and that exclusive immunity was lost when the insurer exceeded its proper
role in the process. The Unruh Court had concluded that the insurer’s
committing of intentional torts, placed the insurer outside the role of being
the alter ego of the employer, and became a “person other than the
72

Stafford, 526 P.2d at 43.
Id. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155(e) (1962) is one of several provisions in the
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act that directly penalizes employers for failure to
comply with the Act’s requirements. The statute provides for a civil penalty up to
$1,000 for failure to file reports. ALASKA STAT. § 23.50.155(e) (1962). Under
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155(f) (1962), a 25% penalty on unpaid awards payable
under the terms of an award. The Commission can also award attorney’s fees to
claimants. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.145 (1962). The employer faces felony
liability for failure to pay compensation due. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.255
(1962).
74
Stafford, 526 P.2d at 43.
75
Id. at 43-44.
76
Id. at 43 (adopting Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063 (Cal. 1972)).
73
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employer” against whom the employee is entitled to bring a civil action for
damages. The Unruh Court refused to allow tort recovery for negligent acts
by the insurer reasoning that the system of workers’ compensation would
be subjected to a process of partial disintegration as a result. However, the
Unruh Court found that permitting suits for intentional torts would
subserve the laudable objectives of the compensation scheme, while
encouraging the insurer to fulfill its proper role in that scheme.77
In Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., the Florida Court recognized that
minor delays in payment, and conduct amounting to simple bad faith in
claim handling procedures of the employee’s compensation claim are
protected by immunity.78 The Court stated that mere delay of payments or
simple bad faith in handling workers’ compensation claims are not
actionable torts, and that employees are not permitted to transform such
simple delays into actionable torts cognizable by the courts.79 However,
where the conduct of the insurer goes beyond a simple claim of delay or
termination of benefits and alleges harm caused subsequent to and distinct
from the original workplace injury, the Court found that Florida’s Workers’
Compensation Act did not permit compensation insurance carriers to cloak
themselves with blanket immunity in circumstances where the carrier has
not merely breached the duty to timely pay benefits, or acted negligently,
but has actually committed an intentional tort upon an employee. The Court
stated:

77

Id. at 42-43 (citing Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063, 1073) (Cal.
1972)).
78
Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., 905 So. 2d 84, 91 (Fla. 2005).
79
Id. See also Sheraton Key Largo v. Roca, 710 So. 2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998) (stating an employee cannot avoid the exclusivity of the workers’
compensation law and transform a mere delay in payments into an actionable tort
simply by calling that delay outrageous, fraudulent, deceitful, or an intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Assoc. Indus. of Fla. Prop. & Cas. Trust v. Smith,
633 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“Because Florida’s compensation
law contains mechanisms to insure timely payment and provides an array of
sanctions which may be imposed when a carrier wrongfully withholds payment,
the remedy under the act is exclusive.”); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Whitworth, 442
So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (determining that while the employee
alleged a bad faith refusal to timely compensate him for his disabilities, the
complaint did not allege that the insurance carrier intentionally harmed the
employee).
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The workers’ compensation system was never designed or
structured to be used by employers or insurance carriers as
a sword to strike out and cause harm to individual
employees during the claim process and then provide a
shield from responsibility for an employee’s valid
intentional tort claim for that conduct through immunity
flowing under the law. Most certainly, the workers’
compensation system was never intended to function as a
substitute for an employee’s right to seek relief in a
common law intentional tort action against an employer or
insurance carrier, but was only intended to provide
employers and insurance carriers with immunity for
negligent workplace conduct which produced workplace
injury. Minor delays in payments, and conduct amounting
to simple bad faith in claim handling procedures of the
employee’s compensation claim have been captured within
the immunity.80
The Court in Aguilera held that an insurance carrier that utilizes the process
of administering benefits to intentionally injure a worker is not afforded
immunity.81
D. BREACH OF CONTRACT THEORY
The courts in Delaware82 and Utah83 have found that their state’s
Workers’ Compensation Act did not bar a cause of action brought in
contract against the claimant’s workers’ compensation insurer. As an
example, in Pierce v. Int’l Ins. Co. of Illinois, the Delaware Supreme Court
ruled that Delaware’s Workers’ Compensation Act did not bar a cause of
action in contract brought by claimants against a workers’ compensation
insurance carrier alleging bad faith delay in payment of claims.84
According to the Court in Pierce, the claimant is limited to contract
remedies which include breach, consequential and punitive damages.85
80

Aguilera, 905 So. 2d at 91.
Id. at 98.
82
Pierce v. Int’l Ins. Co. of Ill., 671 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1996).
83
Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 1995).
84
Pierce, 671 A.2d at 1362.
85
Id. at 1367.
81
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However, damages for emotional distress do not arise from the breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing when the insurer allegedly acts in
bad faith by delaying payment of claims.86
The Utah Supreme Court in Savage v. Educators Ins. Co.
concluded that injured workers cannot pursue a tort action for bad faith.87
This was predicated upon the jurisprudence of Utah which had previously
held that a breach of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair
dealing did not give rise to a tort claim because the claim was actionable
only as a contractual breach.88 Because injured claimants do not have a
contractual relationship with the workers’ compensation insurer, the Court
in Savage held that no cause of action exists between the injured employee
claimant and the workers’ compensation insurer for breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.89 To support this conclusion, the Court in
Savage recognized that a cause of action in favor of employees against an
insurer for the manner in which it adjusted a workers’ compensation claim
was inconsistent with the workers’ compensation scheme and, in fact,

86

Id.
Savage, 908 P.2d 862, 866.
88
Id.
89
Id. The relationship between a workers’ compensation insurer and an
injured employee is different from the relationship between an insurance company
and a normal third-party. However, some courts examining the relationship have
concluded that it involves the same level of intimacy as does the relationship
between an insurer and a first-party insured. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio,
706 P.2d 1258, 1272 (Colo. 1985) (holding that covered employee stands in the
same position as an insured in a private insurance contract). The roots of this
relationship are grounded in the purpose of workers’ compensation statutes, which
is to provide speedy, equitable relief to injured employees. See State Tax Comm’n
v. Indus. Comm’n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984). Under worker’s
compensation statutes, employees relinquish their common-law claims against
their employers in return for the promise that employers and their workers’
compensation insurers will fairly compensate them for injuries sustained in the
course of employment. From the time of injury, employees in most areas rely on
workers’ compensation insurers for protection from the severe financial adversity
associated with disabling injuries. This reliance, combined with the exclusive
control workers’ compensation insurers exercise over the processing of claims
creates a considerable disparity in bargaining power. Thus, injured employees are
particularly vulnerable to delaying tactics and other bad faith acts by workers’
compensation insurers. See Scott Wetzel Servs., Inc. v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 804, 810
(Colo. 1991).
87
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could do substantial harm to the workers’ compensation system as a whole.
The Court observed:
[B]eyond the legalistic objection to appellant’s position,
we must point out that if delay in medical service
attributable to a carrier could give rise to independent third
party court actions, the system of workmen’s
compensation could be subjected to a process of partial
disintegration. In the practical operation of the plan, minor
delays in getting medical service, such as for a few days or
even a few hours, caused by a carrier, could become the
bases of independent suits, and these could be many and
manifold indeed. The uniform and exclusive application of
the law would become honeycombed with independent and
conflicting rulings of the courts. The objective of the
Legislature and the whole pattern of workmen’s
compensation could thereby be partially nullified.90
The Court in Savage observed that Utah’s workers’ compensation
system contemplated situations where a claim for medical benefits was
denied by a workers’ compensation insurer.91 Under the Workers’
Compensation Act, an employee who disagreed with the denial of benefits
could apply for a hearing with the Industrial Commission.92 Therefore, the
Court found that the workers’ compensation system provided an efficient
and definite remedy to employees who disagreed with the decision of a
workers’ compensation insurer.93 The Court observed that both the
Legislature and the Commission provided penalties to be imposed where an
insurer or employer delayed payment without good cause.94

90

Savage, 908 P.2d at 867 (citing with approval the Florida Court of Appeals
in Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 So. 2d 658, 660-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979)); see also Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 342 P.2d 976, 979-80 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959).
91
Savage, 908 P.2d at 867.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
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II. LEGISLATIVE
INTERVENTION
AFTER
JUDICIAL
RECOGNITION OF A COMMON-LAW BAD FAITH TORT.
In a few instances, the state legislatures have reacted to their state’s
judicial adoption of a common-law bad faith tort in the workers’
compensation context by passing legislation to strengthen the exclusivity
provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act to include bad faith
misconduct. These corrective legislative attempts have experienced mixed
success.
The seminal case for extending bad faith tort responsibility to
workers’ compensation claimants is the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s
decision in Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co.95 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Coleman reasoned that a bad faith action predicated upon
the settlement practices of the workers’ compensation insurer was an
“independent” claim for injuries that was not covered by the Wisconsin
Workers’ Compensation Act.96 The Court rejected the insurer’s contention
that the Workers’ Compensation Act provided the claimant’s sole remedy
reasoning that the available compensation remedy is exclusive, “only if the
injury falls within the coverage of the Act.”97 The injury asserted by
Coleman, according to the Court, was “distinct in time and place” from the
original industrial injury and, as such, it did not fall within the purview of
Wisconsin’s Workers’ Compensation Act.98 Therefore, the Court
concluded, the exclusivity provision of the Act was not a bar to a claim
grounded on tort principles. In finding that Coleman’s injury was separate
and distinct from the original injury suffered in the course of employment,
and not merely an aggravation or extension of the original injury, the Court
in Coleman quoted Professor Larson to illustrate its finding:
It is true that but for the original injury the investigation
would never have been undertaken and the second injury
would not have occurred. But must we go on to say that the
carrier acquires complete tort immunity ever after for
anything its agents do to carry out their investigation?
Suppose the agent had decided to burglarize the claimant's
house to get needed evidence. Suppose claimant died of
95

Coleman v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 221 (Wis. 1979).
Id.
97
Id. at 222.
98
Id. at 223.
96
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fright on seeing the burglar. Is the compensation act the
exclusive remedy, merely because the activity involved,
which was the collecting of evidence, was in the
mainstream of the agent's duties?
Again, suppose a claimant has a compensable broken toe,
and is being tailed by a photographer. Claimant sees him in
the bushes, a scuffle ensues, and claimant receives a skull
fracture as a result of a blow from the camera. Is this skull
fracture nothing but an aggravation of the broken toe?99
The Court in Coleman focused upon the Compensation Act’s
penalty provision, finding that it did not foreclose an action for the tort of
bad faith. The Court found that the penalty provision was designed to avoid
litigation by promoting the automatic payment of benefits where there was
no justification for delay.100 In instances where the insurer inexcusably
delayed payment due to its own mismanagement or deficient
administration, the penalty provision was applicable.101 However, the Court
based its decision, allowing for a bad faith cause of action, on the public
policy consideration of providing a remedy in instances where the penalty
provision may be wholly inadequate.102 “The inexcusable-delay provision .
. . does not contemplate that the intentional tort of bad faith can be expiated
merely by payments augmented in the amount of 10 percent.”103 Where
insureds have been harmed to the extent that the remedies available in the
penalty provision are inadequate, the insured can bring an action for the tort
of bad faith.104
99

Id. at 223-24 (quoting 2A ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW, § 65.00, at 13-36 to 13-37 (1978)).
100
Coleman, 273 N.W.2d at 224 (interpreting WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.22(1)
(West 1977) allowing for increase of compensation award of 10% as penalty for
inexcusable delay of payments).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. (citing Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329, 331 (1st Cir. 1974)
(federal Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act does not
prohibit separate tort action for insurer’s bad faith conduct outside bounds of Act);
Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y., 526 P.2d 37, 43 (Alaska 1974)
(penalty provision of Alaska’s Workers’ Compensation Act no bar to recovery of
intentional bad faith torts of insurer committed in processing worker’s claim)).
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The Wisconsin Legislature successfully overturned the Coleman
decision in 1981 when it replaced the old penalty provision of the Workers’
Compensation Act with a new penalty provision giving an exclusive
remedy for an insurer’s bad faith conduct.105
In Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. 1992), the
Indiana Supreme Court permitted workers to sue workers’ compensation
insurers for bad faith.106 The Court observed that Indiana’s statutes granted
a right to injured employees to assert actions for damages against persons
other than the employer or a fellow employee.107 The Indiana courts had
consistently held the exclusive remedy provisions do not apply to bar the
right of an employee to assert actions against third-parties.108 Under Indiana
law, the exclusive remedy provisions precluded separate actions for
employee injuries only when the injury or death (a) occurred by accident,
(b) arose out of employment, and (c) arose in the course of employment.109
Actions for employee injuries or death not meeting each of these
prerequisites were not excluded and could be pursued in the courts.110 The
Indiana courts observed:
The relationship of the compensation insurance carrier to
the employer should not afford it special immunity.
Various entities may also be involved in assisting
employers in fulfilling their obligations under the worker's
compensation laws. Ambulance services, physicians,
hospitals, pharmacies, medical device manufacturers, and
others may participate in providing medical and
rehabilitative care covered by worker’s compensation. We
find no adequate justification to absolve worker's
compensation insurance carriers and other such third
parties of their responsibilities in the event of additional

105

See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(3)(bp) (West Supp. 1984) (providing
exclusive remedy for employers or insurers’ bad faith conduct through lesser of
200% of compensation due or $15,000).
106
Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327 (Ind. 1992).
107
Id. at 330 (citing IND. CODE § 22-3-2-13 (1992)).
108
Stump v. Commercial Union, 601 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 1992); Rosander
v. Copco Steel & Eng’g Co., 429 N.E.2d 990, 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
109
Evans v. Yankeetown Dock Corp., 491 N.E.2d 969, 973 (Ind. 1986).
110
Id.
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injuries or harm proximately caused by their actionable
conduct.111
After the Stump decision, the Indiana Legislature enacted IND.
CODE § 22-3-4-12.1(a), the so-called bad faith statute, which became
effective in July 1997. The statute provides as follows:
The worker’s compensation board, upon hearing a claim
for benefits, has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine
whether the employer, the employer’s worker’s
compensation administrator, or the worker’s compensation
insurance carrier has acted with a lack of diligence, in bad
faith, or has committed an independent tort in adjusting or
settling the claim for compensation.112
Based upon the statutory language, the Compensation Board has exclusive
jurisdiction in bad faith situations.113
In Borgman v. State Farm Ins. Co., the constitutionality of
Indiana’s workers’ compensation bad faith statute was challenged.114 It was
argued that the statute violated the “open courts” provision of the Indiana
Constitution115 because the statute improperly granted the Board authority
to consider claims beyond work-related incidents.116 The Court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute finding that the Indiana Legislature, in
enacting the bad faith statute, had merely acted to restrict the remedy
available for a breach of duty imposed upon the worker’s compensation
insurance carrier.117 Additionally, the Court in Borgman noted that the
statute did nothing more than designate the proper forum for bringing the
enumerated claims against the worker’s compensation insurance carrier and
did not operate to strip the Borgmans of an established right of recourse.
While the Wisconsin and Indiana Legislatures were successful in
re-establishing exclusivity after their courts had permitted a common-law
bad faith tort, the Arizona Legislature was unsuccessful. In two opinions
111

Stump, 601 N.E.2d at 331.
IND. CODE ANN. §22-3-4-12.1(a) (West 2011).
113
Borgman v. State Farm Ins. Co., 713 N.E.2d 851, 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 855.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 856.
112
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the Arizona Court of Appeals held that the exclusivity doctrine of
Arizona’s Workers’ Compensation Act did not bar common-law actions for
bad faith against workers’ compensation carriers.118 In response to these
cases, the Arizona Legislature enacted ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-930 which
provides in relevant part:
A. The Commission has exclusive jurisdiction as
prescribed in this section over complaints involving
alleged unfair claim processing practices or bad faith
by an employer, self-insured employer, insurance
carrier or claims processing representative relating to
any aspect of this chapter. The commission shall
investigate allegations of unfair claim processing or
bad faith either on receiving a complaint or on its own
motion.
B. If the Commission finds that unfair claim processing or
bad faith has occurred in the handling of a particular
claim, it shall award the claimant, in addition to any
benefits it finds are due and owing, a benefit penalty of
twenty-five per cent of the benefit amount ordered to
be paid or five hundred dollars, whichever is more.
C. If the Commission finds that an employer, self-insured
employer, insurance carrier or claim processing
representative has a history or pattern of repeated
unfair claim processing practices or bad faith, it may
impose a civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars for
each violation found. The civil penalty shall be
deposited in the state general fund.
Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-930(E), the Commission was charged with
adopting rules to define unfair claim processing practices and bad faith. In
formulating those rules and definitions, the Commission was statutorily
required to consider “among other factors, recognized and approved claim
processing practices within the insurance industry, the Commission’s own

118

Boy v. Fremont Indem. Co., 742 P.2d 835 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Franks
v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 718 P.2d 193 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
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experience in processing workers’ compensation claims and the workers’
compensation and insurance laws of [Arizona].”
In Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co., the Arizona Supreme Court
considered the Legislature’s adoption of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-930. The
issue before the Court was whether the statute deprived the courts of
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s common-law action for bad faith. The Court in
Hayes questioned whether the timing of the statute’s adoption expressed a
legislative intent to overrule the prior case law establishing a common-law
tort of bad faith.119 The Court noted that the penalties imposed by ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 23-930 were relatively modest. Although the penalty amount
was not dispositive in itself to the Court’s ruling, the Court observed that it
could not say that the penalties were so flexible, and the administrative
remedies so comprehensive, that the Legislature must have intended for
them to provide the sole remedy for, or deterrent to, the serious abuses that
the common-law addresses.120 At the conclusion of its statutory analysis,
the Court in Hayes concluded that ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-930 did not
divest Arizona courts of jurisdiction over the common-law causes of action
previously recognized by the courts.121
III. STATUTORY PENALTIES AND DETERRENCE.
Workers’ compensation statutes often contemplate questionable
denials of benefits and provide remedies to the injured employee by
providing a forum for the resolution of those types of disputes and, in many
119

Hayes v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 872 P.2d 668, 672 (Ariz. 1994).
Hayes, 872 P.2d at 675 (citing Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S.
200, 216 (1994) (statutory scheme so comprehensive that it, along with statute’s
history, demonstrated legislative intent to preclude district court review of
administrative orders); CETA Workers’ Org. Comm. v. City of N.Y., 617 F.2d
926, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1980) (the statutes comprising the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act cannot be construed to authorize a private right of
action for breach because “the totality of these provisions, comprehensive and
well-crafted to the Act’s administrative, institutional, and political exigencies,
affirms the primacy and suggests the exclusivity of the [administrative] procedures
. . . .”). See also Carpentino v. Transport Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 556, 561 (D. Conn.
1985) (relatively low penalties are an important factor in determining whether to
allow common-law tort actions); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Holland,
469 So. 2d 55, 58 (Miss. 1985) (penalty provisions for workers’ compensation bad
faith inadequate to deter intentional carrier wrongdoing).
121
Hayes, 872 P.2d at 678.
120
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cases, contain penalty provisions designed to provide a remedy for
unreasonable conduct on the part of the insurance company.122 As an
example, in Texas an insurer is subject to a 15% penalty if the insurer fails
to pay benefits or file a notice of controversion within 20 days of receiving
notice of the claim.123 Additionally, a 12% penalty plus “reasonable
attorney’s fees for the prosecution and collection of the claim” may be
imposed as a sanction against an insurer who fails to promptly pay the
proceeds of a settlement.124 In Alaska, an employer can be subjected to a
civil penalty up to $1,000 for the failure to file reports125 and can face a
20% penalty on unpaid awards payable under the terms of an award. The
Workers’ Compensation Commission can also award attorney’s fees to
claimants.126 Significantly, an employer can face felony liability for failure
to pay compensation due.127
In Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co.128 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the common-law tort of bad faith was barred by the exclusivity
provisions of Illinois’ Workers’ Compensation Act. Central to the Court’s
finding was the observation that Section 19(k) of the Illinois Workers’
Compensation Act provided for the payment of penalties of 50% of the
amount of compensation payable whenever “there has been any
unreasonable or vexatious delay of payment or intentional underpayment of
compensation, or proceedings have been instituted or carried on by the one
liable to pay the compensation, which . . . are merely frivolous or for
delay.”129 The Court found that the statute was applicable not only to cases
involving ordinary delay without justification, but also where the delay was
malicious.130 The Court held that a common-law action should not, without
other evidence of legislative intent, be held to survive the Act’s exclusivity

122

See, e.g., Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 866, 870-72 (Ill.
1983) (claim for vexatious delay and alleged outrageous conduct held to be within
the penalty provision of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and such remedy
was exclusive).
123
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 18(a) (repealed by Acts 1989, 71st
Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, § 16.01(7) to (9), eff. Jan. 1, 1991).
124
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.208(d) (West 2005).
125
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155(c).
126
See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.145.
127
See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.255.
128
Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 866, 867 (Ill. 1983).
129
ILL. REV. STAT.1973, ch. 48, par. 138.19(k).
130
Robertson, 448 N.E.2d at 869.
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provisions merely because the remedy provided in the Act for the injury
alleged applies to other kinds of injuries as well.131
However, some jurisdictions have allowed bad faith claims despite
the existence of statutory penalties. In general, these jurisdictions have
based their conclusions on two factors: (1) the failure of the relevant
statutes to identify specific penalties for bad faith or injurious delay of
payment; and (2) a failure to provide penalties to adequately compensate
employees for the real harm suffered as a result of delayed payments.132
Examples of the former reasoning can be found in Iowa and Colorado. An
example of the latter reasoning can be found in Arizona.
The Iowa and Colorado courts have permitted bad faith lawsuits
because their state WCA statutes did not have penalty provisions
specifically addressing bad faith. The Court in Boylan v. American
Motorists Ins. Co. concluded that it was “unlikely that the legislature
intended the penalty provision in [Iowa’s WCA] to be the sole remedy for
all types of wrongful conduct by carriers with respect to the administration
of workers’ compensation benefits.”133 The Court in Boylan observed that
Iowa’s penalty provisions only applied to delays in the commencement or
termination of workers’ compensation benefits134 but did not address issues
131

Id. In Perfection Carpet, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 630 N.E.2d
1152, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), the Court observed that the purpose of the
Workers’ Compensation Act was to provide financial protection to workers for
accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. Under Section
5(a) of Illinois’ Workers’ Compensation Act, workers do not have a common law
or statutory right to recover damages from their employer for an injury sustained
while in the line of duty other than the compensation provided in the Act. Illinois’
Workers’ Compensation Act also recognized that under certain circumstances
additional compensation or penalties should be assessed against the insurance
carrier. Section 19(k) provided penalties in the amount of 50% of the amount of
compensation payable where “there has been any unreasonable or vexatious delay
of payment or intentional underpayment of compensation.” The Court noted that
Section 19(l) provided additional compensation where “the employer or his
insurance carrier shall without good and just cause fail, neglect, refuse or
unreasonably delay the payment of weekly compensation benefits due to an injured
employee during the period of temporary total disability.” The Court reaffirmed
the Robertson decision.
132
See, e.g., Gibson v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220, 220 (Me.
1978); Aranda v. Ins. Co. of North Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 210 (Tex. 1988);
Coleman v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 220 (Wis. 1979).
133
Boylan v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Iowa 1992).
134
Id.
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regarding compensation benefits themselves because there was no
provision within the Iowa statute for penalty benefits for failing to provide
appropriate medical care.135 The Court in Boylan implicitly suggested that
the penalty provisions were nothing more than some sort of administrative
prod to dissuade insurance carriers from negligence in claims handling, but
that the penalty statutes did not specifically contemplate willful, reckless,
or otherwise egregious acts that the recognition of a tort of bad faith would
be presumed to cover.136 The Colorado Supreme Court in Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Savio, observed that while the penalty provisions in Colorado’s
Workers’ Compensation Act applied to conduct which violated the Act, the
penalty statutes137 did not provide any direct remedy to employees who
may claim injuries from the same conduct which is proscribed by the
penalty provisions. 138
There is wide variation regarding the nature and extent of penalties
provided by the various state Workers’ Compensation Acts. Courts have
reached differing conclusions as to whether penalty provisions provide
adequate deterrence for insurer misconduct in the workers’ compensation
context. As an example, in Arizona, the courts have determined that the
penalty statutes in Arizona’s Workers’ Compensation Act do not provide
significant deterrence. In Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co., the Arizona
Supreme Court noted that the penalties imposed by the Workers’
Compensation Act139 were relatively modest.140 In assessing the strength of
135

Id. (citing Klein v. Furnas Elec. Co., 384 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Iowa 1986)).
See Michelle M. Lasswell, Workers’ Compensation – Employee’s
Allegations that Workers’ Compensation Insurer Terminated His Benefits in Bad
Faith Stated Bad Faith Tort Claim Against the Insurer – Boylan v. American
Motorists Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1992), 43 DRAKE L. REV. 477, 478
(1994); Fenton, supra note 12, at 850-51.
137
See 3 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-43-304, 8-43-305, 8-43-306, 8-43-401, 8-43401.5 (2010).
138
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1276 (Colo. 1985).
139
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-930 (1987).
140
Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co,, 178 Ariz. 872 P.2d 668, 675 (citing Thunder
Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 216 (1994) (statutory scheme so
comprehensive that it, along with statute’s history, demonstrated legislative intent
to preclude district court review of administrative orders)); CETA Workers’ Org.
Comm. v. City of N.Y., 617 F.2d 926, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1980) (the statutes
comprising the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act cannot be construed
to authorize a private right of action for breach because “the totality of these
provisions, comprehensive and well-crafted to the Act’s administrative,
136
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the penalty provisions set forth in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-930(B), the Court
in Hayes noted:
A.R.S. § 23-930(B) authorizes a penalty, payable to the
claimant, of 25% of the amount wrongfully withheld or
$500, whichever is greater. In addition, under section (C),
if the Commission finds a pattern of abuse, it may impose
a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation, payable
to a special fund rather than to the claimant. This penalty
structure seems to discourage claimants from bringing bad
faith claims if the amount in controversy is small because
there is little chance of recovering enough money to pay an
attorney. It is an equally weak deterrent to bad faith
practices in larger cases because a 25% penalty can easily
be absorbed by an insurer who selectively targets abusive
practices to those cases likely to succeed. Moreover, even
if an insurer faces the added penalty for a pattern of abuse,
the penalty is only $1,000, regardless of the amount the
insurer wrongfully withholds. Thus, in cases in which a
$1,000 fine is small compared to the amount the insurer
would stand to gain, the fixed fine provides little deterrent
to unfair practices if the insurer selects only those cases in
which the practices are most likely to succeed in
preventing workers from pressing genuine claims. It is
therefore questionable whether these penalties are adequate
to discourage bad faith practices. This, of course, is not to
say that the legislature could not have meant a relatively
weak set of remedies to be the sole remedy for bad faith
practices, but it more logically indicates the opposite
intent.141

institutional, and political exigencies, affirms the primacy and suggests the
exclusivity of the [administrative] procedures . . . .”). See also Carpentino v.
Transport Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 556, 561 (D. Conn. 1985) (relatively low penalties
are an important factor in determining whether to allow common-law tort actions);
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Holland, 469 So. 2d 55, 58 (Miss. 1985)
(penalty provisions for workers’ compensation bad faith inadequate to deter
intentional carrier wrongdoing).
141
Hayes, 872 P.2d at 676 n.14.
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However, the New Mexico Supreme Court observed that New
Mexico’s Workers’ Compensation Act penalty provisions provided
sufficient deterrence to prevent an insurer from denying benefits in bad
faith while enforcing the public policy against the bad faith handling of
workers’ compensation claims. In Cruz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., the New
Mexico Supreme Court interpreted Section 52-1-28.1 and considered its
effect on bad faith claims.142 Specifically, the New Mexico Supreme Court
considered the size of the award available to the worker. The Court stated:
Further, Section 52-1-28.1 provides an adequate remedy.
The purpose of the bad-faith action in the Act is to secure
benefits for the employee and penalize the employer or
insurer. Under Section 52-1-28.1, the employee receives all
compensation for benefits due and owing and “shall
receive” an extra “benefit penalty” of up to twenty-five
percent of the claim. Section 52-1-28.1(B). Although this
penalty may not be a great amount when the amount of the
claim is small, it provides sufficient deterrence to prevent
an insurer from denying benefits in bad faith and enforces
the public policy against the bad-faith handling of workers’
compensation claims. In addition, although this Section
may not provide a recovery for emotional distress or an
award of punitive damages, we previously have held that
“the employer or insurer’s liability is limited to that set
forth in the Act.”143
IV. UNIFYING REMEDIES FOR BAD FAITH
EXCLUSIVITY AND INCREASED PENALTIES.

THROUGH

Cogent legal analysis supports the competing views adopted by
various courts in deciding whether to permit or disallow a common-law
cause of action for insurance company bad faith in the workers’
compensation context. Judicial reluctance to permit a common-law bad
faith remedy as an exception to the exclusive remedy rule stems from a
judicial unwillingness to tamper with what courts see as the fixed terms of
the carefully designed legislative bargain underlying workers’

142
143

Cruz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 889 P.2d 1223, 1226 (N.M. 1995).
Id.
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compensation.144 Courts taking this view regard the exclusive remedy rule
as a reluctantly conceded bargaining chip essential to the original deal and,
in turn, to the preservation of the compensation system.145 Some of these
courts perceive that their authority to modify the bargain is constrained and
therefore they defer to legislatures for the enactment of any needed
reforms.146 Indeed there are sound policy reasons for denying such claims.
As an example, the Court in Noe v. Traveler’s Ins. Co. recognized that “if
delay in medical service attributable to a carrier would give rise to
independent third-party court actions, the system of workmen’s
compensation could be subjected to a process of partial disintegration.” 147
The Court observed “the uniform and exclusive application of the law
would become honeycombed with independent and conflicting rulings of
the courts. The objective of the Legislature and the whole pattern of
workmen’s compensation could thereby be partially nullified.”148

144

The Workers’ Compensation Acts shift from the employee to the employer
the risk of work-related injuries incident to modern industrial activity. In return,
they require the worker, as a condition for receiving the benefits of the Acts, to
surrender his or her right to sue a common law. This balancing of advantages is
embodied in the exclusive rights and remedies provision of the respective Act.
The exclusive remedy provision typically bars all actions against an employer
where a personal injury to an employee comes within the Act. The exclusive
remedy provision makes the Act the exclusive means of settling all such claims.
However, the amount of compensation available under the Act may be
substantially less than could be recovered in a successful common-law action; but
in other cases, the employee will receive benefits he would not otherwise have
enjoyed because of his inability to establish the employer’s common-law liability.
This is the balance that was struck by the state legislatures in order to afford the
widest practical coverage for work-related injuries.
The Workers’ Compensation Act provides an exclusive remedy of
compensation and derogation of common-law rights and is not cumulative or
supplemental thereto but wholly substitutional. The compensation afforded by the
Act is statutory in character, and the right of any claimant thereto is dependent
upon the terms and conditions of the statute. These include the procedures for
adjudicating a compensation claim as well as the terms and conditions of
substantive entitlement.
145
See Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers’
Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1654 (1983).
146
Id.
147
Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 342 P.2d 976, 979 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
148
Id. at 979-80.
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One commentator has correctly observed that a bad faith cause of
action “stems” from the same source as the original action – a compensable
workers’ compensation injury.149 Certainly, a cause of action for bad faith
arises out of the originating statutory proceedings. “[T]he fact that a
claimant makes application for workers’ compensation benefits under the
policy and under the Act is tied to the fact that there was a compensable
injury in the first place.”150
It is hard to argue, conceptually, with the notion that insurer bad
faith is “inextricably interwoven” with the insurer’s status in the workers’
compensation process. Reasoning that investigation by an insurer
“constitutes a service ‘inextricably interwoven’ with the insurer’s status,”
the Court in Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch. concluded that as long as the insurer
acts within the role contemplated by the Act, liability should not be
imposed beyond the provisions within the Act.151 However, the tortious
conduct constituting bad faith occurs “after the injury, outside the
workplace, and away from the employer. It occurs in the context of
administration and investigation of the claim under the insurance policy . . .
.”152
Courts have circumvented the exclusivity provisions of workers’
compensation statutes by allowing an independent action against an insurer
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.153 As an example, in Unruh
v. Truck Ins. Exch., the Court allowed the claimant to recover for the
intentional torts committed by the insurer under the dual capacity doctrine.
149

Lasswell, supra note 136.
Fenton, supra note 12, at 851.
151
Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498 P.2d 1063, 1071 (Cal. 1972). The Court
reinstated the counts alleging assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and punitive damages for the reason that such insurer conduct removed
the insurer from its normal role. Id. at 1073.
152
Fenton, supra note 12, at 851.
153
See Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 329, 331 (1st Cir. 1974)
(intentional infliction of mental and emotional suffering under Maine law);
Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of New York, 526 P.2d 37, 39, 42 (Alaska
1974) (conscious infliction of mental distress); Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 498
P.2d 1063, 1073 (Cal. 1972) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); see also
Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 427 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(intentional infliction of emotional distress); Gibson v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Ins. Co.,
387 A.2d 220, 222 (Me. 1978) (intentional infliction of physical and emotional
distress); Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257, 261-62 (Mont. 1980)
(intentional infliction of emotional distress).
150

2012

JURISPRUDENTIAL SURVEY OF BAD FAITH

493

154

The dual capacity doctrine allows an injured employee a separate tort
against his employer who has dual legal personalities; one as an employer
and another in a secondary non-employer capacity.155 The Court in Unruh
found that the insurer had stepped out of its proper role of “insurer”156 by
embarking upon a detestable course of conduct and, therefore, as one acting
under a different capacity, should not be afforded protection under the
workers compensation exclusivity provision.157
As this case law developed, courts appeared to act upon a concern
that there would be a wave of tort actions based on intentional delays and
154

Unruh, 498 P.2d at 1063 (Cal. 1972).
See Duprey v. Shane, 249 P.2d 8, 13-15 (Cal. 1952).
156
Some employers do not purchase workers’ compensation insurance at all.
They are authorized to act as self-insurers under the state’s Workers’
Compensation Act. Some courts have held that self-insureds may be held directly
liable for bad faith in the handling of a worker’s compensation claim. See, e.g.,
Falline v. GNLV Corp., 823 P.2d 888, 893 (Nev. 1991); Sizemore v. Cont’l. Cas.
Co., 142 P.3d 47, 54 (Okla. 2006). The Court in Reedy v. White Consol. Indus.,
Inc., 503 N.W.2d 601, 603 (Iowa 1993), observed: “[We] see no distinction
between a workers’ compensation insurance carrier for an employer and an
employer who voluntarily assumes self-insured status under the act.”
Some states levy fines against self-insureds who delay payments but it has
been observed that “although administrative fines may have some deterrent effect
on self-insured employers, they do not purport to address the plight of the injured
worker who may suffer great deprivation as a result of the tortuous denial or delay
of his or her benefits.” Falline, 823 P.2d at 894; see also Hough v. Pac. Ins. Co.,
927 P.2d 858, 868 (Haw. 1996). At least one court has found that a self-insured’s
bad faith exposure cannot be avoided by contracting out its claim handling
functions to a third-party administrator (TPA). See, e.g., Scott Wetzel Servs., Inc.
v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 804 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).
A question arises as to whether a TPA can be held directly liable for bad faith.
The few courts that have considered this issue are split on the issue. As an
example, some jurisdictions have held that because the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing imposes obligations of a non-delegable nature and because there is a
lack of privity between the TPA and the insured employee, the TPA cannot be held
directly liable. See, e.g., Simmons v. Congress Life Ins. Co., 791 So. 2d 360, 365
(Ala. Civ. App. 1998) rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ex parte Simmons, 791 So.
2d 371 (Ala. 2000). See also Walter v. Simmons, 818 P.2d 214 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991). However, other courts have found that TPAs may be directly liable “even in
the absence of contractual privity with the employee.” E.g., Scott Wetzel Services,
Inc., 821 P.2d at 813; see also Dellaira v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 102 P.3d 111, 115
(N.M. Ct. App. 2004).
157
Unruh, 498 P.2d at 1077.
155
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terminations of payments. Some courts began to demand that the insurer’s
conduct be “conspicuously contemptible.”158 Under this rationale, an
insurer’s mere delay in making compensation payments would not be a
sufficient basis on which to ground an action in tort.159
Generally, outrageous or deceitful conduct was needed to maintain
a tort action outside the exclusive remedy provision.160 Mere delay in
making compensation payments would not be a sufficient basis to ground
an action in tort while only extreme and outrageous conduct would be
actionable at common law.161 Clearly, the conduct which gives rise to the
158

See Martin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 497 F.3d 329, 330 (1st Cir. 1974) (insurer
stopped payment on valid compensation payments only after claimant had
deposited and made withdrawals against them, resulting in severe embarrassment
and emotional distress); Coleman v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220, 221
(Wis. 1979) (action for tort of bad faith and intentional infliction of emotional
distress after insurer stopped payments three times, causing plaintiff to be evicted).
159
See Martin, 497 F.2d at 331 (mere late payment not sufficient basis for tort
action); Stafford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. Inc., 526 P.2d 37 (1974)
(tortuous conduct must go beyond untimely payments to pierce exclusivity
defense); Unruh, 498 P.2d at 1071-72 (mere negligence of compensation carrier
will not give rise to tort liability); Coleman, 273 N.W.2d at 224 (mere delay is
adequately compensated by 10% penalty award).
160
Ricard v. Pac. Indem. Co., 183 Cal. Rptr. 502, 506 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(outrageous and deceitful conduct needed to maintain tort action outside exclusive
remedy provision); Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 427 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1981) (outrageous conduct required to state action in tort).
161
The state of Alabama has attempted to reconcile the concept of exclusive
remedy with the provision of the limited intentional torts of “outrageous conduct”
or “intentional infliction of emotional distress.” This approach addresses standard
or simple bad faith under the Workers’ Compensation Act while extreme bad faith
is handled outside the Act. This leaves a gap where moderate bad faith is not
adequately addressed by the Act and not allowed as an independent tort.
A tort claim against a workers’ compensation insurer alleging a bad faith
failure to pay an insurance claim is barred by the exclusivity provisions of
Alabama’s Workers’ Compensation Act. Stewart v. Matthews Indus., Inc., 644 So.
2d 915, 918 (Ala. 1994) (citing ALA. CODE §§ 25-5-11, -52, -53 (1975); Farley v.
CNA Ins. Co., 576 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 1991); Garvin v. Shewbart, 442 So. 2d 80
(Ala. 1983)); Oliver v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 1025, 1026 (Ala. 1989);
Nabors v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 489 So. 2d 573 (Ala. 1986); Moore v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 468 So. 2d 122 (Ala. 1985); Waldon v. Hartford Ins. Grp., 435 So. 2d 1271
(Ala. 1983). Although the Alabama Supreme Court has held that a claim alleging
bad faith failure to pay an insurance claim, in the context of a workers’
compensation claim, is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act, the court
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has also recognized that the tort of outrageous conduct or intentional infliction of
emotional distress can occur in a workers’ compensation setting. See, e.g., Farley,
576 So. 2d at 158 and Garvin, 442 So. 2d at 80. The Court in Stewart observed:
The [Workers’ Compensation] Act is designed to compensate
those who are injured on the job and provides immunity from
common law suits for those employers and carriers who come
within the Act. A suit seeking recovery under the tort of
outrageous conduct does not seek compensation [or] medical
benefits for the original on-the-job injury. The connection with
the physical injury that gave rise to the original workmen’s
compensation claim is tenuous. The conduct giving rise to the
tort of outrageous conduct in the context of this kind of case can
be more accurately characterized as mental assault than as
failure to pay compensation or medical benefits even though it
may arise in a failure to pay context. Conduct constituting the
tort of outrageous conduct cannot reasonably be considered to be
within the scope of the Act. When the employer or carrier’s
conduct crosses the line between mere failure to pay and intent
to cause severe emotional distress, the cloak of immunity is
removed.
Stewart, 644 So. 2d at 918 (emphasis added) (citing Garvin, 442
So. 2d at 83).
Under Alabama law, the tort of outrageous conduct or intentional
infliction of emotional distress involves “extreme and outrageous conduct” by one
who “intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another.” Am.
Road Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361, 365 (Ala. 1980). In order to present a
case of outrageous conduct, the plaintiff must show that the conduct was “so
outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized society.” Am. Road Serv. Co., 394 So. 2d at 365. See also Cates v. Taylor,
428 So. 2d 637 (Ala. 1983); Bearden v. Equifax Services, 455 So. 2d 836 (Ala.
1984); Strickland v. Birmingham Bldg. & Remodeling, 449 So. 2d 1242 (Ala.
1984).
The severe emotional distress required for the tort of outrage requires the
following:
“The emotional distress … must be so severe that no reasonable person
could be expected to endure it. Any recovery must be reasonable and justified
under the circumstances, liability ensuing only when the conduct is extreme.” Am.
Road Serv. Co., 394 So. 2d at 365.
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tort of bad faith can be independent enough from the workplace injury to be
considered as not being truly under the umbrella of the workers’
compensation system.162 The problem lies in finding the separation point
where the exclusive remedy principle becomes a tangential issue to the
recognition of a tort remedy for bad faith rather than a sticking point which
calls into question the entire cause of action. Some bad faith conduct is
extreme in nature which separates the tortious bad faith conduct by the
insurer or its agent from the original workplace injury, which was
otherwise meant to be compensated by the no-fault workers’ compensation
system.
Statutory remedies may provide a reasonable method to resolve
common cases of payment delay or refusal, however some remedy
provisions do not contemplate the harm which may arise from an insurer’s
intentional bad faith conduct.163 Compensation laws should be exclusive
only when they provide an adequate remedy.164 Are the penalties adequate?
Virtually all states have enacted statutory penalty provisions to
provide a remedy for an insurer’s inexcusable or unreasonable withholding
of benefits.165 The penalties are added to the amount of unpaid
compensation166 and range from 10%167 to 200%.168 In some states

The outrageous conduct must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
Farley, 576 So. 2d at 158.
162
Boylan v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Iowa 1992).
163
Gibson v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220, 223 (Me. 1978)
(penalty provision of Workers’ Compensation Act not sufficient to redress
claimant since fines assessed to insurer paid to state rather than claimant);
Coleman, 273 N.W.2d at 224 (10% remedy provision does not adequately
compensate worker for detriment occasioned by intentional tort).
164
Stafford, 526 P.2d at 43.
165
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-221(e) (2011) (providing 15% penalty for
insurer’s inexcusable delay of compensation benefits); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
39, § 104-A(2) (1984) (forfeiture of $25 per day for insurer’s failure to pay
compensation); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 18a(a) (West 1985)
(providing for 15% penalty of all past due compensation).
166
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:658 (West 1978) (12% of difference
between amount tendered or paid and amount found due); 820 ILCS 305/19(k)
(percentage award of compensation “additional to that otherwise payable”);
W.S.A. § 102.18(1)(bp) (percentage of “total compensation due”).
167
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 5814(b) (West 2004) (10% for delay); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 440.20(7) (West 2011) (punitive penalty of 20% of unpaid installment).
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attorney’s fees may be awarded.169 Oftentimes the penalty provisions are
fixed to a specific percentage of the compensation award irrespective of the
quality of the insurer’s misconduct.170 Some states have adopted penalty
provisions which take into consideration instances where an insurer acts
intentionally or unreasonably in denying benefits by increasing the
percentage awarded to the claimant.171
The penalties can be significant. As an example, the Illinois statute
increases the penalty to 50% of the benefits due where the insurer has
unreasonably or vexatiously delayed payments, intentionally underpaid
compensation, or instituted frivolous proceedings for the purpose of delay
where no real controversy ever existed as to the insurer’s liability for
paying the compensation.172 Under Wisconsin’s penalty provision, a
claimant may have his or her unpaid compensation benefits increased by
25% where the insurer has not acted in “good faith” in processing a
claim.173 The Wisconsin penalty statute also provides for those instances
when a carrier engages in “malicious or bad faith” conduct by awarding a
claimant “the lesser of 200% of total compensation due or $15,000.”174
Under the Wisconsin statute, the Department of Labor defines what
conduct demonstrates malice or bad faith in assessing a penalty. Under
168

See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp) (West 2011) (up to 200% or $30,000
penalty may be assessed against insurer for malicious or bad faith failure to pay
compensation benefits).
169
See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 48/138.16 (West 2011) (reasonable attorney’s
fees are recoverable where insurer’s delay is unreasonable); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22:658 (punitive penalty of 12% and “all reasonable attorney’s fees for the
prosecution and collection of such amount”).
170
See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 5814(b) (West 2004) (penalty fixed at 10% of
compensation award); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-705(e) (2011) (penalty designated at
set rate of 15% after 14 days); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. Ann. art. 806, § 18a (West
2011) (penalty not to exceed 15% of unpaid compensation).
171
See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/155 (2004) (penalty imposed against insurer
whose actions are “unreasonable,” “vexatious,” or “intentional”); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 23:1201 (percentage penalty plus attorney’s fees where insurer’s conduct
“arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause”); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
176.225(1) (penalty assessed against insurer who acts “unreasonably or
vexatiously”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp) (penalty imposed where insurer’s
conduct malicious or in bad faith).
172
See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/19 (k) (West 2011).
173
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(b) (West 2010).
174
See id. § 102.18(1)(bp).
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Wisconsin common law, however, in order to show an insurer’s “bad faith”
the plaintiff must show “[t]he absence of a reasonable basis for denying
benefits of the policy and the defendant’s knowledge or reckless disregard
of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.”175
Penalty statutes can hold an insurer accountable for its actions by
imposing fair and adequate penalties where the circumstances dictate.
Penalty statutes can also provide the claimant with an adequate remedy for
any detriment he or she may have suffered and create an incentive for the
insurer to act reasonably in settling an employee’s claim. Additionally, by
barring common-law recoveries, exclusive remedy penalty provisions can
foreclose the possibility of high damage verdicts being assessed against an
insurer and the possible disintegration of the workers’ compensation
scheme. Certainly the adoption of a bad faith tort action can assist in
equalizing the bargaining power between the worker and insurer during
claim processing by prompting the insurer to act reasonably and in good
faith in processing claims.176 Significant penalties can also achieve this
goal.

175

See Anderson v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978).
See Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Wis.
1981) (bad faith action good policy since promotes assurance workers “exclusive
remedy will not be denied through the intentional wrongdoings of the insurer”);
accord Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972) (insureds
forced to take insurance contracts “as is,” leaving little or no remedy); Christian v.
Am. Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899, 902 (Okla. 1977) (insured has essentially no
bargaining power in insurance contract; relegated to terms of contract as basis of
decision to extend insured’s bad faith tort action). But see Hayes v. Aetna Fire
Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257, 262-63 (Mont. 1980) (Harrison, J., specially
concurring) (recognition of independent action may place insurers at disadvantage
in settle claims).
In Izaguirre v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 749 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. App.
1988), the court found that the penalties provided by Texas’ Workers’
Compensation Act were not exclusive remedies for any wrongful denials or delays
of payments stating “a special relationship arises out of the parties’ unequal
bargaining power and the nature of insurance contracts which would allow
unscrupulous insurers to take advantage of their insured’s misfortunes in
bargaining for settlement or resolution of claims.” Id. at 554. The court in
Izaguirre went on to state that the statutory regulation and existing statutory
penalties were not adequate to equalize the bargaining power between workers and
insurers in settling claims. Id. at 554-55. But see Bowen v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co.,
512 So. 2d 248, 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
176
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One commentator has observed that through the promulgation of
statutory penalties and guidelines, a state legislature can fashion a “bad
faith” remedy to compensate employees for the detriment they may suffer
as a result of insurer “bad faith” while the insurer is protected by limiting
the amount which may be recovered.177 The commentator’s legislative
proposal was modeled after the statutes which had been enacted in Illinois,
Minnesota and Wisconsin.178 The proposal, which includes statutorily
regulated penalties for an insurer’s bad faith conduct, is aimed at balancing
the bargaining powers between the parties by creating an incentive for the
insurer to deal fairly and in good faith when processing a claim.”179 The
following is the proposed amendment to state Workers’ Compensation
Acts:
Additional Award as Penalty for Bad Faith Conduct of
Insurance Carriers or Employers in the Processing or
Settlement of Employee Claims
(a) After notice and a hearing or upon the opportunity to
be heard,180 the [insert name of jurisdictional body, i.e.,
Industrial Commission], or upon appeal, a court of
competent jurisdiction, may in its discretion award
additional compensation which it considers just, up to,
but not exceeding, the lesser of 200% of the
compensation then past due or $70,000181 in any case
where an insurance carrier or employer has:
448 N.E.2d 866 (Ill. 1983); Gonzales v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 659 P.2d 318, 320
(N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
177
Frederick L. Streck, III, Bad Faith Claims Practices in Texas – Do They
Exist?: Extending a Bad Faith Cause of Action to Texas Workers’ Compensation
Insurance Claimants, 16 ST. MARY’S L.J. 679, 703 (1985).
178
Id. at 704 (citing 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/19(k) (West 2011);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(1) (West 1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp)
(West 2010)).
179
Streck, supra note 178, at 704.
180
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(1) (West 1985) (providing party against
whom proceeding brought opportunity to be heard so as to refute charges against
him and provide due process under law) cited in Streck, supra note 178, at 704
n.137.
181
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp) (West 2010) (where the
compensation commission was empowered to award just compensation “not to
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(1) instituted proceedings and/or interposed a
defense where no real or present controversy
exists as to the carrier's liability to pay the
compensation, but which are only frivolous or
are for delay;182 or
(2) unreasonably, vexatiously, or in bad faith
delayed or refused compensation payments;183
or
(3) intentionally underpaid compensation.184
(b) The penalty award as provided in this section is to be
the employee's exclusive remedy against an insurance
carrier or employer for engaging in conduct described
in subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3).
(c) Actions or conduct rising to the level described in
subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) are to be defined by

exceed the lesser of 200% of total compensation due or $15,000”) cited in Streck,
supra note 178 at 704 n.139.
182
See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/19(k) (West 2011) (penalty available
where “proceedings have been instituted or carried by one liable to pay the
compensation, which do not present a real controversy, but are merely frivolous or
for delay”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(1)(a) (West 1985) (“instituted a
proceeding or interposed a defense which does not present a real controversy but
which is frivolous or for the purpose of delay”) cited in Streck, supra note 178 at
704-05 n.140.
183
See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/19 (k) (West 2011) (penalty imposed
where insurer’s conduct unreasonable or vexatious in delaying payments); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp) (West. 2010) (statute sets applicable standard of
recovery for bad faith action) cited in Streck, supra note 178, at 705 n.141.
184
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.225(1)(d) (West 1984) (penalty may be
imposed where employer or insurer has “intentionally underpaid compensation”')
cited in Streck, supra note 178, at 705 n.142.
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rule of the [insert name of jurisdictional body, i.e.,
Industrial Commission].185
The commentator contemplates that the penalty provision will be
discretionary with the governing Industrial Commission or the courts.186
The proposed amended statutory penalty provision addresses the
social cost associated with permitting tort liability in the workers’
compensation context.187 The author of the amendment provides the
following support for the amendment’s adoption:
The exclusive remedy proviso of the legislative enactment
has the distinct advantage of guaranteeing greater
protection for the employee and, at the same time, the
proposal adequately insulates the insurer from liability in
tort and its resultant high damages. The insulation of the
insurer from excessive liability in tort will also ultimately
protect the consumer by indirectly maintaining the price of
goods. In a workers’ compensation situation, the employer
pays the premium to the insurer with the employee being
named as a third-party beneficiary. When the insurer is
burdened with a tort verdict, the penalty passed on to the
employer in the form of increased premiums are thereafter
transferred to the consumer through an increase in the cost
of the employer’s goods and services. This ‘passing the
buck’ situation would be almost nonexistent under the
proposed legislation due to the reduced likelihood of
insurer tort liability.188

185

See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(bp) (West 2010) (“department may, by
rule, define actions which demonstrate malice or bad faith”) cited in Streck, supra
note 178, at 705 n.144.
186
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.18(1)(b) (West 2010) (imposition of
penalty left to discretion of department of labor); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. §
176.225(1) (West 1985) (assessment of penalty award discretionary with
compensation judge or court) cited in Streck, supra note 178, at 705 n.145.
187
See Glenn L. Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need for Legislative
Intervention, 13 PAC. L.J. 833, 857 (1982) (society as the consumer ultimately
bears the risk of loss in the form of higher premiums for policies sold occasioned
by unlimited tort verdicts rendered against insurers).
188
Streck, supra note 178, at 706.
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The proposed amended statutory penalty provision is triggered by a
single act of bad faith and the available penalty compensation is based
upon a specific delayed payment. An alternative approach would be to
establish a two tier monetary penalty provision. Instructive is the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners’ (“NAIC”) Model Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act which utilizes a two tier penalty structure.
The first tier of monetary penalties under the NAIC Model Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices Act has a per-violation cap of $1,000 and an
aggregate cap for all violations of $100,000.189 Second tier penalties are
applicable where the violation was committed “flagrantly and in conscious
disregard of [the] Act.”190 Many jurisdictions trigger tier two penalties
where the insurance company knew or should have known that its conduct
violated their respective Acts.191 Second tier penalties are capped at
$25,000 for each violation with an aggregate cap of $250,000.192
189

See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.125(a)(13) (2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-461(A)(12) (2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 507B.4(9)(l) (West 1988); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 304.12-230(12) (West 2004).
190
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1542(1) (2004); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2601
(McKinney 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(11) (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE §
26.1-04-03 (2000).
191
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1108(a) (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 38a-817(b) (West 2000); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 18 § 2308(a)(1) (2005); GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-6-8(a)(1) (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:12-201(a)(1) (1993).
The Alaska Legislature provided its Commissioner with the elements to be
considered and weighed in assessing the amount of a monetary penalty. The
Alaska Commissioner is to consider: (1) the amount of loss or harm caused by the
violation; (2) the amount of benefit derived by the insurance company by reason of
the violation; (3) the seriousness of the violation; (4) the promptness and
completeness of the insurance companies remedial action; (5) whether a single act
or a pattern of practice was involved; and (6) deterrence. ALASKA STAT. §
21.36.320 (2004).
The South Dakota Legislature provided similar guidance to its
Commissioner. In determining an appropriate penalty, the Division of Insurance
will balance four specific factors of the insurance company and the insured: (1) the
magnitude of the harm to the insured or claimant; (2) the actions taken by the
insurance company, insured and/or claimant that either lessen or worsen the result
of the violation; (3) any impediments that the insured or the claimant caused to the
insurance company in either the process or the settling of the claim; and (4) the
actions of the insurance company, specifically those that worsen the harm to the
claimant or the insured from the violation. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33-68
(2000).
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In order to use a two tier penalty system where the most severe
penalties are based upon both flagrant and conscious disregard of the
Workers’ Compensation Act, there would need to be built into the
Workers’ Compensation Act a provision for monitoring insurance company
misconduct across various claims.
In the context of the NAIC Model Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act, seventeen states have adopted provisions in their Act which
require insurance companies to maintain records regarding complaints of

Vexatious conduct has been elaborately addressed by the Missouri
Legislature in the context of third party claim settlement practices. MO. ANN.
STAT. § 375.420 (West 2002). There are seven elements that the Missouri courts
look to in conducting an analysis of vexatiousness under the Unfair Claims Act.
First, the insured’s claim must be assessed and determined as it was presented to
the insurance company at the time it was presented. Hopkins v. Am. Econ. Ins.
Co., 896 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). Second, the insured must show
that the refusal to pay by the insurance company “was willful and without
reasonable cause of excuse, as facts would have appeared to a reasonable person
before trial.” Id.; accord State ex. rel. Pemiscot County, Missouri v. Western
Surety Co., 51 F.3d 170, 174 (8th Cir. 1995); Nelson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 359 F.
Supp. 271, 298 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Bickerton, Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 898
S.W.2d 595, 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). Third, the “existence of a litigable issue,
either factual or legal, does not preclude the statutory penalty where there is
evidence that the insurer’s attitude was vexatious and recalcitrant.” Liberty Life
Ins. Co. v. Schaffer, 853 F.2d 591, 592 (8th Cir. 1988). Fourth, a holding that
coverage is adverse to the insurance company in and of itself does not mandate
damages be assessed to the insurer’s vexatious delay in paying. Id. at 593; see also
Morris v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 895 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
Fifth, the insurance company is liable for vexatious delay in paying when it
continues to refuse to pay even after it becomes aware that its defense is without
merit. Kostelec v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 64 F.3d 1220, 1227-28 (8th Cir.
1995); Allen v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 753 S.W.2d 616, 620-21 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988). Sixth, despite the fact that the insurance company may have had a
valid dispute on a question of law or fact up through trial, does not prevent a
statutory penalty for unfairly treating the insured. DeWitt v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co., 667 S.W.2d 700, 710 (Mo. 1984) (en banc). Seventh, a jury may consider all
of the evidence and surrounding circumstances of the case and even without any
direct evidence, find the insurance company guilty of a vexatious delay. Laster v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 693 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
192
ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.125(a)(11) (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20461(A)(10) (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-816(6)(j) (2000).
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improper claim handling.193 Typically these states require insurance
companies to keep a “complete record of all complaints of its insureds.”
Most states that impose this requirement specify that the records must
indicate the total number of complaints, their classification by type of
insurance, the nature of each complaint, the disposition of the complaint,
and the time it took to process each complaint.194 While most states require
information regarding “complaints,” four states (Vermont,195 Florida,196
Kansas197 and Massachusetts198) also require recordation of any
“grievance” in addition to “complaints.” Only New Hampshire requires an
annual report to the insurance department regarding complaints.199
Moreover, New Hampshire permits claimants to use this information in
administrative and judicial proceedings.200
Evidence as to the numbers and types of complaints to the
insurance department against an insurer, and said
department’s complaint experience with other insurers
writing similar lines of insurance, shall be admissible in
evidence in an administrative or judicial proceeding
brought under this title, provided that no insurer shall be

193

ARK. CODE. ANN. § 23-66-206 (4)(A) (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
38a-816(7) (West 2004); DEL. CODE. ANN., tit. 18 § 2304(17); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
626.9541 (1)(i)(3)(j); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2404(10) (West 2000); LA. REV.
STAT. § 22:1214(17) (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 176D § 3(a)(10) (West 2007);
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 500.2026(2) (LexisNexis 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. §
33-21-105(i) (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417:4(XV)(a)(13) (209); N.J. STAT.
ANN. 17:29B-4(10) (West 2007); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2601(b) (McKinney 2009);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 36 § 1250.5(14) (West 2011); 40 PA. STAT. ANN.
§1171.5(a)(11) (West 1999); TEX INS. CODE ANN. § 21.21-3(b)(6) (repealed 2005);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4 724(10) (2005); W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(10)
(LexisNexis 2011).
194
Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and West
Virginia.
195
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4724(10) (2005).
196
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541 (1)(i)(3)(j) (West 2004).
197
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2404(10) (West 2000).
198
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 176D § 3(a)(10) (West 2007).
199
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417:4(XV)(a)(13) (2009).
200
Id. § 417:4(XV)(b).
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deemed in violation of this section solely by reason of the
numbers and types of such complaints.201
The standard time frame for keeping this complaint information is
from the date of the last insurance department examination. However,
Massachusetts only requires the information to be kept for two years;202
Oklahoma requires information to be kept for three years or since the date
of its last financial examination, whichever is longer;203 Texas requires the
information be kept for three years or since the date of its last examination,
whichever time is shorter;204 and Pennsylvania requires the information to
be kept for a four year period.205
To effectively work within the workers’ compensation context,
insurers would be required to keep statistics on each penalty imposed,
including the nature of the misconduct and the penalty award amount,
during the processing of a claim. The insurer would also need to maintain
statistics which allow aggregate calculations to be generated. To some
extent, misconduct would need to be aggregated into categories and each
award would have to identify the specific misconduct category(ies) found
as the basis of the award. Categorization would permit necessary
standardization to permit the statistical analysis. Penalties could also be
categorized to correspond to the misconduct type. Statistics would be state
specific.
Abandoning a common-law tort of bad faith in favor of an
exclusive penalty regulatory approach has three distinct advantages: (1)
uniformity in the standard of conduct; (2) an efficient administrative
hearing process; and (3) accurate record keeping.
A. UNIFORMITY IN THE STANDARD OF CONDUCT.
A regulatory approach would bring certainty regarding appropriate
and inappropriate conduct. Currently, the common-law tort of bad faith is
defined by vague legal constructs like “good faith and fair dealing” or “fair
debatability.” The creation of a specific inventory of regulated improper
claim handling practices would provide greater certainty to the insurance
201

Id. See also N.Y. INS. LAW § 2601(b) (McKinney 2009).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176D § 3(a)(10) (West 2007).
203
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 1250.5(14) (West 2011).
204
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.005 (West 2005).
205
40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1171.5(a)(11) (West 1999).
202

506

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.2

industry regarding what conduct is forbidden in the workers’ compensation
context and, conversely, what specific conduct should be engaged in. As an
example, the NAIC Model Act proscribes fourteen unfair claims practices.
The Model Act contains a general requirement that insurance companies
“adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation
and settlement of claims arising under its policies.”206 The various
Industrial Commissions could do the same.
B. AN EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING PROCESS
A regulatory administrative adjudicatory process would have the
benefit of a knowledgeable trier of fact. The administrative adjudicatory
process, utilizing administrative hearing officers or administrative law
judges, brings to the hearing process a knowledgeable trier of fact who
understands the purpose of the WCA as well as the focused workers’
compensation segment of the insurance industry and its standards, customs
and practices. Because the trier of fact will have a significant understanding
of the insurance industry, the workers’ compensation penalty hearing
process can be abbreviated and become more focused upon creating a
record regarding each individual claim which can then be aggregated into
an annual report for oversight purposes.
Utilization of a regulatory administrative hearing process can lead
to speedy resolution of disputed claims through an abbreviated
administrative hearing process that limits discovery. By limiting discovery
and abbreviating the overall process, lower costs in presenting the claim
should be realized.
C. ACCURATE RECORD KEEPING
A regulatory administrative approach would permit a better record
to track improper claim handling practices within an insurance company so
that when penalties are assessed there is an adequate record, especially for
tier two penalties, to prove a pattern or frequency in improper claim
handling. Although the aggregate of penalties in a given year may
approximate a large monetary loss, insurance company executives will not
206

See, e.g., 2 Nat’l Ass’n Ins. Commissioners Proc. 367-70 (1976). The Act
and regulations are also set out at II National Association of Insurance
Commissioners Official NAIC Model Insurance Laws, Regulations and
Guidelines, 890-1 to 890-4, 900-1 to 900-10 (2011).
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be able to be dismissive about what produced the financial loss, i.e., a
rogue jury.
The availability of accurate information regarding the failure of a
particular insurance company’s claim handling guidelines within its field
offices is essential to positive change. Presently, only 13 states require
insurance companies to keep records regarding all complaints and/or
grievances made as the result of perceived claim mishandling under the
NAIC Model Act.207 A uniform adoption of mandatory record keeping in
the workers’ compensation context must be a focus of any regulatory
approach to claim handling practices. Requiring insurance companies to
provide detailed annual reports to the insurance department and industrial
commission in the states in which they underwrite business regarding the
number of complaints and grievances classified by type of violation and
information regarding the nature of each complaint, together with the
complaint’s disposition would assist not only insurance departments in
regulating the industry, and assist administrative law judges in assessing
penalties but would also assist insurance company executives. Information
regarding fines/penalties imposed which can be allocated by classification,
together with a report of attorney’s fees expended would bring to the
forefront the true cost of claim mishandling.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts are equally divided on whether a common-law tort of bad
faith should be permitted in the workers’ compensation context. The legal
analysis used by courts for these competing viewpoints on this issue are
cogent and cannot be dismissed easily.
The respective state Workers’ Compensation Acts provide an
efficient mechanism for employees and insurers to resolve disputes relating
to work-related injuries in a timely and expeditious manner. The system
provides a knowledgeable trier of fact through experienced hearing officers
and administrative law judges. Utilizing the existing workers’
compensation system to resolve issues involving alleged insurer
misconduct and bad faith would permit a timely resolution of any
impediments to the disposition of an employee’s compensation for workrelated injuries. However, in order to provide sufficient deterrence,
207

Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont and West
Virginia.
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substantial penalties for insurer misconduct and bad faith must be provided
to the trier of fact.
Any regulatory penalty framework must include a requirement that
insurers track penalties that have been awarded with sufficient specificity
to create a positive informational feedback to insurance company executes
regarding the actual and cumulative cost of inappropriate claim processing.
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INTRODUCTION

This article describes how the Spanish property insurance cartel
was organized and operated, beginning with the introduction of legally
required Inherent Defects Insurance (“IDI”) for new housing in May 2000.
Direct insurers took initial steps in the formation of the cartel, and
reinsurance companies were crucial in spreading its anticompetitive effects
throughout the IDI market.
The Spanish National Competition Commission (“NCC”)
discovered the cartel in early 2009. By the end of the year, the three major
companies selling property insurance (Asefa, MAPFRE Empresas and
Caser) as well as the majority of the reinsurers for property insurance
(Suiza/Swiss Re, SCOR and MÜNCHENER) were fined a total of
€120,728,000.1 The companies were condemned for infringing Article
1

See Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (Spanish National Competition
Commission), Compañías de Seguro Decenal Resolución, S/0037/08 (Nov. 12,
2009) [hereinafter NCC Decennial IDI Resolution]. However, the NCC resolution
has been appealed in court and a decision is pending on several grounds (mainly
concerning the existence of a violation and the amount of the fines). See Brief, La
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (CNC) Imposes €120.728.000 in Fines on
Insurance Companies Cartel, EUR. COMPETITION NETWORK (Jan. 2010),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/01_2010/brief_01_2010_short.pdf;
Michael Bradford, Spain Charges Big Insurers Developed Construction Coverage
Cartel,
BUS.
INS.
(Nov.
23,
2009),
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101.1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”)
and Section 1 of the Spanish Competition Act (“SCA”) by organizing and
taking part in a conspiracy to raise the prices of mandatory property
insurance for new buildings.2
II.

SPANISH DECENNIAL INSURANCE FOR NEW HOUSING

The Spanish building industry sprawl of the 1980s and 1990s was
followed by complaints regarding the quality of buildings and protection of
buyers. For that reason, new legislation was enacted in the late 1990s to
strengthen and clarify liability rules in this area.
The Spanish Act 38/1999 on building regulations was put into
effect on May 6, 2000.3 The Act introduced a complete and modern legal
framework for the building industry in Spain. It clarified the duties and
liabilities of all the agents involved in the building process, with the aim of
assuring better quality of new buildings (including functionality, security
and occupancy), as well as better conditions and guarantees for purchasers
of the new buildings.
Among other relevant provisions, the 38/1999 Act requires
property promoters or developers to subscribe to a ten-year IDI policy for
newly constructed housing.4 Building developers are legally responsible for
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20091122/ISSUE01/311229973?tags=|7
6|80.
2
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art 101.1, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 88 [hereinafter TFEU], available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm; Defensa de la Competencia art. 1
(B.O.E. 2007, 159) (Spain) [hereinafter SCA] (unofficial translation available at
http://www.cncompetencia.es/Inicio/Gestion
Documental/tabid/76/Default.aspx?EntryId=18425&Command=Core_Download&
Method=attachment).
3
Ordenación de la Edificación (B.O.E 1999, 266) (Spain).
4
Articles 9.2.d and 19.1.c, and Additional Disposition 2.1 of the Spanish
Building Regulations Act gives the builder the option of buying the insurance on
behalf of the developer, who initially has the legal obligation to purchase insurance
[Section 19.2.d]. Before 2000, liability insurance for architects and builders was
available and regularly purchased in accordance with Section 1591 of Spanish
Civil Code, which makes architects and builders liable for building defects over a
period of 10 years beginning with the end of the construction work (if the defects
had to do with vices on ground, construction, or direction of building work). Based
on general insurance contract law, prior to the 1999 Act there were different
insurance products available to those involved in building work, including
professional liability insurance, liability insurance, all-risks building insurance, and
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any harm resulting from the building’s foundation and other structural
elements for 10 years after the completion of the building’s construction.
The extent of decennial liability includes material damages to the building
arising from inherent vices or defects in the masonry, supports, beams,
framework, load-bearing walls or any other structural elements that
threaten the building’s solidity, mechanical resistance and stability. The
Act makes the purchase of insurance for such liabilities compulsory, and
makes the buyer of the home the beneficiary to the policy.5 IDI provides a
mechanism for reducing or avoiding construction defects litigation.
The mandatory nature of decennial IDI, including an obligatory
100% coverage of construction management expenses, such as paying
professional fees and permits (deductibles could not exceed 1% of the total
sum insured), had the effect of providing a background in which an
anticompetitive agreement by insurance and reinsurance companies could
easily flourish. Neither policyholders (namely, housing developers) nor
insurers have much choice regarding certain features of the policy,
including whether to contract and the extent of coverage to insure.6
Obviously, in this sense, demand for decennial IDI is highly inelastic
(must-contract service).
decennial liability insurance. See Josefa Brenes, GARANTÍAS POR DEFECTOS EN LA
CONSTRUCCIÓN EN LA LEY DE ORDENACIÓN DE LA EDIFICACIÓN 51-71 (Apr.
2005); Ángel Carrasco Perera, Comentario al artículo 19, in COMENTARIOS A LA
LEY DE ORDENACIÓN DE LA EDIFICACIÓN 351, 358-66 (Ángel Carrasco Perera,
Encarna Cordero Lobato, Mª del Carmen González Carrasco eds., 3d ed. 2005).
5
According to Section 20.1 of the Spanish Building Regulations Act, the
insurance policy details must be presented to the Notary and must be included in
the public deed of the building to be registered in the Real Estate Registry. Without
this, registration is not possible, and any further sale transactions would not be
notarized. See Brenes, supra note 4, at 357-79; Antonio J. Jiménez Clar, El Sistema
de Seguros en la Ley de Ordenación de la Edificación, 6 REVISTA DE DERECHO
PATRIMONIAL 19, at 43-45, 61-64 (2001); JESÚS ESTRUCH ESTRUCH, LAS
RESPONSABILIDADES EN LA CONSTRUCCIÓN 855-59 (2d ed. 2005).
6
Contractual freedom and choice is severely limited, if not abolished,
although some authors assert that there still remains the possibility for both
potential policyholders and insurers to choose their contractual parties and alert
them to possible distortions provoked by the mandatory nature of IDI, ranging
from insurance companies’ inclusion of abusive contract terms against the insured
to excessive judicialization or an increase in housing prices. See Eduardo Pavelek
Zamora, Seguros Obligatorios y Obligación de Asegurarse, 106 REVISTA
ESPAÑOLA DE SEGUROS 235, 240 (2001); FEDERICO ARNAU MOYA, LOS VICIOS DE
LA CONSTRUCCIÓN: SU RÉGIMEN EN EL CÓDIGO CIVIL Y EN LA LEY DE
ORDENACIÓN DE LA EDIFICACIÓN 295-96 (July 2004).
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Aside from mandatory ten-year insurance coverage for building
developers, optional supplementary coverage is available in three-year
increments in accordance with the 38/1999 Act decrees on water tightness
of roofs and walls, as well as other elements that affect the stability and
habitability of a building. The Act also prescribes a one-year liability
period for the builder regarding the condition of finishing elements
(“snagging list”). Supplementary coverage for this liability is also
available. In these last two instances, insurance is not required. However,
insurance companies frequently offer voluntary, supplementary coverage to
housing promoters who purchase the mandatory decennial insurance for
new residential developments.7
The requirement of mandatory insurance was also the starting point
of a new market for decennial insurance in Spain that grew hand-in-hand
with the growth of the construction industry until 2007, but which
decreased dramatically thereafter (see Table 1).
TABLE 1. THE DECENNIAL IDI MARKET IN SPAIN (2000-2008)
Year Number of Coverage
Total Price
contracts
Amount (€)
(€)
2000 2,042
2,193,975,000
15,056,000
2001 14,948
10,471,910,000
65,486,000
2002 26,143
21,922,843,000
145,258,000
2003 26,302
31,062,129,000
225,002,000
2004 32,559
41,865,225,000
312,895,000
2005 35,157
46,650,215,000
355,069,000
2006 38,111
52,080,802,000
386,404,000
2007 36,508
50,505,917,000
355,557,000
2008 17,515
25,632,962,000
174,116,000
Source: NCC Resolution of 12 November 2009, S/0037/08, Finding of
Fact 2.4.
On the other hand, the origins and evolution of the decennial IDI
market in Spain were characterized by the substantial concentration of the
offering of this type of insurance by three companies. From the beginning,
insurers Asefa, MAPFRE and Caser together held 60% of the market.8 The
7

For more information on the additional coverage normally included in IDI
policies in excess of the mandatory coverage, see Brenes, supra note 4, at 180-86.
8
Asefa is co-owned by the French insurance company Société Mutuelle
d´Assurance du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics (SMABTP) and the French
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rest of the market was fragmented in smaller shares held by about fifteen
other insurance companies.
On the other hand, from its inception, the decennial IDI market was
deeply affected by reinsurance contracts between the four primary
reinsurers active in this market: Suiza, MÜNCHENER, SCOR and
MAPFRE RE.9 In general, the influence of reinsurers on contractual and
underwriting conditions of any direct insurance contract is well known.10
Firstly, two of the four reinsurance companies were affiliates of
two of the main IDI insurers (SCOR and MAPFRE RE). Secondly, when
mandatory IDI was established in May 2000, reinsurance contracts for
decennial IDI were structured as proportional quota share schemes, shifting
reinsurer SCOR. See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Finding of Fact
1.1, at 7. Apparently, Asefa is heavily dependent on its insurance activities in the
construction market, in which it is strongly specialized.
9
MAPFRE RE mainly reinsured the decennial IDI contracted with MAPFRE
Empresas, and later on retroceded it to the other three main IDI reinsurers. See
NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Finding of Fact 2.7, at 20. Despite
being two independent legal entities, both companies belonged to the same
corporate group, and the NCC took that into consideration when assessing their
behavior, deciding they did not deserve separate fines. See id., Legal Ground 9th,
at 68-69.
10
Underwriting philosophy and underwriting success by direct insurers are
conditions considered by reinsurers before signing a reinsurance contract with
them. See Aviva Abramovsky, Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 CONN. INS.
L.J. 345, 375 (2009) (“Just as with primary insurance, the existence of a
reinsurance agreement limits the options of insurer action if they wish to benefit
from the reinsuring agreement.”); see also id. at 377 (“Rather it is the identification
that terms and standards common to the reinsurance relationship have the potential
to affect insurance company action as regards their primary policyholder in areas
that come within the bounds of current insurance regulatory interests. Specifically,
insurer practices in underwriting and claims handling.”).. In the Decision of Dec.
20 1989, relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, the EU
Commission showed how a collaborative agreement among reinsurers restricted
competition both in German reinsurance and in direct insurance markets for
machinery loss-of-profits insurance and space insurance. See Commission
Decision IV/32.408-TEKO of 20 Dec. 1989, 1990 O.J. (L 13) 34. Indeed,
regarding the limits reinsurers face in exercising their influence on insurance
carriers, the EU Commission held that “TEKO's coordination activity goes well
beyond the influence of reinsurers that is otherwise customary on the market, since
reinsurers generally confine themselves to checking the premiums and the terms
and conditions worked out by direct insurers and neither calculate the direct
insurers' offers for them at the outset nor serve as a permanent joint information
and advisory body for a specific group of undertakings.” Id. at 36.
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a higher share of risk exposure to the reinsurers, who correspondingly
shared an even proportion of the premium.11 Premiums and losses were
shared on the same pro-rata basis (for more on this, see infra § 2.1).
Because of the agreement amongst the four reinsurers active in the IDI
market, no alternative type of reinsurance contracts were available for
purchase. This severely constrained potential competition in the market by
both direct insurers and reinsurers willing to follow other contractual
schemes.12 Only in 2007, when the cartel was brought to light by the NCC,
did facultative reinsurance contracts and non-proportional reinsurance
agreements come into use.13 Such agreements came into use in the form of
stop-loss or excess-loss, in which the basis is the loss incurred and not the
risk ceded, with the reinsurer covering a set amount of the loss exceeding
the amount retained by the insurance carrier.14
III.

THE MECHANICS OF
INSURANCE CARTEL

THE

SPANISH

PROPERTY

According to the evidence discovered by the NCC, the year after
the 38/1999 Act became effective (i.e., when mandatory decennial IDI was
established), there were contacts amongst IDI carriers and IDI reinsurers
concerning excessive competition in this new market. Apparently,
competition led to a dramatic decrease in IDI premiums, and some of the
companies active in that market decided something needed to be done to
stop that trend. It is unclear how many meetings took place and who was
part of those meetings, but it is well settled that there was a common
understanding between Asefa and MAPFRE (the IDI carriers) and Suiza,
MÜNCHENER and SCOR (the reinsurers) that premiums had to be
increased and that uniform contracting conditions should be followed
throughout the decennial insurance market.15
11

See Patrick L. Brockett, Robert C. Witt & Paul R. Aird, An Overview of
Reinsurance and the Reinsurance Markets, 9 J. INS. REG. 432, 435-37 (1991).
12
It does not seem that the proportional quota share reinsurance and the
refusal to write any other type of reinsurance contract was aimed at protecting
reinsurers’ financial health, but only to ensure that no primary insurer would be
able to sell IDI contracts that did not follow the premiums fixed by the cartel. See
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 792 (1993).
13
Indeed, no more proportional quota share treatises were written after that
time.
14
See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Findings of Fact 2.6-2.7,
at 17-20.
15
See id., Findings of Fact 3-6, at 22-23.
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The main outcome of this understanding was a draft prepared by
Asefa at the end of August 2001, entitled “Corrective Measures Decennial
Damage Insurance”, which set market-wide standards for technical and
commercial features of decennial insurance. The Asefa draft contained
some technical requirements for IDI contracting and quality control, as well
as several measures that involved a minimum price-fixing agreement. In
December 2001, after discussions with MAPFRE and the IDI reinsurers, a
new version of the document was finally agreed upon by Asefa, MAPFRE
Empresas, MÜNCHENER, Suiza and SCOR, entitled “Corrective
Measures Decennial Damage Insurance-2002”.16
A. CARTEL ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION
Several other meetings between IDI insurers, reinsurers and thirdparty IDI providers (including savings and bank associations) took place in
2002 to fine-tune the pricing conditions agreed upon for IDI contracts, but
according to the NCC, the effects of the cartel commenced in January
2002.17 Starting at that point, IDI reinsurance contracts included the agreed
upon corrective measures; indeed, minimum pricing and underwriting
conditions for direct IDI established by the cartel were annexed to
reinsurance contracts between 2002 and 2007.18
Reinsurance was key in the organization of the cartel.19 The
generalization of proportional quota share reinsurance treatises as the only
16

See id., Findings of Fact 7-11, at 23-24.
See id., Findings of Fact 13-19, at 26-28. Some cartel members raised
doubts regarding the compliance of all reinsurers with the agreed-upon corrective
measures. See id., Finding of Fact 15, at 26-27. Apparently, the most important
moment took place on May 7, 2002, when Asefa and all the reinsurers agreed to
new minimum price conditions and monthly monitoring meetings to examine
defections. See id., Finding of Fact 18, at 27-28.
18
See id., Findings of Fact 12, 20-24, at 24-26, 28. The NCC assumes a year
(from January to December) as the minimum duration of a cartel, because that is
the typical duration of reinsurance contracts. Id.
19
In other competition cases in the insurance market, authorities have found
reinsurance crucial to structuring anticompetitive behavior. See EU Commission
Decision of 30 March 1984, relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC
Treaty, ¶¶ 10, 16, 23 (IV/30.804- Nuovo CEGAM, OJ L99, of April 11, 1984, 2937) (regarding engineering insurance in Italy). In one famous U.S. case, reinsurers
were key in a conspiracy by direct insurers to change certain policy terms on
commercial liability insurance and property insurance policies (reducing risk
exposure to insurance carriers). Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,
17
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type of reinsurance available in the IDI market gave way to a situation in
which reinsurers depended greatly on the ceding insurer. Proportional
quota share reinsurance “involves the cession by reinsured of a fixed
proportion of business within the scope of the reinsurance contract to the
reinsurer.”20 Reinsurance companies did not offer alternative contractual
schemes in which the reinsured had a choice as to what risks he would
cede. Indeed, in that situation, IDI insurers could easily be considered mere
agents of the reinsurers.21 Proportional quota share treatises strengthened
the influence of the reinsurers on the IDI market.22 As the most profitable
775-77, 792 (1993); see also Edward Correia, How to Reform the McCarranFerguson Act, 22 MEMPHIS STATE U. L. REV. 43, 62-65 (1991); Charles R.
McGuire, Regulation of the Insurance Industry After Hartford Fire Insurance v.
California: The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Antitrust Policies, 25 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 303, 334-35 (1994); James P. Rhatican, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California: A Mixed Blessing for Insurance Antitrust Defendants, 47 RUTGERS L.
REV. 905, 907-09 (1995). The involvement of reinsurers was also critical in some
conspiracies detected within the U.S. fire insurance market. See St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 560-61 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
U.S. v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 535-36 (1944).
20
See Nicholas Legh-Jones (ed.), MACGILLIVRAY ON INSURANCE LAW, ¶ 3313 (2003); see also EU Commission, BUSINESS INSURANCE SECTOR INQUIRY,
INQUIRY INTO THE EUROPEAN BUSINESS INSURANCE SECTOR PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 17 OF REGULATION 1/2003, INTERIM REPORT, Jan. 2007, 24-25, available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_
services/inquiries/interim_report_24012007.pdf; Gary Patrik, Reinsurance, in
FOUNDATIONS OF CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SCIENCE, 342-43, 348-49 (2001, 4th ed.).
21
See OECD, COMPETITION AND RELATED REGULATION ISSUES IN THE
INSURANCE
INDUSTRY,
1998,
DAFFE/CPL(98),
27,
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/25/1920099.pdf (“However, as in other
industries, the vertical relationships that arise through reinsurance may act to
facilitate collusion. In particular, a situation might arise where the upstream
reinsurance market is relatively concentrated. In this circumstance the downstream
insurers may be able to utilize the reinsurer as a tool for enforcing collusive
arrangements. For example, the insurers (via the reinsurer) argue that ‘uniformity
of premiums and policy conditions is required to make the calculation of the tariffs
for reinsurance possible’. The reinsurer, by enforcing tariff uniformity (at the cartel
price) becomes the mechanism by which collusion is enforced.”).
22
Apart from the specific type of reinsurance used in the decennial IDI
market, there has allegedly been an overall shift in the relationships among
insurance carriers and reinsurers. See PEDRO PORTELLANO DÍEZ, EL REASEGURO:
NUEVOS PACTOS 26-27 (2007). Reinsurers are increasingly vertically integrated
with insurers, through “captive insurance firms,” and there is an increasing
reciprocal influence or intervention in direct insurance, not only informally, but

518

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.2

type of reinsurance for reinsurers, proportional quota share treatises are
normally used for homogeneous risks and when there is difficulty
foreseeing the accident or loss rate. Such treatises provide reinsurers with a
balanced, continuous business flux, in which a proportionate quota share of
all IDI premiums is ceded independent of its amount. Of course, a similar
proportion of risk exposure is also transferred to the reinsurer.
The automatic cession framework pushed reinsurers and reinsureds
into a community of interest, in which the direct IDI contracts written by
insurance companies have a straightforward and immediate impact on
reinsurers. As the reinsurers’ stake in the functioning of decennial IDI grew
larger, the reinsurers sought to control different features of premiums and
risk exposure by imposing conditions and requirements in underwriting
direct insurance contracts, specifically, a minimum premium.
Compared to other insurance products, setting premiums for
decennial IDI contracts requires accounting for different elements related to
the characteristics and location of the building, and although some
sophistication by the housing developers purchasing this type of insurance
can be assumed, the process is not a straightforward exercise. The NCC
found a good deal of evidence illustrating how reinsurers fixed minimum
premiums for direct IDI insurance throughout the market by requiring
uniform minimum pricing conditions to be followed by direct insurers if
they wanted their IDI contracts to be subject of cession to IDI reinsurers.
Indeed, pricing conditions for IDI contracts were agreed upon by
cartel members, including: (1) the minimum percentage of decennial IDI
coverage for apartments and houses, (2) the minimum flat amount per IDI
contract and per housing unit, (3) identical percentages of supplementary
coverage outside of mandatory IDI (such as coverage for water tightness of
roofs and walls and stability of non load-bearing walls), (4) extra
percentages charged for resignations to claims against other agents in the
building process and IDI price references per square meter of building area
to correct for low-value declarations that could imply lower premiums.23
The conditions agreed to by cartel members were exact and precise, and

also through contractual means. Id. at 45-51. See also EU Commission, supra note
21, at 26-27.
23
See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Finding of Fact 25, at 29.
According to the NCC, these conditions were the same “corrective measures” for
decennial damage insurance contract agreed to by the cartel members in 2001.
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were to be applied to the coverage amount in the calculation of the
commercial premiums.24
In sum, the reinsurance side of the cartel heavily influenced direct
IDI contracts written from 2002 onward, imposing minimum premiums and
even correcting for possible value changes in housing that could lead to
underinsurance.25 The NCC sampled twenty different direct IDI contracts
underwritten by Asefa, MAPFRE and Caser, and found that minimum price
conditions set by the cartel were strictly followed.26
B. MONITORING AND POLICING COMPLIANCE WITH CARTEL
Operating at two different levels, insurance and reinsurance, the
property insurance cartel faced difficulties in monitoring compliance with
the established minimum price conditions. The NCC provides several
examples of how reinsurance and insurance carriers, whether they were
part on the cartel or not, acted as the primary agents in monitoring IDI
offerings below the price set by the cartel, while the reinsurers were also
the judges and executioners acting against any potential defections (see

24

In setting the premium to be paid, insurers start from a technical calculation
of the risk covered (probability of accident), taking into account the sum insured
and the contract duration (this is called the gross premium or the premium at risk),
but the final premium charged (i.e., the commercial premium or the net premium)
is the result of adding certain other expenses (administrative and other charges,
including the profit to be earned by the insurer) to the gross premium. According to
the NCC, the cartel went into the details of fixing the final premiums to be charged
by IDI carriers.
25
See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Finding of Fact 26, at 31.
A similar device was found to be essential in the operation of the fire insurance
cartel in Germany. See Case 45/85, Verband der Sachversicherer e.V. v Comm’n
of the European Cmty., 1987 E.C.R. 405, 455 (“German re-insurance companies
decided to include in their contracts of re-insurance concerning the same risks a
special ‘premium calculation clause’ according to which premium rates which fail
to conform to the recommendation are to be treated in the event of a claim as
under-insurance.”).
26
See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Finding of Fact 28 and
Legal Ground 3rd, at 31, 53-54. The NCC reckoned that technical features of some
buildings may introduce additional risks that require additional surcharges, and
some other circumstances that may give way to further discounts and surcharges
(type of soil, slope, phreatic stratum, foundations and type of structure) that were
out of the minimum pricing conditions set by the cartel.
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Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the cartel structure and
organization).27

In practice, every time a potential defection by direct insurers was
detected, the action moved upstream to the reinsurance level of cartel
members. Upstream reinsurance cartel members were in charge of adopting
measures to prevent IDI offerings that did not comply with the cartel terms
from being underwritten in the market. Reinsurers refused to allow the
cession of any IDI contracts that did not comply with the pricing conditions
set by the cartel, and even cancelled those that were agreed to below cartel
prices.
The biggest challenge to the cartel took place at the end of 2006,
when the insurer Mutua de Seguros a Prima Fija (MUSAAT) negotiated a
non-proportional excess-loss reinsurance contract with the reinsurer
Hannover Re, which would have altered the standard contractual provisions
employed by IDI reinsurers and would have led to a violation of the cartel’s
minimum prices. However, the original cartel members, along with Caser,
persuaded Hannover Re to withdraw the reinsurance contract it had offered
to MUSAAT.28
27

See id., Findings of Fact 29-34, at 31-32. The NCC considered claims not
only by cartel members but also by the insurers Vitalicio and Allianz. See id.,
Findings of Fact 36, 39, at 33.
28
See id., Findings of Fact 40-44, at 33-35. Caser was not considered to be an
original member of the cartel and, initially, it only followed the conditions set by
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Nevertheless, the initiative of MUSAAT destabilized the cartel and
led to its breakdown in 2007. MUSAAT eventually managed to get
reinsured under conditions different than those imposed by the cartel.
Although several meetings by cartel members took place during 2007 in
order to reinforce the cartel’s strength,29 the initiation of investigations by
NCC ultimately put an end to the cartel.
C. CARTEL EFFECTS: ECONOMIC RELEVANCE
In order to estimate the economic significance of the cartel and its
impact on the pricing of decennial IDI, the Spanish NCC utilized statistics
on the evolution of the decennial insurance market from 2001 to 2007.
Although both direct insurers and reinsurers were members of the cartel,
the NCC determined that only the direct IDI market was affected by the
cartel. Using the available data, the NCC calculated the average premium
rate per sum insured for the period 2002-2007. This calculation permitted
the NCC to observe an increase in average premiums while the cartel was
in place (see Table 2). According to NCC calculations, the total excess in
decennial IDI premiums paid by residential building developers from 2002
to 2007 amounted to around 17% of the premiums paid over the duration of
the cartel (about €242,436,072).30

reinsurers. However, the NCC considered its role changed in 2006, when it started
playing a relevant function in monitoring defections from the minimum pricing
agreement. See id., Legal Ground 6, ¶ 4, at 60-63.
29
See id., Findings of Fact 45-58, at 35-37.
30
See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Finding of Fact 59, at 31.
The reinsurers and insurance carriers involved in the cartel acknowledged an
increase in average premiums for IDI after 2002, but they denied that it had
anything to do with a cartel. For them, it was the result of normal market
operations. Instead, the NCC attributed the entire increase in average premiums to
the effect of the cartel. According to the NCC, it amounted to around 17% of the
premium paid over the duration of the cartel.
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TABLE 2. CALCULATION OF CARTEL IMPACT ON IDI PRICES (20022007)
B/A
abse CxA Total
B-D
Premium
Sum
Total
nt
Premium
B/A
absent
Year Insured
Premiu
cartel
excess due
in %
I
in
cartel €
€ (A)
ms € (B)
to cartel €
(D)
%
(C)
2002 21.9228 145.258 0.66 0.63
138.1139
7.1440
2003 31.0621 225.002 0.72 0.63
195.6914
29.3105
2004 41.8652 312.895 0.75 0.63
263.7509
49.1440
2005 46.6502 355.069 0.76 0.63
293.8963
61.1726
2006 52.0808 386.404 0.74 0.63
328.1090
58.2949
2007 50.5059 355.557 0.70 0.63
318.1872
37.3697
(I) Total percentage of premiums per sum insured in the year prior to
the existence of cartel (in millions), year 2001 (Source: NCC
Resolution of 12 November 2009, S/0037/08, findings of fact 2.4 and
59).
In the words of the NCC, the minimum price agreement
“eliminated all competition in prices in all the decennial IDI market, all
policyholders had to pay, at least, the minimum prices set.”31 Surely,
reinsurers competed amongst themselves in the commissions charged and
could compete in setting different proportions of risk exposure taken, but it
is clear that they all took part in an anticompetitive agreement that froze
competition in both the IDI reinsurance market and the direct IDI market.
Competition amongst reinsurers was severely restrained by the condition
that only proportional pro quota share treatises were available and,
consequently, by the identical underwriting and pricing conditions IDI
reinsurers set for the direct IDI market. Concerning the latter, it is true that
there were variations in the commercial conditions offered by insurance
carriers over the minimum prices set by the cartel, which might be
explained by the complex criteria used to set final prices as well as the
existence of some competition by direct insurers above the cartel minimum
prices.

31

Id., Legal Ground 10, at 73-81.
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Another consequence of the cartel was that while it was in effect,
cartel members at both primary insurance and reinsurance levels
maintained and even increased their market shares. Only the breakdown of
cartel in 2007 allowed other insurance companies (for example, MUSAAT)
to gain a substantial market share, as the minimum pricing agreement
ceased to be in effect and alternative reinsurance contracts started to
become available.32
IV.

LEGAL ASSESSMENT BY NCC

The evidence above led the Spanish National Competition
Commission to determine that insurers Asefa and MAPFRE and reinsurers
SCOR, Suiza and MÜNCHENER had violated Article 101.1 of the TFEU
and Section 1.1.a of the SCA. As described above, the cartel operated at
two levels (direct IDI and IDI reinsurance), limiting the types of
reinsurance contracts available for IDI carriers and setting a minimum
premium for decennial property insurance in Spain from 2002 to 2007. The
two-level structure of the cartel was crucial for its effectiveness. The cartel
was deeply rooted on the relationships among IDI carriers and IDI
reinsurers (and vice versa). However, the NCC considered the horizontal
dimension of the agreement at both levels -either among direct insurers or
among IDI reinsurers - to be prevalent to the vertical dimension.33
Moreover (as mentioned earlier, supra § III.C), the NCC focused its
attention on the cartel’s impact on competition within the direct IDI
market, although it is clear that competition was also restrained in the IDI
reinsurance market.

32

See id., Legal Ground 10, ¶ 6, at 70. There is some controversy regarding
the data used by the NCC to make these calculations. The NCC used the data
available from the Investigación Cooperativa entre Entidades Aseguradoras y
Fondos de Pensiones (ICEA). This was the first Spanish association of insurance
companies founded in 1963 (see more information at http://www.icea.es). Its
reports and statistics are constructed with data provided by member insurance and
reinsurance companies. Cartel members complained about the inaccuracy and
variability of ICEA’s data and statistics. However, the NCC considered that despite
possible defects and variations in the statistics used, there was enough evidence of
the violation committed which, moreover, the SCA and the TFEU prohibited
because of its object, no matter the effect it might have had in the market. See also
id. ¶¶ 5, 7-11, at 70-72.
33
See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 6, at 60-63.
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A. APPLICABLE LAW AND POSSIBLE EXEMPTIONS
Regarding EU competition law, the cartel created a minimum
pricing agreement in violation of Article 101.1.a of the TFEU that affected
member state trade, as it covered the entire Spanish market and prevented
reinsurance companies offering no proportional treatises, facultative
reinsurance contracts, and other pricing conditions different from those set
by the cartel from entering the Spanish market.34 In making this
determination, the NCC ascertained that the cartel had fragmented the
Spanish decennial IDI market.
Regarding domestic competition law, although the cartel operated
when the 1989 SCA was in force, the NCC investigation and proceedings
did not take place until after the 2007 SCA had been adopted.35 In any case,
an agreement fixing minimum prices, such as the one that occurred in the
decennial IDI cartel, was a violation of both versions of the SCA, as no
relevant change was introduced on this prohibition in the new Act. In fact,
the language in the newly adopted SCA is identical to the language of the
previous SCA.
However, both EU law and Spanish domestic law contemplate that,
due to the specific nature and regulated character of the insurance industry,
34

See Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico
Assicurazioni SpA, Cannito v. Fondiaria Sai SpA, Tricarico v. Assitalia SpA, 2006
E.C.R. § 52; Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde
van Advocaten, 2002 ECR I-1653, § 95 (“As regards the question whether intraCommunity trade is affected, it is sufficient to observe that an agreement, decision
or concerted practice extending over the whole of the territory of a Member State
has, by its very nature, the effect of reinforcing the partitioning of markets on a
national basis, thereby holding up the economic interpenetration which the Treaty
is designed to bring about.”) (citing Case 8/72 Bereeniging van Cementhandelaren
v. Comm’n [1972] ECR 977, ¶ 29; Case 42/84 Remia & Others v Comm’n [1985]
ECR 2545, ¶ 22; and CNSD, ¶ 48). See also Commission Notice - Guidelines on
the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2004 O.J.
(C 101) § 78 (“Horizontal cartels covering the whole of a Member State are
normally capable of affecting trade between Member States. The Community
Courts have held in a number of cases that agreements extending over the whole
territory of a Member State by their very nature have the effect of reinforcing the
partitioning of markets on a national basis by hindering the economic penetration
which the Treaty is designed to bring about.”).
35
Moreover, the NCC determined that the cartel existed and continued
producing effects several months after the 2007 SCA was in force (Sept. 1, 2007),
so even the latter would be applicable. NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note
1, Legal Ground 1, at 40-42.
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some business practices in insurance markets are exempted from
prohibitions on competition.36 Therefore, one could foresee that the
companies accused of organizing the IDI cartel would raise the defense that
their actions were covered by the insurance exemption. Firstly, cartel
members argued that per EC Regulation 358/2003, decennial liability
constituted a “new risk” that should be covered by the special regime set by
the Block Exemption Regulation (“BER”).37 According to cartel members,
mandatory decennial IDI for housing as required by the 28/1999 Act gave
way to a new class of insurance, and all of the arrangements made by
insurers and reinsurers concerning decennial IDI were justified due to the
lack of information on the risk and adequate coverage.38 In the same vein, it
was argued that the proportional treatise by reinsurers were promulgated as
a natural consequence of such a situation and, moreover, that it allowed
reinsurers to substantially limit the risk assumed by controlling direct
insurance conditions.39 The NCC dismissed each of these arguments by
examining the evidence of how the price fixing agreement was conceived
as the anticompetitive solution that Asefa, MAPFRE and the reinsurers
designed to correct what they understood to be excessive market
competition. According to the documentary proof obtained by the NCC in
the form of minutes from the cartel members’ meeting, the first year the
38/1999 Act was in force, the cartel members considered decennial IDI

36

See FRANCISCO MARCOS & ALBERT SÁNCHEZ-GRAELLS, ACTIVIDAD
ASEGURADORA Y DEFENSA DE LA COMPETENCIA: LA EXENCIÓN ANTITRUST DEL
SECTOR
ASEGURADOR,
Instituto
del
Ciencias
del
Seguro,
http://www.mapfre.com/ccm/content/documentos/fundacion/csseguro/libros/Actividad-aseguradora-y-defensa-de-la-competencia-la-exencionantitrust-del-sector-asegurador.pdf (for an explanation of the insurance sector
exemption both in EU Law and Spanish Law). In this article, references are made
to Commission Regulation (EC) No. 358/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 53/8), but the
exemption has been significantly rewritten by Commission Regulation (EU) No.
267/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 83/1).
37
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 358/2003, supra note 37, at 8-16 (on the
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements,
decisions and concerted practices in the insurance sector).
38
Brenes, supra note 4, at 242 (When discussing premium calculation in her
study of decennial IDI, Brenes mentions the lack of experience in the Spanish
insurance market on the risks covered by this type of insurance that greatly
encumber the pricing process).
39
NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 3rd, ¶¶ 3-4, at
49-55.

526

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.2

premiums to be too low and agreed that something needed to be done to
substantially increase them.40
Moreover, Spanish general insurance legislation includes an
obligation for each insurance company to avoid underinsurance by setting
minimum premium schedules with adequate technical provisions, and by
requiring that the measures adopted to comply with these requirements do
not restrict competition (Section 25.3 of the 2004 Spanish Insurance
Regulation).41 The agreements entered into by the direct IDI insurers and
reinsurers did not comply with that provision, as they agreed to and
imposed minimum commercial premium rates throughout the Spanish IDI
market.42 Therefore, a legal exemption could not exist that would be
applicable to the behavior of companies in the IDI market in accordance
with Section 2.1 of the 1989 SCA (currently, Section 4.1 of 2007 SCA).
Furthermore, such an exemption would not be available and operative
against an application of Article 101.1 of TFEU.43
Finally, the NCC brushed aside any possible exemption for the
cartel agreement that could have been given due to beneficial market
effects or the efficiencies arising from it (in accordance with Article 101.3
of TFEU and Section 1.3 of 2007 SCA). It also disregarded arguments that
the Spanish Ministry of Development’s enactment of the LOE justified the
cooperation amongst cartel members.44

40

Id., Legal Ground 3rd, ¶¶ 7-9, at 50-51.
Royal Legislative Decree 6/2004 (R.C.L. 2004, OSJ 267) (Spain). (“The
premium rates shall be sufficient, on reasonable actuarial assumptions, to enable
the insurer to meet all the obligations arising from insurance contracts and, in
particular, to establish adequate technical provisions…They also shall respect free
competition in the insurance market without, for this purpose, being considered a
restraint of competition the use of risk premium rates based on common
statistics.”) (approving the revised text of the Law on regulation and supervision of
private insurance).
42
NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 3rd, ¶ 4, at 50
(The dissenting opinion considers this legal provision as grounds for awarding a
legal exemption to IDI insurers and reinsurers in accordance with Section 2.1 of
the 1989 Spanish Competition Act 16/1989, of July 17).
43
See Francisco Marcos, Comentario Artículo 4, in COMENTARIO A LA LEY DE
DEFENSA DE LA COMPETENCIA 239, 274-79 (Jose Manuel Sala Arquer ed., 2d ed.
2010).
44
NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 4th, ¶¶ 6-8, at
57-58.
41
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B. DIRECT EVIDENCE OF THE CARTEL
Although the NCC established strong evidence regarding the
minimum price fixing agreement and its operation, cartel members denied
its existence. They acknowledged their reciprocal contacts and participation
in meetings as proven by the NCC, but asserted that these meetings were
aimed only at sharing information and experiences of purely technical
character regarding decennial IDI coverage.45
According to the cartel members’ defense, their contacts and
meetings contemplated sharing technical information and cooperatively
calculating coverage costs that were intercommunicated amongst
companies within the exemption provided by the 2003 BER. The NCC
responded that the cartel members’ behavior exceeded the strict scope and
conditions imposed by Article 3 of 2003 BER. This provision requires that
information and data shared by insurance companies be of a purely
technical nature (that is, actuarial data) and not contain any indication of
the level of commercial premiums.46 Article 4 excluded from the
exemption those agreements that oblige companies to use the information
and data shared when conducting their insurance business.47 The NCC
showed that both final commercial premiums and mandatory premiums
were established and imposed throughout the IDI market by the cartel.
According to the evidence put forward by the NCC, Asefa,
MAPFRE Empresas, Caser, MÜNCHENER, Suiza and SCOR were part of
a price fixing scheme; the commercial premiums were agreed upon and
compliance was mandatorily imposed on insurance carriers that were part

45

See id., Legal Ground 3rd, ¶¶ 1-2, at 49.
See Commission Regulation 267/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 1, 2 (EU) (“It is
therefore appropriate to stipulate in particular that agreements on commercial
premiums are not exempted. Indeed, commercial premiums may be lower than the
amounts indicated by the compilations, tables or study results in question, since
insurers can use the revenues from their investments in order to reduce their
premiums. Moreover, the calculations, tables or Studies in question should be nonbinding and serve only for reference purposes.”) (emphasis added). See also
Alessandro De Nicola & Donatella Porrini, Scambio di Informazioni e Mercato
Assicurativo: Analisi Economica del Diritto Antitrust en Italia e USA, in
CARTELLLO A PERDERE. ASSICURAZIONI, ANTITRUST, E SCAMBIO
D’IINFORMAZIONI, 131, 153-55 (Rubbettino ed., 2008); MARCOS & SÁNCHEZGRAELLS, supra note 37, at § 4.1.
47
See id.
46
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of the cartel and indirectly imposed on the rest of the market through the
influence of reinsurers (see supra §§ III.B, C).48
C. LACK OF AN ALTERNATIVE COMPETITIVE EXPLANATION
If the direct evidence of the existence of the cartel was not enough,
the NCC also rejected alternative explanations of their agreements that
were put forward by cartel members.49 In providing a more solid ground for
its conclusions, the NCC set aside all of the arguments advanced by the
conspiring insurers and reinsurers on plausible lawful and competitive
reasons that could justify their behavior.
Of course, the NCC did not determine that the proportional share
treatises agreed to by conspiring reinsurers and direct IDI insurers, in
which reinsurers fixed some minimum direct insurance pricing terms, were
anticompetitive per se. Nevertheless, it was suspicious that no other type of
reinsurance was available, and that the reinsurance members of the cartel
acted against any attempt for any other type of reinsurance contracts to be
written.
However, the NCC determined that it was more than suspicious
that there was no competition below certain threshold premiums in IDI
insurance (following the pricing conditions set by IDI reinsurers which
were identical throughout the market, see supra § III.A). There is no
plausible explanation for the uniform premiums in the IDI market other
than the minimum price fixing agreement by reinsurers (and the three
larger IDI carriers), in violation of Article 101.1 of TFEU and Section 1 of
SCA.
D. FINES AND DAMAGE CLAIMS
The NCC deemed Asefa, MAPFRE Empresas, Caser,
MÜNCHENER, Suiza and SCOR to be part of a cartel that fixed minimum
prices in the IDI market from 2002 to 2007. Operating at two levels,
reinsurance and insurance, the cartel had an atypical and complex structure
that included horizontal agreements at each of the two levels coupled with
48

See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 3rd, ¶¶ 1016, at 53-57. The NCC even found evidence indicating that cartel members knew
about the unlawful nature of their behavior, with several references made by them
as to how important it was to keep all their contacts and agreements secret and
away from competition authorities. See id., Legal Ground 4th, ¶¶ 3-5, at 54.
49
See id., Legal Ground 5th, at 58-60.
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vertical agreements among the three IDI carriers and all of the reinsurers
that were active in the IDI market (see supra Figure 1).50
The agreement amongst cartel members was a single and complex
agreement, which included fixing minimum prices for decennial IDI
insurance, monitoring compliance by direct insurers, and detecting and
prosecuting defections from cartel prices. There was a concerted action by
some insurance carriers and all the IDI reinsurers to fix and control
premiums on the decennial IDI market, boycotting and retorting against
those direct insurers that did not comply with cartel conditions, and the
NCC considered this a single and continuous infringement of Article 101.1
of TFEU and Section 1.1 of SCA.51
In setting the amount of the fine, the NCC applied Section 10 of the
1989 SCA.52 This Section gives discretion to set the level of the fines, with
50

See id., Legal Ground 7th, at 63-66.
Following EU case law, the NCC does not apportion the responsibility of
cartel members in the conspiracy, nor does it deconstruct the different parts of the
complex violation. See Joined Cases T-101/05 and T-111/05, BASF AG & UCB v.
Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-4959, ¶¶ 159-61; Joined Cases T-305/94 to T-307/94, T313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94,
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij & Others v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. II-945, ¶696.
But see NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 2nd, at 42-49
(The dissenting opinion criticized the NCC’s refusal to apportion responsibility in
a conspiracy).
52
See The Competition Act § 10 (B.O.E. 1989, 170) (Spain) (“1. The Court
may impose on the economic agents, undertakings, associations, unions or groups
that have either deliberately or through negligence breached the terms of Sections
1, 6 and 7, or failed to comply with a condition or obligation foreseen in Article
4.2, fines of up to 150.000.000 pesetas (901.518,16 euros), amount which may be
increased up to 10 percent of the turnover corresponding to the financial year
immediately prior to the Court resolution. 2. The amount of the sanction shall be
determined according to the importance of the breach, for which purpose the
following factors shall be taken into consideration: a) The type and scope of the
restriction upon competition. b) The dimension of the market affected. c) The
market share of the corresponding undertaking. d) The effect of the restriction
upon competition had on the actual or potential competitors, the other parties in the
economic process and the consumers and users. e) The duration of the restriction
upon competition. f) The reiteration of the prohibited conduct.”). But see NCC
Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 7th, at 63-66 (The
dissenting opinion suggested that the cap set by § 10 of 1989 SCA was
inappropriately exceeded by the majority opinion because the aggravating
circumstance considered was indeed part of the cartel itself, which should have
meant that a cap of 901,518.16 euro per firm was applicable. However, that
51
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the only condition being that the NCC must assess all concurring
circumstances proportionally. First, the NCC considered the cartel duration
of January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2007.53 Second, being a long-term
violation, the NCC also took into account the severe nature of the violation,
the relevant position in the market of the insurance carriers and reinsurers
involved with the cartel, the mandatory nature of decennial IDI insurance
(which made demand inelastic), the possibility for housing developers to
transfer the cost of insurance to final clients (i.e., consumers were the final
victims of the cartel), and the deliberate nature of the violation.
To calculate the fine within the framework of Section 10 of 1989
SCA,54 the NCC surreptitiously used its 2009 Communication on the
Quantification of Sanctions.55 First, to estimate the base amount of the fine,
the sales volume affected by the violation was calculated (taking into
account the duration of the violation).56 The base amount is the percentage
of the sales volume affected, ranging from 10% to 30% (varying with the
severity of the infringement and its capacity for producing cascade effects
in other markets).57
Subsequently, the NCC adjusted the base amount applicable to
each firm. In the case of Asefa, the NCC considered its behavior as the
frontrunner in organizing the cartel and policing and controlling defections
to be an aggravating factor. Concerning Caser, although it was a late
member of cartel, its role in monitoring cartel defections was similarly

assessment is mistaken, as the cap applies only to business firms and agents
lacking a business turnover.).
53
See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Finding of Fact 12, at 2024.
54
Most of the information on the quantification of the fine has been purged
from the public text of NCC resolution (due to confidentiality issues), which
greatly hinders the analysis that can be done here.
55
See The Competition Act art. 1-3 (B.O.E. 2007, 159) (Spain); Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 81-82, Dec. 29, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 1,
73-75; see also Andrew Ward & Carmen Hernández, Clemencia y Sanciones, in
LA LEY DE DEFENSA DE LA COMPETENCIA: BALANCE DE SU APLICACIÓN 251, 252
(Sergio Baches ed., 2010). But see Begoña Barrantes, Dos Años de Aplicación del
Artículo 1 de la Ley 15/2007, de 3 de Julio, de Defensa de la Competencia:
Balance y Asuntos Más Destacados, in LA LEY DE DEFENSA DE LA COMPETENCIA:
BALANCE DE SU APLICACIÓN 127, 157-59 (Sergio Baches ed., 2010) (criticizing the
application of the NCC Communication in this case).
56
See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, at 4-5.
57
See id. at 5.
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considered an aggravating factor.58 Similarly, aggravating circumstances
were considered in the case of the reinsurer SCOR due its boycott of
MUSAAT, as well as in the cases of Suiza59 and MÜNCHENER. Only
MAPFRE was not considered to have been involved in any aggravating
circumstances.60 No attenuating circumstances were considered for any of
the cartel participants. Table 3 details the final amount of fines imposed to
each company. For now, it suffices to say that, if NCC estimations are
correct, the total amount of fines imposed (€120,728,000) is only half the
amount of the harm inflicted to the victims (which, according to the data
provided by the NCC, would amount to €242,436,072, see supra Table 2).
If the data used by the NCC is accurate, the fines are far below both the
illegal profits and the consumer harm.
TABLE 3. FINE CALCULATION
Companies

Basis (€)

Amount of fine
(€)
27,759,000
21,632,000

Asefa
25,235,000
MAPFRE
Empresas/ 21,632,000
MAPFRE RE
Caser
12,947,000 14,241,000
SCOR
16,908,000 18,599,000
MÜNCHENER
15,101,000 15,856,000
Suiza /Swiss Re
21,563,000 22,641,000
Source: NCC Decennial IDI Resolution

The companies considered the fines to be disproportionately large,
and have rushed to appeal the fines imposed to the competent judicial court
(Audiencia Nacional) on several grounds. The fate that awaits the NCC
resolution is still unknown. Recently, several fines imposed by the NCC
58

See supra note 25. The implication of Caser in the cartel may be one of the
weakest points of the NCC Resolution. Proportionally, it got a larger fine than its
fellow cartel members, specially bearing in mind it only took part in the last two
years of the cartel.
59
See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 8th, at 6668 (justifying why Suiza, being a wholly owned subsidiary of Swiss Re, should be
considered responsible together and inseparably with the latter, and only one fine
was imposed to them).
60
See NCC Decennial IDI Resolution, supra note 1, Legal Ground 9th, at 6869.
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have been repealed and lowered by the National Court and/or the Supreme
Court.
On the other hand, and somewhat unexpectedly, the NCC
resolution did not fuel any damage claims in court against cartel members.
This dearth of private claims for damages is puzzling and revealing, not
only due to the weak competition culture and the difficulties still faced for
private enforcement of competition law in Spain, but also because of the
specific features and intricacies of the decennial insurance cartel that may
well hamper judicial claims for damage compensation against conspiring
insurers and reinsurers.61
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has analyzed the property insurance cartel that operated
in Spain from 2002 to 2007. Insurance and reinsurance firms active in the
Spanish property insurance market promoted it as a reaction to increased
competition in the market after IDI was required by law in 2000.
Understanding the cartel organization, as well as its dynamics and
effectiveness, underlines the role of reinsurance companies as the monitors
and enforcers of the minimum pricing agreement. By restricting
reinsurance contracts available to proportional share treatises, reinsurers
(SCOR, MÜNCHENER and Suiza/Swiss Re) exerted total control over the
IDI direct insurance market, contributing greatly to the minimum pricing
conditions agreed to by some insurers (Asefa, MAPFRE and Caser). The
Spanish NCC uncovered the cartel in 2007 and imposed fines totaling more
than €120 million to the companies.
The cartel owed its origin to the imposition of mandatory decennial
insurance in 2000, but the characteristics of the close relationship among
insurance companies and reinsurers in this context and sectorial regulation
in the matter favored the creation and development of a perfect conspiracy
to restrain competition in the Spanish market for property insurance.

61

See Francisco Marcos, Why There Might Not Be Many Damage Claims
Arising From the Spanish Property Insurance Cartel?, in PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
OF COMPETITION LAW, 303, 319-30 (Velasco San Pedro et al. eds., 2011).

NOT IN THE FINE PRINT: RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO
LIFE INSURANCE POLICY DISCLOSURES REGARDING
RETAINED ASSET ACCOUNTS
MICHAEL A. BARRESE*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Tom is the primary breadwinner of his family. In order to protect
his wife and children financially in the event that he passes away, he goes
online and researches life insurance policies. After becoming familiar with
the different forms of life insurance, Tom purchases a $250,000 life
insurance policy from a large insurance company. When he purchases the
policy, he makes his wife, Melissa, the primary beneficiary. Under the
policy, in the event that Tom dies, Melissa is entitled to a lump-sum
$250,000 payment.
Six months after purchasing the policy Tom dies in a car accident.
Melissa, as beneficiary, is entitled to a lump sum $250,000 payment per the
terms of the policy. In the past, this would have been no problem, the
insurance company would merely write the $250,000 check to Melissa.
However, in 1984, something changed.1 Some large insurance companies
rolled out a new form of payment, the Retained Asset Account.
Retained Asset Accounts (“RAAs”) are created when life insurance
carriers provide the beneficiary of a life insurance policy with a pseudocheckbook instead of a single lump sum check.2 Instead of being paid out
with a check for the entire amount of the life insurance policy, the proceeds
are placed into the insurer’s general corporate account from which the
beneficiary can draft funds with the use of the pseudo-checkbook.3
*B.S. in Finance and Marketing from Lehigh University in 2008; University
of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate Class of 2012. I would like to thank
my uncle, James Barrese, for all of his help and advice while writing and redrafting
this note. I would also like to thank my parents and siblings for their support and
guidance throughout my time at the University of Connecticut School of Law.
1

ADVOCATE LAW GROUP P.C., RETAINED ASSET ACCOUNTS,
http://www.retainedassetaccounts.com/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
2
Id.
3
David Evans, Fallen Soldiers' Families Denied Cash as Insurers Profit,
BLOOMBERG, (July 28, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201007-28/fallen-soldiers-families-denied-cash-payout-as-life-insurers-boostprofit.html (“The ‘checks’ that Cindy Lohman wrote, the ones rejected by retailers,
were actually drafts, or IOUs, issued by Prudential. Even though the ‘checks’ had
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Because of this change, Melissa does not receive a lump-sum
payment; rather she receives a pseudo-checkbook from the insurance
company that appears to be drawn from Bank A. Confused by this, Melissa
reads the policy disclosure and learns that this pseudo-checkbook entitles
her to write checks against the Retained Asset Account up to the value of
the insurance policy. With this knowledge, Melissa realizes that she has
some options. She can write a pseudo-check for the full amount of the
policy and deposit it into her own bank account or she can leave the funds,
in whole or in part, in the Retained Asset Account until she has an
immediate need for them.
As it turns out, the insurance company has not deposited any of
Melissa’s funds into an account at Bank A. Instead, the funds were
deposited in the insurance company’s corporate account at Bank C. When
Melissa attempts to deposit a pseudo-check at her bank, Bank B, there is a
delay. The delay is caused by the clearing process that the pseudo-check
has to go through in order to be deposited. Instead of Bank B drawing the
funds directly from Bank A, Bank B must go to the insurance company
who then requests the release of funds from Bank C to Bank B. At the end
of the day, Melissa still gets the money she is owed, it just takes longer
than it would have if she had received an ordinary check for the full
amount of the policy from the start.
The practice of providing Retained Asset Accounts in lieu of a
lump-sum check was critically described in the article “Fallen Soldiers’
Families Denied Cash as Insurers Profit,” by Bloomberg journalist, David
Evans.4 The issue made its way into other media outlets and eventually
lawsuits were filed in Federal District Court regarding the policy
disclosures and administration of the Retained Asset Accounts.
This note expands upon the discussion in the mainstream media by
presenting a description of both benefits and criticisms of Retained Asset
Accounts as well as recommendations for changes to policy disclosures
that would improve the image of this type of account. In Section II, the
paper discusses the benefits and criticisms of Retained Asset Accounts. In
Section III, disclosure issues are identified and solutions are presented. The
note concludes that there are benefits to both the beneficiaries and to the
insurance companies but there are also components of Retained Asset
Accounts that are questionable and need to change. Because of these
the name of JPMorgan Chase & Co. on them, Lohman’s funds weren’t in that
bank; they were held by Prudential. Before a check could clear, Prudential would
have to send money to JPMorgan, bank spokesman John Murray says.”).
4
Id.
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questionable components of Retained Asset Accounts, it would be wise for
insurance companies to improve their disclosure statements regarding
Retained Asset Accounts in order to avoid both bad publicity and potential
litigation.
II.

RETAINED ASSET ACCOUNTS

In 2010, insurance companies had over $28 billion invested in
Retained Asset Accounts.5 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
(“MetLife”) alone had 36 percent of that total and makes an estimated $100
to $300 million a year on Retained Asset Accounts.6
Retained Asset Accounts are created when an insurance company
“pays the proceeds from a life insurance policy or annuity contract to a
beneficiary by sending the beneficiary ‘a checkbook instead of a check.’”7
For example, if a life insurance policy is supposed to be paid in a lumpsum, instead of sending a check for the full amount of the policy, the
insurance company will send a pseudo-checkbook that permits the
beneficiary to write pseudo-checks (drafts) against the Retained Asset
Account.
A. BENEFITS
While the mainstream media has provided several articles
criticizing Retained Asset Accounts, there are some benefits to using them
to pay life insurance benefits to beneficiaries.
First, the intention behind RAAs was to give beneficiaries
immediate access to the proceeds from insurance policies.8 Traditionally,
lump sum checks issued by insurance companies took two weeks to clear
once deposited in the beneficiary’s bank account.9 By providing the
pseudo-checks attached to a Retained Asset Account insurance companies
were, in effect, providing easier access to funds at the time families needed
5

Id.
Id. (“Gerry Goldsholle, the man who invented retained-asset accounts, says
MetLife makes $100 million to $300 million a year from investment returns on the
death benefits it holds. A former president of MetLife Marketing Corp.,
Goldsholle, 69, devised the accounts in 1984.”).
7
ADVOCATE LAW GROUP P.C., RETAINED ASSET ACCOUNTS, supra note 1.
8
ADVOCATE LAW GROUP P.C., Benefits of Retained Asset Accounts,
RETAINED ASSET ACCOUNTS, http://www.retainedassetaccounts.com/benefits-ofretained-asset-accounts.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
9
Id.
6
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it most. The immediate use of funds is not possible under the traditional
single lump-sum check payment method.10
Second, RAAs provide continuous interest payments to
beneficiaries as soon as the claim is approved and until the beneficiary
withdraws all of the money they are entitled to.11 As previously stated, it
takes several weeks for a bank to clear a single lump-sum check, the
clearing time effectively reduces the interest that can be earned on the lump
sum payment. Combine this delay with the mailing delay of the check and
RAAs pay interest on the funds for a longer period than a single lump-sum
check. RAAs also allow the beneficiary to move the funds into higher yield
accounts more quickly than they could with a single lump-sum check.
As originally designed, insurance companies guaranteed that RAAs
would pay beneficiaries and interest rate that was equal to or greater than
the average rate paid “banks and money market mutual funds on similar
accounts.”12 In addition to guaranteeing a level of payment equal to or
greater than bank rates, the insurance company also provided a floor, below
which interest rates on RAAs would not fall.13 In the current economic
climate, this floor provides significant upside for RAAs due to extremely
low interest rates on regular bank accounts.
In addition, RAAs were designed with consumer protection in
mind. Instead of relying solely on the insurance company to back the
accounts, they were designed to also be insured by State Sponsored
Guarantee Associations (“SSGA”).14 While it is not FDIC insurance, State
Sponsored Guaranty Associations do provide some protection against
insurance company insolvency.
Finally, RAAs were designed in the mold of a standard bank
account. They would pay interest, provide monthly statements and also
provide mutual benefit to the beneficiary and insurance company that
maintained the account.15 In order to provide a return to beneficiaries, the
insurance company has to use their funds to make money, similar to how a
bank lends out money from a savings account at an interest rate higher than
it pays to account holders.
10

Id.
Id.
12
Id.; AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, About Retained Asset Accounts,
(July 29, 2010), available at http://www.acli.com/Newsroom/Documents/
80af916fc317435cb9340a17bdbaf052AboutRetainedAssetAccounts.pdf.
13
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, supra note 12.
14
ADVOCATE LAW GROUP P.C., Benefits of Retained Asset Accounts, supra
note 8.
15
Id.
11
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B. CRITICISMS
Journalistic criticisms present several important questions about
RAAs, these include: whether RAAs are a permitted distribution method
per the initial contract with the policyholder; do beneficiaries understand
how RAAs operate as a payment option; is interest paid on the funds in the
RAA and, if so, is the rate competitive with financial alternatives; and are
they as safe as depositing the funds into an FDIC insured bank account, a
common alternative available to beneficiaries.
One problem highlighted in the journalistic efforts is the claim that
insurance companies provide beneficiaries with pseudo-checks that the
beneficiary believes to be the same as a check from their bank. What the
insurance companies actually provide are drafts. Several beneficiaries have
encountered difficulties when trying to use these drafts as several retailers
have rejected the beneficiary’s draft even though the Retained Asset
Account had more than enough money in it to cover the transaction.16 It has
been suggested that beneficiaries do not generally understand that the funds
in RAAs are not readily available for payment in the bank against which
the pseudo-checks are drawn. This is based on the perception that insurance
companies have intentionally refrained from disclosing important facts
regarding Retained Asset Accounts.
Instead of paying the entire policy benefit in one lump sum
payment, the RAA scheme permits life insurance companies to retain the
funds in their general account and provide beneficiaries with a book of
drafts.17 The drafts are issued against the insurance company’s general
corporate account rather than an individual beneficiary account.18 This
scheme permits the life insurance company to retain substantial funds in
their general corporate account, an account that earned over 4% interest in
2010.19 While all of the insurance providers pay interest on the accounts,
and several pay more than the average Money Market Account,20

16

Evans, supra note 3.
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Money Market Definition, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.co
m/terms/m/moneymarket.asp, (last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (“The money market is
used by a wide array of participants, from a company raising money by selling
commercial paper into the market to an investor purchasing CDs as a safe place to
park money in the short term. The money market is typically seen as a safe place
to put money due the highly liquid nature of the securities and short maturities, but
17
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journalists have called attention to the spread between the return the
insurance provider receives on its investment and the amount of interest it
pays beneficiaries. 21 “Prudential’s general account earned 4.4 percent in
2009, mostly from bond investments, according to SEC filings. The
company has paid survivors 0.5 percent in 2010.” Met Life also paid
approximately 0.5 percent to beneficiaries with Retained Asset Accounts, a
rate that was less than half the rate paid in some banks. The fact that there
is a spread between the interest paid to beneficiaries and the earnings from
retained funds by the life insurer is no different from the fact that any firm
in the financial sector holding funds for an investor attempts to earn more
on the retained funds than they pay to the investor. In order to be a valid
criticism, it would have to be based on evidence that the risk-adjusted
return to the RAA beneficiary is not sufficient and disclosed. The evidence
suggests that some of the largest life insurance companies paid between
0.5% and 1.5% interest to beneficiaries on the retained RAA funds during
between 2008 and 2010.22 In addition to paying lower interest rates, if the
money were put in a bank, it would be insured by the FDIC up to two
hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).23
By comparison, banks paid between 0.1% and 4.0% on their FDIC
insured money market accounts during this same period.24 RAA funds are
offered some protection against insolvency by industry solvency protection
plans but few non-governmental insurance plans match the risk protection
provided in the government’s FDIC plan. The level of protection against
the insolvency of the insurer is another question that leads to criticism of
industry disclosure practices.
While not relevant to the purpose of this paper, two similar classes
of Retained Asset Accounts have been identified by the mainstream media;
beneficiaries of military policies and beneficiaries of non-military policies.
The main difference lies in the fact that military personnel have to use
Prudential for their life insurance needs while non-military policyholders
can get insurance from any insurance company that is legally able to offer
life insurance in the state. Again, while not important for the purposes of
there are risks in the market that any investor needs to be aware of including the
risk of default on securities such as commercial paper.”).
21
Evans, supra note 3.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Online
Savings
Account
Interest
Rates
History,
THESUNSFINANCIALDIARY.COM (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.thesunsfinancialdiary
.com/personal-finance/online-savings-account-interest-rates-history.
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this paper, the journalistic attention to RAAs appears to be stimulated by
attention to the effect on the families of military personnel.25
Retained Asset Accounts are seen by the providers as a useful to
beneficiaries, giving them time to think about what they want to do with
the money they have received instead of having a single check which they
“could lose” weighing heavily on them.26 Insurance companies have been
quick to point out that a beneficiary can withdraw all of the money in the
account whenever they want, even on the day they receive the pseudocheckbook. However, the insurance company has not adequately disclosed
important information including the potential delay for each pseudo-check
to clear, that the checks may not be widely accepted by retailers, and that
holding funds in Retained Asset Accounts benefits the insurance company
itself.27
Through proper disclosure, the insurance companies offering
RAAs can reduce the misperception that beneficiaries think they are
receiving their own personal account similar to that which they can obtain
from their local bank. Insurers need to make a better effort to ensure that
beneficiaries understand that instead of a single “lump sum” payment
drawn on funds deposited in a bank account they receive a right to make a
request for funds held in the insurance company’s general corporate
account without the security of FDIC insurance and used by the insurer for
their corporate purposes until the beneficiary has closed the account by
withdrawing all of the remaining funds due.
While there is likely no quantifiable harm done by lack of
disclosure regarding Retained Asset Accounts and thus there will be no
ability for beneficiaries to recover damages in court from this failure to
disclose pertinent information to policy holders and beneficiaries until there
is a failure of the insurance provider, regulatory agencies should still
require clear and concise disclosure of the actual nature and extent of
insurance backing of Retained Asset Accounts for the benefit of the
reputation of the industry generally.

25

Evans, supra note 3.
Bloomberg News, V.A. Agreed to Withholding of Benefits, Documents Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/14/
business/14insure.html?_r=1&src=twr.
27
Id.
26
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1. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) is an
independent corporation that insures deposits in banks and thrift institutions
against failure.28 The FDIC was created as part of the Glass-Steagall Act of
1933 in response to the over nine thousand bank failures during the Great
Depression.29 The FDIC insures deposit accounts for up to two hundred
fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) per individual, per bank.30 An individual
could put $1 million in a single FDIC insured bank and be covered for only
$250,000 of that sum or that same individual could spread that $1 million
into 4 or more FDIC insured banks and be insured for the entire $1 million.
The FDIC does have ways to receive more than $250,000 worth of
coverage at one bank provided certain criteria are met, such as having
accounts in different asset categories.31
Example 1: Single Account (owned by one person): $250,000 per owner.32
Example of Insurance Coverage for Single Accounts33
Depositor

Type
Deposit

Jane Smith

Savings account $25,000

Jane Smith

Certificate of
Deposit

$250,000

Jane Smith

NOW account

$50,000

Jane Smith's sole
proprietorship

Checking
account

$50,000

Total Deposited
28

of Amount
Deposited

$375,000

Who is the FDIC?, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/
learn/symbol/index (last updated Aug. 11, 2011).
29
Robert Stammers, The History of the FDIC, INVESTOPEDIA.COM (Jan. 6,
2009), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/fdic-history.asp.
30
Who is the FDIC?, supra note 28.
31
Deposit Insurance FAQ, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/
edie/fdic_info.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
32
Id.
33
Id.
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$250,000

Uninsured Amount

$125,000
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The FDIC is funded through premiums paid by banks and thrifts
and from earnings on U.S. Treasury Securities.34 These premiums are paid
regularly and go into what is described by some as a “war chest”.35 “To
provide an effective banking safety net, it is necessary for the FDIC to
replace cash (of the failed bank) with cash from the FDIC at the moment
the bank fails.”36 The FDIC insures traditional bank accounts, savings,
checking, trust, certificates of deposit (“CDs”), money market savings
accounts and IRA accounts.37 Since its creation in 1934, no depositor
insured by the FDIC has lost a single penny of insured funds as a result of a
bank failure.38 It is because of this success that the FDIC has gained such
prominence and respect from individuals and businesses alike. A further
discussion of more complex formations for FDIC coverage is discussed in
the Appendix.
2. State Sponsored Guaranty Associations
The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company observed that the
financial integrity of Retained Asset Accounts is provided primarily by the
company’s own financial strength but also through state insurance guaranty
associations.39 Like the banking industry, the insurance industry offers
protection against the insolvency of an insurer. The insurance industry
protection, however, is not a nationally uniform system like the FDIC is.
This section describes some pertinent issues of the so-called State
Sponsored Guaranty Associations. This issue important because Retained
34

Id.
Peter G. Gallanis, President, Nat’l Org. of Life and Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n,
Address at the American Bar Association’s Insurer Relationship and Run-off: The
Next Level, Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Session: NOLHGA, the Life and
Health Insurance Guaranty System and the Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, at 9
(June 5, 2009), available at http://www.nolhga.com/resource/file/NOLHGA
andFinancial Crisis.pdf.
36
Id. at 10.
37
Insured or Not Insured?, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/
consumers/consumer/information/fdiciorn.html (last updated Apr. 11, 2011).
38
Who is the FDIC?, supra note 28.
39
Evans, supra note 3.
35
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Asset Accounts are not insured by the FDIC and there is an open question
about whether they are insured by SSGAs.
In a letter written by FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair to the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”), Ms. Bair
expressly denied the fact that Retained Asset Accounts were insured by the
FDIC.40 The letter indicated that the only way Retained Asset Accounts
could be insured by the FDIC is if the insurance company is holding the
funds as a Fiduciary to the policyholders and beneficiaries.41 In Clark v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., the plaintiff filed a claim against Met Life for
breach of fiduciary duty.42 The claim was summarily dismissed when Met
Life submitted a motion to dismiss on the issue indicating that the
insurance company is not acting as a fiduciary in maintaining RAAs for
beneficiaries.43
The National Organization of Life & Health Insurance Guaranty
Associations (“NOLHGA”) and State Sponsored Guaranty Associations,
on the other hand, have been providing “security” for RAAs since 1983.44
NOLHGA is “a voluntary association made up of the life and health
insurance guaranty associations of all 50 states, the District of Colombia
and Puerto Rico.”45
State Sponsored Guaranty Associations “were created to protect
state residents who are policyholders and beneficiaries of policies issued by
a life or health insurance company that has gone out of business.”46 Most
insurance companies licensed to write life and health insurance or annuities
in a given state are required to be members of the state’s SSGA.47 Should
one of these companies fail, the SSGA issues an assessment for funds to
continue the coverage promised by the failing insurance company subject

40

Retained Asset Accounts and FDIC Deposit Insurance Coverage, FED.
DESPOSIT INS. CORP. http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2010/fil10048.html
(last updated Aug. 11, 2010).
41
Id.
42
Clark v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:08-cv-00158-LRH-VPC, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 95097, at *19 (D. Nev. Sept. 10, 2010).
43
Id.
44
Facts & Figures, NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE AND HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASS’NS,
http://www.nolhga.com/factsandfigures/main.cfm (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
45
Id.
46
Policy Holder Information: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ORG. OF
LIFE AND HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASS’NS, http://www.nolhga.com/policyholderinfo/
main.cfm/location/questions (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
47
Gallanis, supra note 35, at 3.

2012

RETAINED ASSET ACCOUNTS

543

to the limits of the SSGA.48 Unlike the FDIC, State Sponsored Guaranty
Associations do not collect funds on the national level; instead they are
collected only in the state of the failing insurance company and collections
are based upon the market share of insurance companies from the previous
year.49 This has led some commentators to raise concerns about the
sufficiency of the funds if some of the larger suppliers of life insurance
were to fail.50
Each SSGA “is authorized by its enabling statute to assess and
collect, from insurance companies writing covered lines of business in the
state (the Guarantee Association’s ‘member insurers’), the amount needed
to satisfy the Guaranty Association’s obligations to policyholders.”51 Due
to funding constraints, the limits of the SSGA may be lower than the limits
of the failed insurer’s contract.52 The fact that the SSGA limits to the
amount of coverage they will continue is not unlike the fact that the FDIC
limits the return to a failed bank depositor. However, unlike the coverage
provided by the FDIC, there is no national standard for SSGA coverage.
SSGA coverage limits are established by state law and vary from state to
state.53 In the area of life-health insurance, most states provide at least the
following coverage:
$300,000 in life insurance death benefits
$100,000 in cash surrender or withdrawal values for life
insurance
$100,000 in withdrawal and cash values for annuities
$100,000 in health insurance policy benefits54
48

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, STATE SOLVENCY
REGULATION OF PROPERTY-CASUALTY AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 68 (Dec.
1992).
49
National Organization of Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Associations,
INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nolhga.asp (last visited
Jan. 21, 2011).
50
Id.
51
Gallanis, supra note 35, at 9.
52
Id.
53
The National Organization of Life and Health Insurance Guaranty
Associations and The National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds, Joint
Comments of NOLHGA and NCIGF in Response to FIO’s Request for Public
Input, http://www.nolhga.com/pressroom/articles/NOLHGA-NCIGF%20FIO%20
SUBMISSION.PDF.
54
Policy Holder Information, supra note 46; AMERICAN COUNSEL OF LIFE
INSURERS, supra note 12.
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In the event that an insurer is judged by regulators to be insolvent,
the legal process of liquidation begins. The liquidation process allows the
sale of the firms’ assets and the use of the funds raised to pay liabilities. If
and when the funds are not sufficient to pay liabilities, the SSGA supplies
necessary funds from assessments on in-state insurers.55 The SSGA
member companies are obligated to pay the assessments, however the
assessments, which are generally allocated based on the firm’s market
share from the previous year within the state and are generally limited to a
maximum of 2% of collected premiums in the prior year.56 With the
exception of New York State, SSGAs do not have an FDIC style “war
chest” available ready to pay claims before a company fails.57 The SSGA’s
funding comes from assessments that are collected only when are needed.
In other words funds are only collected after a failure occurs and income
from the sale of firm assets is depleted.58 The FDIC needs the war chest
because bank accounts and checking accounts are “demand obligations”
whereas life insurance and annuity products are generally promises to pay
in the future.59 Given that RAAs are modeled after standard bank accounts,
it stands to reason that SSGAs should have a war chest to cover on demand
obligations from holders of RAAs.
Like bank depositors, in order to recover the difference in coverage
limits and contractual benefits, the policyholder would have to file suit
against the estate of the failed insurance company and get in line behind all
other creditors to receive a potential payout when the failed company’s

55

State Laws and Provisions Report, NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE AND HEALTH INS.
GUAR.
ASS’NS,
http://www.nolhga.com/policyholderinfo/main.cfm/location/
questions (last updated Dec. 31, 2011).
56
Id. (Rhode Island maxes out at 3% and North and South Carolina max out at
4%); Joint Comments of NOLHGA and NCIGF in Response to FIO’s Request for
Public Input, NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE AND HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASS’NS,
http://www.nolhga.com/pressroom/articles/NOLHGANCIGF%20FIO%20SUBMISSION.PDF.
57
Gallanis, supra note 35, at 9.
58
Id.
59
Id.; see also Evans, supra note 3 (If one insurer is unable to meet its
obligations, people could lose faith and demand payment from other companies
triggering a panic similar to a bank run. The purpose of the FDIC was to put an end
to bank runs, allowing insurance companies to act like this with Retained Asset
Accounts could set the economy up for another failure due to an inability of
insurance companies to meet their payment obligations should people lose faith in
the system and demand immediate payment on their “accounts.”).
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assets are liquidated.60 The likelihood of any significant recovery by a
policyholder or beneficiary in this situation is very small.
3. The Financial Strength of the Insurance Company
As previously discussed, Retained Asset Accounts are not FDIC
insured. Instead, the primary “insurance” for RAAs is the financial strength
of the insurance company.61 In light of recent economic events, including
the scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, AIG, and Lehman Brothers
among others, corporate assurances of financial might does little to instill
confidence in beneficiaries.62
Perhaps the most well known example of why CEOs and corporate
executives are not trusted by investors and the general public is the failure
of Enron. Once a tremendous economic success, Enron’s misrepresentation
of its finances almost singlehandedly led to a nationwide recession.
Between 1997 and 2001 Enron claimed substantial growth in annual
profits.63 Media outlets and financial analysts applauded Enron for its
success only to learn later that it was all a sham.64 In the end, even Enron
had to admit that “[f]inancial statements for [1997 through the first two
quarters of 2001] and the audit reports relating to the year-end financial
statements for 1997 through 2000 should not be relied upon.”65
Unfortunately analysts and investors did not hesitate to consider
the complexity of Enron’s financial statements before investing and they
paid dearly for the trust they put in the public statements of Enron’s Chief
Officers.66
After Enron collapsed, WorldCom pushed the economy down
further with its own series of questionable accounting decisions. Between
1999 and 2002 WorldCom used “shady accounting methods” to make its

60

Gallanis, supra note 35, at 2.
Id.
62
See Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES (Aug. 26,
2002), http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html (for an in-depth
look at the corporate scandals of the late 1990s and early 2000s).
63
Dan Ackman, Enron Says, ‘Oops’, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2001),
http://www.forbes.com/2001/11/09/1109topnews.html.
64
Howard Kurtz, The Enron Story That Waited to be Told, WASH. POST (Jan.
18,
2002),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64769-2002Ja
n17.html.
65
Ackman, supra note 63.
66
Kurtz, supra note 64.
61
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books look better than they were.67 WorldCom accomplished this fraud in
two ways. First, their accounting department “underreported ‘line costs’
(interconnection expenses with other telecommunication companies) by
capitalizing these costs on the balance sheet rather than properly expensing
them.”68 Second, WorldCom would inflate their revenues by using falsified
accounting entries “from ‘corporate unallocated revenue accounts.’”69 On
July 21, 2002, WorldCom filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in what would
be the largest such bankruptcy filing in the history of the United States.70 In
2003, it was “estimated that the company’s assets had been overstated by
$11 billion.”71
The failure of Enron, WorldCom and many others are examples of
why Met Life’s assurances that their policies are insured by the financial
strength of the company are not going to reassure investors and
beneficiaries.72 While these assurances may have meant something to
investors in the early 1990s, because of the misstatements by others, these
statements no longer hold water with investors and beneficiaries. This may
be unfair, but it is true none-the-less. Because of this, insurance companies
need to do more to inform beneficiaries about their products, specifically
about RAAs.
In 1990, the House Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations
and the House Committee on Energy & Commerce investigated and
reported on the current status of the regulation of insurance companies and
on the financial condition of the insurance industry.73 The report is known
as the Dingell Report: Failed Promises. The House Committee indicated in
this report that financial failures in insurance companies come with

67

WorldCom Scandal: A Look Back at One of the Biggest Corporate Scandals
ASSOCIATED
CONTENT,
in
U.S.
History,
YAHOO
http://www.associatedcontent.com/
article/162656/worldcom_scandal_a_look_back_at_one.html (last visited Jan. 21,
2011).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.; Luisa Beltran, WorldCom Files Largest Bankruptcy Ever: Nation’s No.
2 Long-Distance Company in Chapter 11 – Largest with $107 Billion in Assets,
CNN MONEY (July 22, 2002), http://money.cnn.com/2002/07/19/news/
worldcom_bankruptcy/.
71
WorldCom Scandal: A Look Back at One of the Biggest Corporate
Scandals, supra at note 67.
72
Evans, supra note 3.
73
Id.
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consistent elements.74 These elements are: “rapid expansion, over-reliance
on managing general agents, extensive and complex reinsurance
arrangements, excessive under-pricing, reserve problems, false reports,
reckless management, gross incompetence, fraudulent activity, greed, and
self dealing.”75 According to the report, the following list contains the
primary causes of insurer insolvencies:
1. Inefficient, reckless, and deplorable middle and upper
management, including personnel deficiencies;
2. Gross incompetence/bad business judgment;
3. Rapid and/or over expansion and diversification;
4. Over-reliance upon and a failure to monitor and
supervise Managing General Agents (MGAs),
including the improper delegation of responsibilities;
5. Expensive and complex reinsurance arrangements,
including the problem of uncollectible reinsurance;
6. Excessive underpricing and inadequate pricing
schemes;
7. Poor investment policies;
8. Inadequate reserve problems;
9. False financial reporting and fraudulent activity;
10. Greed and self-dealing;
11. Under-capitalization; and
12. Inadequate regulation by state regulators and/or
independent public accounting firms, including the
failure to identify and correct the insurer's problems.76
These issues consistently resulted in over-leveraged insurance companies
that filed unclear or misleading statements of financial condition.77 The

74

Steven W. Schwabb et al., Caught Between Rocks and Hard Places: The
Plight of Reinsurance Intermediaries Under U.S. and English Law, 16 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 485, 489 (1995); STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT &
INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., FAILED PROMISES: INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCIES 2 (Comm. Print
1990) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT].
75
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 74, at 2.
76
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 74, at Opening remarks of Chairman Rep.
John D. Dingell (D. MI.); David W. Evans & Paul S. Cohen, Professional Liability
Targets in Cases of Insolvency: Directors and Officers, and Accountants, 580
PLI/Comm 157, 161-65 (1991).
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Dingell Report also “cited the states' failure to regulate the reinsurance
market as another significant cause of insolvencies.”78 Specifically, the
Dingell Report suggested that due to an absence of adequate supervision by
state regulators, insurance companies maintained very low capital levels
that could be manipulated as needed to continue operations.79
In addition to the Dingell Report, the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Affairs investigated the regulation of life insurance
companies in 1992 and similarly found that capital reserves held by life
insurance companies were not adequate given the level of business they
were conducting during the period.80 The Advisory Commission’s report
also notes that because insurance companies are able to predict their payout
schedule with greater accuracy for life insurance policies than for other
types of insurance, such as property-casualty insurance, life insurance
companies are able to make more long term and speculative investments.81
Given the findings in the Dingell Report, the findings of the
Advisory Commission, and the recent financial scandals at prominent
companies such as Enron, WorldCom and AIG, it would be unwise to trust
that the financial strength of an insurance company will insure Retained
Asset Accounts against loss. Because of the criticisms discussed above,
significant changes to policy disclosures should be made so that
policyholders and beneficiaries are more aware of the pros and cons of
holding funds in a Retained Asset Account.
III.

DISCLOSURE

The issue with RAAs is not necessarily whether the “accounts” are
actually insured by the FDIC but the perception that life insurance
companies have not adequately disclosed the fact that these so called
accounts are not insured by the FDIC. While State Sponsored Guaranty

77

COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 74, at Opening remarks of Chairman Rep.
John D. Dingell (D. MI.).
78
Id.; David W. Evans & Paul S. Cohen, Professional Liability Targets in
Cases of Insolvency: Directors and Officers, and Accountants, 580 PLI/Comm
157, 161-65 (1991).
79
John L. Ingersoll et al., Federal Regulation of Insurance: The Industry’s
Response to H.R. 4900 and H.R. 1290, 23 SPG Brief 10, 11-12 (1994).
80
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: STATE
SOLVENCY REGULATION OF PROPERTY-CASUALTY AND LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANIES 53 (Dec. 1992).
81
Id.
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Associations often provide coverage of $300,000 per life,82 if an insurance
company fails, there is both a question of whether the SSGA provides
coverage for RAAs and the fact that some individuals are entitled to more
than the amount provided by SSGAs and they will be forced to either take
the loss or file suit against the failing insurance company in the hope that
there will be enough money left over from liquidation to allow them to
recover.83
The potential for beneficiaries such as the surviving spouse of a
member of the Armed Forces to incur unanticipated losses or file suit
against failed insurance companies are not ideal options for the beneficiary
or the insurance industry. This is why adequate disclosure is necessary.
With adequate disclosure beneficiaries are better able to appropriately
assess the risks and rewards of the Retained Asset Account versus taking
payment from the insurer and placing their money in a different and
perhaps more secure investment such as a savings account, money market
account or United States Treasury Bonds. Without appropriate disclosure
individuals will not have sufficient information to make intelligent
investment decisions.
Journalistic efforts suggest that insurance companies have
presented Retained Asset Accounts to policy holders and beneficiaries as
though they are Money Market Accounts or in the alternative as though
they are accounts similar to bank accounts in that each beneficiary has their
own account with their name on it where their money is deposited.84 In
Clark v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., the issue of how Retained Asset
Accounts are presented as though they are Money Market savings accounts
was mentioned, but not thoroughly discussed.85
In their disclosure statements, Met Life’s RAA is presented as the
“Total Control Account Money Market Option.”86 In a recent suit over
RAAs against Met Life, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada

82

Facts & Figures, supra note 44.
Policy Holder Information, supra note 46.
84
See Clark v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:08-cv-00158-LRH-VPC, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 95097, at *2-14 (D. Nev. Sept. 10, 2010) (Met Life Retained Asset
Accounts are formed when policy disbursements exceed $5,000. The funds are
placed in an account named the “Total Control Account Money Market Option”
(TCA for short). The account name was found to be “inherently deceptive” due to
its implication that the funds were in a Money Market Account or its equivalent
and that they were FDIC insured.).
85
Id. at *12-13.
86
Id.
83
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found Met Life’s use of the term Money Market “inherently deceptive.”87
The Court noted that using the term “Money Market” in their RAA
description created the impression that the beneficiary would receive their
own Money Market Account and that that account would be insured by the
FDIC.88 Although the court noted that the disclosure statement was
“inherently deceptive,” the court granted Met Life’s motion for summary
judgment because the beneficiary was unable to demonstrate suffering any
harm from Met Life’s breach.89 The court limited its finding to the fact that
because Met Life has not failed (been deemed insolvent by the SSGA), and
thus the beneficiary had not lost any money, there was no recovery to be
had.90 While it did not decide the issue of RAA disclosure, it did lay the
foundation for how courts will discuss Retained Asset Accounts in
subsequent cases. If Met Life and other insurance companies continue to
characterize RAAs as “money market” accounts, that name will likely be
considered “inherently deceptive” by courts and in the event of a failure
will likely result in a damage award. To avoid such a situation, it is in the
best interest of insurance companies to correct the flaws in their disclosure
statements that lead to criticisms of the true nature of their Retained Asset
Accounts.
Clark appears to have been a wakeup call for Met Life. Starting in
July 2010, twenty-five years after Met Life began using Retained Asset
Accounts, the customer agreement signed by the policy holder disclosed
that Retained Asset Accounts will, at least initially, hold funds for their
beneficiaries and that Retained Asset Accounts are not the same as the
money market accounts one might hold at a local bank. The section goes on
to inform the policy holder that the Retained Asset Account that will be
designated for the payout of their benefits will not be insured by the FDIC
in any capacity.91
While MetLife’s actions are certainly a step in the right direction,
they are not the only life insurance company using these accounts. Every
company in the industry can be tainted by the behavior of a few. As such,
more needs to be done in regulating proper disclosure this area of the
insurance industry in order to make sure there are proper safeguards against
collapse and to educate “account” holders on what they are really getting

87

Id.
Id.
89
Id.
90
Clark, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95097, at *12-13.
91
Evans, supra note 3.
88
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when and insurance company informs them that the proceeds from their
policy will be paid through a Retained Asset Account.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Retained Asset Accounts have been subject to significant criticism
by the mainstream media, however their criticisms do not tell the whole
story. While insurance companies have failed to make adequate disclosure
regarding the nature of Retained Asset Accounts, the accounts do provide
several benefits to both beneficiaries and the insurance company. It has
been noted that Retained Asset Accounts are not traditional savings
accounts, checking accounts, CDs, or money market accounts, but they are
similar financial vehicles. The mainstream media has criticized RAAs
because of the misperception that the insurance company is making this
money off of benefits that were supposed to have been paid out to
beneficiaries. While it is true that the benefits were supposed to be
distributed to beneficiaries, RAAs pay competitive interest rates and
provide beneficiaries with time to decide what to do with the funds
distributed to the by the insurance company.
Instead of paying out benefits in the lump sum, life insurance
companies have been sending draft books that allow beneficiaries to draw
against the balance of the Retained Asset Account. While this does not
immediately raise any concerns, the way insurance companies have
disclosed the nature of RAAs is a serious issue. The RAA disclosure
statements have not clearly identified what a Retained Asset Account is,
how it is insured, the interest rate paid and how it differs from a
conventional checking, savings or money market account. While to date the
only harm that has come from these accounts is psychological and
emotional, in the event of another financial downturn or simply the failure
of a large insurance company, the threat of harm is great. Because of this, it
would be wise for insurance companies to adequately disclose the various
benefit payment options and to adequately describe these options,
specifically Retained Asset Accounts, so that purchasers and beneficiaries
understand what type of security they hold.
Although NOLHGA and the insurance industry discuss State
Sponsored Guaranty Associations as an equal to FDIC insurance, this is not
an accurate representation of the SSGA system. SSGAs do not provide the
same type of coverage as the FDIC, nor do they have the same amount of
money available to them at a moment’s notice. SSGAs rely on
contributions from non-failing insurance companies at the time of failure to
support an insurance company’s obligations while the FDIC relies on a
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“war chest” made up of annual payments from banks into a central account
to support its activities.92
Although the public statements of executives at insurance
companies like Met Life indicate that SSGAs are a secondary insurance
policy behind the financial might of the insurance company. The leaders of
similarly situated companies such as Enron, Tyco, AIG, Lehman Brothers,
and WorldCom, among others made the same statements regarding the
investment quality of their securities. Each of these companies failed to live
up to the promises made by their CEO. In the current economic climate,
statements by the CEO regarding the financial strength of a company are
taken with a grain of salt.
Insurance providers should be required to disclose exactly how
they are planning to pay benefits in the event that they receive a valid claim
on a policy. If they agree to pay a lump sum, they should describe how the
lump sum will be paid, whether it is in a single check or through the use of
a Retained Asset Account. This means that insurance companies must
inform both the policy purchaser and eventually the beneficiary how their
funds will be distributed at the outset of the insurer/insured relationship,
rather than waiting until after a claim is made and benefits are paid out.
Describing the payment options in detail will help policy holders
understand what they are purchasing as well as improve the image of the
insurance company as there will be no surprises when a beneficiary
receives pseudo-checks when they were expecting a single lump-sum
payment.
Only through adequate disclosure can potential harms resulting
from insolvency in the insurance industry be avoided. Proper disclosure
should accompany every life insurance contract so that policyholders and
beneficiaries understand what they are entitled to should a claim be filed.
By providing adequate disclosure, beneficiaries will be able to evaluate
whether they want to keep a Retained Asset Account or transfer the funds
to a safer investment vehicle. In addition, adequate disclosure will lessen
bad press against insurance companies because they will have explained
exactly what is being distributed to beneficiaries from the outset. Because
of this, insurance companies should strive to provide adequate disclosure
regarding Retained Asset Accounts.
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Gallanis, supra note 35, at 9.
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APPENDIX
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) is an
independent corporation that insures deposits in banks and thrift institutions
against failure.93 The FDIC was created as part of the Glass-Steagall Act of
1933 in response to the over nine thousand bank failures during the great
depression.94 The FDIC has successfully carried out its business without
losing a single dollar of insured funds for over 75 years.95
The FDIC insures deposit accounts for up to two hundred fifty
thousand dollars ($250,000) per individual, per bank.96 The FDIC does
more than insure a single individual for $250,000 worth of deposits. It
insures a single individual for $250,000 in each FDIC insured bank that
they maintain an account at. That means that an individual could put $1
million in a single FDIC insured bank and be covered for only $250,000 of
that sum or that same individual could spread that $1 million into 4 or more
FDIC insured banks and be insured for the entire $1 million sum. The
FDIC does have ways to receive more than $250,000 worth of coverage at
one bank provided certain criteria are met, such as having accounts in
different asset categories.97
There are four main categories of assets, a single account, joint
account, IRA and retirement accounts and revocable trusts. The FDIC
explains the process by which their coverage works for each of these assets
as follows:
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Who is the FDIC?, supra note 28.
Stammers, supra note 29.
95
Who is the FDIC?, supra note 28; Stammers, supra note 29.
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Who is the FDIC?, supra note 28.
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Deposit Insurance FAQ, supra note 31.
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Example 1: Single Account (owned by one person): $250,000 per owner.98
Example of Insurance Coverage for Single Accounts
Depositor

Type of Deposit

Amount
Deposited

Jane Smith

Savings account

$25,000

Jane Smith

Certificate of
Deposit

$250,000

Jane Smith

NOW account

$50,000

Jane Smith's sole
proprietorship

Checking
account

$50,000

Total Deposited

$375,000

Insurance Available

$250,000

Uninsured Amount

$125,000

Example 2: Joint Accounts (two or more persons): $250,000 per coowner. “[Assume] John and Mary have three joint accounts totaling
$600,000 at an insured bank. Under FDIC rules, each co-owner’s share of
each joint account is considered equal unless otherwise stated in the bank’s
records. John and Mary each own $300,000 in the joint account category,
putting a total of $100,000 ($50,000 for each) over the insurance limit.”99
Joint Account Example

98
99

Account Title

Type
Deposit

Mary and John Smith

Checking

$50,000

John or Mary Smith

Savings

$150,000

Mary Smith or John
Smith

CD

$400,000

Id.
Id.

of

Account Balance
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$600,000

Total Deposits

Insurance coverage for each owner is calculated as follows:
Account
Holders

Ownership
Share

Amount
Insured

Amount
Uninsured

John

$300,000

$250,000

$50,000

Mary

$300,000

$250,000

$50,000

Total

$600,000

$500,000

$100,000

In this example, both John and Mary have ownership shares in the
accounts of $300,000 [in other words, each one of them has ownership of
one half of the checking account ($25,000), one half of the savings account
($75,000), and one half of the CD ($200,000), for a total of $300,000]. As
discussed above, because each individual is insured for up to $250,000 per
bank, Mary’s coverage in the joint ownership category is limited to
$250,000, and $50,000 is uninsured. The same is true for John, giving him
$250,000 worth of coverage and leaving $50,000 uninsured.
Example 3: IRAs and other certain retirement accounts: $250,000 per
owner.100
Example of Insurance Coverage for Self-Directed Retirement
Accounts
Account Title

Account Balance

Bob Johnson's Roth IRA

$110,000

Bob Johnson's IRA

$75,000

Total

$185,000

Amount Insured

$185,000

100

Id.
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Example 4: Revocable trust accounts: “Each owner is insured up to
$250,000 for the interests of each beneficiary, subject to specific
limitations and requirements.”101
Example — POD Accounts with Multiple Owners and
Beneficiaries
Account Title

Account
Balance

Amount
Insured

Amount
Uninsured

Husband and
Wife POD 3
children

$1,500,000

$1,500,000

$0

Husband POD
wife

$250,000

$250,000

$0

Wife POD
husband

$250,000

$250,000

$0

Husband POD
niece and
nephew

$500,000

$500,000

$0

Husband and
wife POD
grandchild

$600,000

$500,000

$100,000

Total

$3,100,000

$3,000,000

$100,000

102

The FDIC is funded through premiums paid by the banks and thrifts and
from earnings on U.S. Treasury Securities.103 These premiums are paid
regularly and go into what is described by some as a “war chest.”104 “To
provide an effective banking safety net, it is necessary for the FDIC to
replace cash (of the failed bank) with cash from the FDIC at the moment
the bank fails.”105 The FDIC insures traditional bank accounts, savings,
checking, trust, certificates of deposit (“CDs”), money market savings
101

Id.
Id.
103
Who is the FDIC?, supra note 28.
104
Gallanis, supra note 35, at 9.
105
Id. at 10.
102
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accounts and IRA accounts.106 The FDIC does not, however, insure mutual
funds, safe deposit boxes, annuities, stocks or bonds.107 Since its creation in
1934, no depositor insured by the FDIC has lost even a single penny of
insured funds as a result of a bank failure.108 To give an idea of how
incredible this accomplishment is, the FDIC reports that since the year
2000, 457 banks have failed.109 It is because of this success that the FDIC
has gained such prominence and respect from individuals and businesses
alike.
In addition to its role insuring deposits after a bank failure, the
FDIC acts preemptively by “examining and supervising financial
institutions for safety and soundness and consumer protection.”110 “The
FDIC is a recognized leader in promoting sound public policies, addressing
risks in the nation's financial system, and carrying out its insurance,
supervisory, consumer protection, and receivership management
responsibilities.”111 In carrying out its duties, the FDIC produces Annual
Reports to the President of the United States and Congress, a Privacy
Program, Strategic Plans about the FDIC’s short and long-term strategic
goals and Financial Reports on its internal business.112

106

Insured or Not Insured?, supra note 39.
Id.
108
Who is the FDIC?, supra note 28.
109
Failed Bank List, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
individual/failed/banklist.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2012).
110
FDIC Mission, Vision, and Values, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
http://www.fdic.gov/about/mission/index.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
111
Id.
112
Privacy Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/
strategic/report/index.html (last updated Jan. 14, 2011); Annual Reports, FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/privacy (last updated June 16,
2011).
107

STANDARDS FOR PLEADING A CLAIM UNDER CUIPA: NO
EXCEPTIONS TO THE CONNECTICUT FACT PLEADING
REQUIREMENT
BETHANY L. DIMARZIO*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.

INTRODUCTION
PLEADING STANDARDS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
PLEADING A CUIPA CLAIM
A. DOES CUIPA PROVIDE A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION?
B.
REQUIREMENTS FOR PLEADING A CUIPA CLAIM
IV. DEFENDING AGAINST CUIPA CLAIMS
V. LEVEL OF SPECIFIC FACTUAL DETAIL REQUIRED
A. LINE 1: SPECIFIC FACTS REQUIRED TO ILLUSTRATE
GENERAL BUSINESS PRACTICE
B.
LINE 2: LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PLEADINGS
PLEADING STANDARDS APPLIED TO CUIPA CLAIMS IN
FEDERAL COURTS
VI. ANALYSIS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
VII. CONCLUSION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In her complaint, a plaintiff alleges that her insurer failed to settle
her claim in a timely fashion when her house burned down. In order to
prevail on her claim, she must allege that other people insured by the same
company experienced the same misconduct. It seems likely that she is not
the only one who has experienced a delay in settling a claim with this
insurer, so in her complaint, she claims that, “upon information and belief”,
other insureds have suffered the same misconduct. If her complaint is
deemed factually insufficient upon a motion to strike, she has no
opportunity to conduct discovery to prove that she is not the only one who
suffered, and no opportunity to pursue her claim. If her complaint is found
*

J.D. Candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law, 2012; B.S.,
University of Connecticut, 2009. I would like to thank Attorney Crystal Fraser,
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to be sufficient, however, the insurer will be subjected to a timeconsuming, expensive, and exhaustive discovery procedure, based on the
plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegations that other insureds suffered similar
misconduct.
Pleading standards serve a critical function in our judicial system
in that they set a threshold by which frivolous claims are stricken or
dismissed, leaving room for meritorious claims to be tried in court.1
Compliance with pleading standards is essential to prevail on a claim;
without adequate pleadings, a claim essentially fails before the case ever
begins. Inadequate pleadings are targets waiting to be stricken, and result in
loss of opportunity to conduct discovery, the inability to present a case, and
ultimately, no possibility of obtaining relief.2
The standards for pleading a claim in federal and Connecticut state
courts are set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure3 and in
Connecticut’s Trial Rules.4 In Connecticut, the courts require the plaintiff
to set forth a concise statement of material facts in support of their
allegations.5 However, the standards for pleading a claim of unfair
settlement practices against an insurer have recently become a subject for
debate, causing a split amongst Connecticut trial courts. Some courts
believe that pleadings should be construed liberally, giving the plaintiff the
benefit of doubt over the insurer.6 Others adhere to strict construction of
pleading standards, suggesting that there should not be an exception to the
state’s fact pleading rule for insurance claims.7 This note analyzes the
standards for pleading a claim under the Connecticut Unfair Insurance
1

Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 48-49 (2010) (discussing the
district court judge’s role in filtering cases based on pleadings and motions to
dismiss and the uncertainty of separating frivolous and meritorious claims).
2
Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1294-95
(2010).
3
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
4
CONN. PRAC. BOOK § 10-1.
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., No.
520348, 1994 WL 76383, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1994) (interpreting a
CUIPA claim liberally under CUTPA because the statutes are remedial in nature).
7
See, e.g., Tomonto v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. CV044001543, 2006 WL
2053723, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 7, 2006) (“This is a fact pleading
jurisdiction. Practice Book § 10-1 states, in part: ‘Each pleading shall contain a
plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies . . . .’”)
(citing CONN. PRAC. BOOK § 10-1).
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Practices Act, and will suggest that there is no adequate reason to suspend
Connecticut’s fact pleading standard for this singular area of law.
PLEADING STANDARDS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS

II.

Until recently, claims for relief in federal court were governed by
the notice pleading approach, wherein the claimant is only required to
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”8 The goal of notice pleading is to “give the defendant
fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.”9 Under a notice pleading standard, if a claim for relief is sufficient to
put the defendant on notice of the claim against him, it will survive a
motion to strike, with factual discovery occurring later in the pretrial
process.10
Notice pleading was adopted because, in many cases, the defendant
is in control of information that is relevant to the plaintiff’s claim, as they
have the knowledge and evidence the plaintiff is seeking to prove their
case.11 Notice pleading balances out this advantage by giving the plaintiff
the benefit of the doubt that they have a legitimate claim, and by not
requiring the plaintiff to cite facts that they cannot be expected to know at
an early stage of litigation.12 However, the lower the pleading standard, the
higher the economic cost, as vague and unsubstantiated pleadings may
permit plaintiffs to conduct extensive and costly discovery inquiries into
the defendant’s affairs.13
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court reconsidered the federal
notice pleading standard in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, a consumer
antitrust action against telephone and telecommunications providers
alleging a conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.14 The Twombly
8

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The United States Supreme Court adopted the notice
pleading standard in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
9
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
10
Miller, supra note 1, at 4.
11
Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 11415 (2009).
12
Id.
13
Id. at 116 (“In particular, the lower the pleading standard, the greater the
potential disparity between defendant's and plaintiff's costs for several claim types .
. . because the range of permissible inquiry into defendant's affairs increases as
pleading specificity requirements decrease, especially for claims in which the
plaintiff's own conduct is of little moment.”).
14
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550, 553 (2007).
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Court adopted a slightly higher standard than notice pleading, holding that
enough facts must be stated to make a claim for relief “plausible” on its
face.15 In 2009, the Supreme Court again leaned away from the notice
pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which relied on and enforced the
plausibility pleading requirement set forth in Twombly.16 The Iqbal Court
dismissed a civil rights complaint filed by a Pakistani man who was
detained after the September 11 attacks.17 Mirroring the language in
Twombly, the Iqbal Court stated that discriminatory animus on the part of
the federal officials was “not a plausible conclusion” based on the facts
pled.18 This newly-formed federal pleading standard has become known as
“plausibility pleading”; a standard that imposes a higher burden on
plaintiffs, requiring just slightly more facts be pled in comparison to the
notice pleading standard.19 The holdings in Twombly and Iqbal regarding
pleading standards are significant in that they indicate a moving away from
the explicit focus on giving notice.20 However, this movement is modest, as
the Court has stated that “plausibility” should not be interpreted as a
demanding standard.21
In contrast to the standards for pleading a claim in federal court,
Connecticut takes a fact pleading approach, requiring that “[e]ach pleading
shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which
the pleader relies, but not of the evidence by which they are to be proved . .
. .”22 By focusing on a plain statement of specific facts, courts avoid
subjecting defendants to frivolous litigation and the overall cost of
operating the judicial system is reduced, as fewer claims survive this strict
pleading standard.23 However, some claims that appear frivolous due to
lack of factual pleading might be dismissed, despite the potentially valid
claims they assert.24

15

Id. at 570.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009).
17
Id. at 1950-51.
18
Id. at 1952.
19
Steinman, supra note 2, at 1310.
20
Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 883 (2009); Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
21
Bone, supra note 20, at 883-84 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
22
CONN. PRAC. BOOK § 10-1.
23
Stancil, supra note 11, at 148-49.
24
Id. at 149.
16
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The main purpose of more lenient pleading standards is simply to
make a party aware of the claims against them.25 The requirements set forth
by notice and plausibility pleading standards are easy enough to satisfy,
which helps to ensure that a litigant gets his or her day in court.26 Despite
the long-standing history of lenient pleading standards in federal courts,
many state courts find it preferable to take a fact pleading approach,
including Connecticut.27 Attorneys handling full workloads of civil
litigation cases find that fact pleading standards make their cases “more
focused, and ultimately less expensive and less time-consuming” than if a
more lenient pleading approach was followed.28 The adoption and practice
of fact pleading in Connecticut is therefore not arbitrary or accidental, but
serves to benefit the judicial system by conserving resources and
expediting meritorious cases.
III.

PLEADING A CUIPA CLAIM

The Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA) was
derived from the National Association of Insurance Commissioner's Model
Act, which has been adopted by most states.29 CUIPA was adopted to
prohibit persons from engaging in unfair or deceptive behavior in the
practice of insurance within the state of Connecticut.30 The statute
specifically lists sixteen prohibited practices, including misrepresenting the
benefits of a policy, disseminating false information to the public, and
engaging in unfair claim settlement practices,31 the last of which is the
25

Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
987, 990 (2003).
26
Id.
27
U. OF DENV. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE LEGAL SYS., Fact-Based
Pleading: A Solution Hidden in Plain Sight, 1 (May 2010),
http://iaals.du.edu/news-room/fact-based-pleading-a-solution-hidden-in-plain-sight
(follow “Read More” link) (“While fact-based pleading has not been a part of the
federal civil process since the 1930s, it remains alive and well in many of the
country’s biggest and busiest state courts, including California, New York,
Pennsylvania, Florida, Texas, Missouri, Virginia, Illinois, New Jersey, Connecticut
and Louisiana. These are courts that collectively handle millions of civil cases
every year.”).
28
Id.
29
Chapell v. LaRosa, No. CV990552801, 2001 WL 58057, at *5 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2001).
30
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-815 (2012).
31
Id. § 38a-816.
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violation this paper will focus on. The list of prohibited acts is followed by
a blanket prohibition on any unlisted, unfair insurance practices.32
CUIPA claims are handled by the Connecticut Insurance
Department, and the Act gives the Commissioner of Insurance broad
discretion to investigate potential unfair practices and enforce its
provisions.33 Once a CUIPA claim is properly pled, therefore, it is at the
discretion of the Commissioner to determine whether the alleged practice
should be investigated, and to request and view any pertinent information.
The Act also established an administrative procedure through which the
Commissioner of Insurance can take action and impose sanctions against
an insurer found to be in violation of its provisions.34
If a plaintiff has experienced unfair insurance claim settlement
practices, bringing a claim under CUIPA is not the only opportunity for
redress. Every contract is accompanied by an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.35 When an insurer withholds payment of a valid
insurance claim in bad faith, in violation of an insurance contract, they
subject themselves to liability in tort.36 A plaintiff can bring a claim of
common law bad faith sounding in tort, and will succeed if they can prove
that the insurer committed an unfair practice with a dishonest purpose or ill
will.37 The payoff to the plaintiff who succeeds in their common law bad
faith claim will not be substantial, however, as punitive damages under

32

Id. § 38a-818 (permitting charges “[w]henever the commissioner has reason
to believe that any person engaged in the business of insurance is engaging in this
state in any method of competition or in any act or practice in the conduct of such
business which is not defined in section 38a-816 . . . .”).
33
Martin v. Am. Equity Ins. Co., 185 F. Supp. 2d 162, 166 (D. Conn. 2002).
34
Elizabeth J. Stewart, Environmental Insurance Coverage Disputes in
Connecticut, 70 CONN. B.J. 280, 306 (1996).
35
Hoskins v. Titan Value Equities Grp. Inc., 749 A.2d 1144, 1146-47 (Conn.
2000).
36
Wiacek v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., No. 329601, 1998 WL 161378, at
*2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998).
37
Buckman v. People Exp., Inc., 530 A.2d 596, 599 (Conn. 1987); see also
Chapman v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 665 A.2d 112, 120 (Conn.
1995) (“[I]n order to receive punitive damages under CUTPA, the plaintiffs were
required to produce evidence that the defendants' actions had a reckless
indifference to the rights of others or that the defendants had engaged in an
intentional and wanton violation of those rights.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Connecticut common law are limited to the amount of attorney’s fees.38
Bringing an action under CUIPA is therefore significantly more attractive
to those who have been subjected to unfair settlement practices than a
claim sounding in tort, as a successful CUIPA claim could potentially
award the plaintiff actual damages, attorney’s fees, and punitive damages.39
A. DOES CUIPA PROVIDE A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION?
Since its inception, individuals have turned to CUIPA to seek
redress from insurers for treating claimants unfairly during the claim
settlement process. However, individuals cannot succeed on such claims,
as the Second Circuit has held that there is no such private cause of action
under CUIPA.40 The Connecticut Supreme Court has not addressed this
issue, and the lower courts are split as to whether CUIPA provides a private
cause of action.41 A minority of courts rule that a private right of action
does exist,42 but the majority opinion is that there is no private right of
action under CUIPA.43 For the purposes of this paper, the majority position
will be adopted, and it will be assumed that there is no private right of
action under CUIPA.

38

Charles T. Lee, Insurance Coverage Litigation in Connecticut: Is There a
Level Playing Field in the “Insurance State”?, 74 CONN. B.J. 362, 379 (2000).
39
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110g (2012). “[U]nder a combination of the
Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act . . . and the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act, . . . insureds may recover substantial punitive damages, if they can
show a defendant engaged in a general business practice of unfair or deceptive
settlement conduct.” Lee, supra note 38, at 379.
40
Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 118 (2d Cir.
2001).
41
W. World Ins. Co. v. Architectural Builders of Westport, LLC, 520 F. Supp.
2d 408, 411 (D. Conn. 2007).
42
See, e.g., George's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., No.
CV000439407, 2001 WL 206081 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 2001); Edelman v. Pac.
Emp’r Ins. Co., No. CV 93 0533463, 1994 WL 590632 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 20,
1994).
43
See, e.g., Am. Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Better Benefits,
LLC, 7591S, 2001 WL 1178596, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2001); Chieffo
v. Yannielli, No. CV000159940, 2001 WL 950286, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. July
10, 2001); Joseph v. Hannan Agency Inc., No. 323310, 1997 WL 15424, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 1997); Stabile v. S. Conn. Hosp. Sys., Inc., No. 326120,
1996 WL 651633, at *3 n.6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 1996).
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Although the Connecticut Supreme Court has expressly declined to
rule on this issue,44 the lack of definite authority doesn’t serve to restrict
private claims. Even if no private right of action exists under CUIPA, the
plaintiff is not left without redress; a claim for relief can be made under the
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) alleging a breach of
CUIPA.45 The CUTPA, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce, does create a private
right of action.46 For the purposes of this paper, pleadings alleging unfair
settlement practices will be referred to as claims under CUIPA, regardless
of whether they are being brought in conjunction with a CUTPA claim.
Although a plaintiff is entitled to bring a claim under CUTPA
alleging a violation of CUIPA, the claim is not proper unless the alleged
unfair practice actually violates CUIPA.47 As a Connecticut statute, CUIPA
is subject to governance by Connecticut’s Trial Rules. Such a claim
therefore must contain a statement of the material facts forming the basis of
the allegation, and meet the criteria set forth in both CUTPA and CUIPA.
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR PLEADING A CUIPA CLAIM
Of the sixteen causes of action contained in CUIPA, the unfair
settlement practices cause of action is unique in that it requires a showing
of multiple instances of misconduct by the same insurer.48 When asserting a
claim of unfair settlement practices under CUIPA, the claimant must plead
that the insurer performed certain actions constituting misconduct in
conjunction with the settlement of their insurance claim.49 Such misconduct
encompasses misrepresenting the insurance policy provisions at issue,
attempting to settle a claim for less than a reasonable person would have
expected, or refusing to pay claims without reasonable investigation.50
These actions must not have been committed only as to the plaintiff; they
44

Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 643 A.2d 1282, 1285 n.4 (Conn. 1994) (“With
respect to the CUIPA count, the defendant contends that CUIPA does not create a
private cause of action. We decline to consider that claim because it is unnecessary
for us to do so.”).
45
Mead v. Burns, 509 A.2d 11, 18 (Conn. 1986).
46
16 Conn. Prac. Series, Elements of an Action § 11:2 (“A statutory cause of
action is created by C.G.S.A. § 42-110g for any person who suffers a loss of
money or property as the result of an unfair trade practice.”).
47
Martin v. Am. Equity Ins. Co., 185 F. Supp. 2d 162, 168 (D. Conn. 2002).
48
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-815 (2012).
49
Id. § 38a-816(6).
50
Id.
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must have been committed “with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice.”51 This clause has led Connecticut courts to conclude
that pleading a claim of unfair settlement practices under CUIPA requires
the claimant to show more than one instance of misconduct on the part of
the insurer.52
The language in the unfair settlement practices cause of action
therefore requires a showing of multiple prohibited acts, whereas the other
causes of action under CUIPA require that only one prohibited act be
asserted.53 By including this language in the statute, the legislature clearly
intended that insurers only be punished for unfair settlement practices
occurring with some frequency, rather than for isolated incidences of
misconduct.54 This indicates that isolated incidences of misconduct,
although unfortunate, are not so seriously in violation of state public policy
as to mandate statutory intervention.55
Furthermore, CUIPA’s protection is not meant to extend to a
plaintiff who claims that multiple unfair settlement practices occurred in
relation to just one insurance claim.56 This point was emphasized in Lees v.
Middlesex Insurance Company, where the plaintiff alleged that the insurer
failed to acknowledge inquiries regarding her claim, failed to affirm or
deny coverage, failed to make a good faith effort to settle the claim
promptly, and failed to properly explain her insurance policy.57 The court
in Lees held that multiple instances of alleged misconduct in relation to one
insurance claim does not rise to the level of a general business practice.58

51

Id.
Mead v. Burns, 509 A.2d 11, 19 (Conn. 1986) (recognizing “the legislative
determination that isolated instances of unfair insurance settlement practices are
not so violative of the public policy of this state as to warrant statutory
intervention”).
53
Ferreira v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., No. 323152, 1996 WL 411999, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 5, 1996); see also Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 229 Conn.
842, 848 n.5 (1994) (“We note that of the sixteen categories of unfair insurance
practices proscribed by General Statutes § 38a-816, only subsection (6) expressly
requires proof that the unfair claim settlement practices enumerated therein were
committed or performed ‘with such frequency as to indicate a general business
practice.’”).
54
Lees, 229 Conn. at 849.
55
Martin v. Am. Equity Ins. Co., 185 F. Supp. 2d 162, 166 (D. Conn. 2002).
56
Lees, 229 Conn. at 848.
57
Id. at 848 n.7.
58
Id. at 849.
52
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DEFENDING AGAINST CUIPA CLAIMS
The main strategy for defending against CUIPA claims in state
court is by filing a motion to strike.59 A motion to strike is used to contest
the legal sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint.60 In evaluating a
motion to strike, the court considers the facts set forth in the complaint and
construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, admitting all
well-pleaded facts.61 Only the facts alleged in the complaint can be
considered; legal conclusions or opinions will not be admitted.62 If the facts
set forth would support the cause of action asserted, the motion to strike
will be denied.63 A motion to strike a claim of unfair settlement practices
under CUIPA is often based on the grounds that the pleading violates
Connecticut Trial Rules by stating insufficient specific facts.
CUIPA claims can also be litigated in federal court if there is
diversity jurisdiction.64 In federal court, the proper motion to defend against
a pleading that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a
motion to dismiss.65 A motion to dismiss is evaluated in largely the same
way as a motion to strike; the court accepts as true all the factual
allegations in the complaint, and draws inferences in the light most
favorable to the movant.66 The action will be dismissed only if it is clear
that no relief can be granted based on the facts and allegations contained in
the complaint.67 It is important to note that, because the standard for
59

Robert B. Yules & Cynthia W. S. Rowen, Insurance Bad Faith Litigation, A
Primer, 67 CONN. B.J. 380, 393 (1993).
60
Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 815 A.2d 1188, 1200-01 (Conn.
2003).
61
Colon v. Geico Cas. Co., No. CV 980419197, 1999 WL 596245, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 28, 1999) (quoting Waters v. Autuori, 676 A.2d 357, 35960 (Conn. 1996)).
62
Wiacek v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., No. 329601, 1998 WL 161378, at
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998).
63
Id.
64
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). The District Court has jurisdiction over civil
actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between citizens
of different states. When considering diversity of incorporated insurers, a
corporation is deemed to be a citizen of both the state it is incorporated in and the
state where it has its principal place of business.
65
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
66
W. World Ins. Co. v. Architectural Builders of Westport, LLC, 520 F. Supp.
2d 408, 410 (D. Conn. 2007).
67
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
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pleading in federal courts is plausibility pleading, the complaint does not
have to contain specific facts; the plaintiff must simply plead sufficient
facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.”68
A strong motion to dismiss or strike comes with the potential
benefit to insurers that the complaint will be immediately disposed of, and
will not survive to be litigated in court.69 Alternatively, upon realizing the
strong legal arguments contained in the motion, the plaintiff might be more
willing to engage in settlement discussions, or settle at a lower price.70 On
the other hand, if the motion is granted, the plaintiff might come back with
stronger legal arguments that are more difficult to defeat at trial.71 Because
of this delicate balancing act, it is critical for an insurer to evaluate the pros
and cons of moving to strike or dismiss a CUIPA action before any such
motion is filed.
V.

LEVEL OF SPECIFIC FACTUAL DETAIL REQUIRED

At the trial level, Connecticut courts are split as to the minimum
facts that must be pled to support a claim under CUTPA and CUIPA.72
“The point of contention among these decisions centers on the requirement
that ‘a CUPTA claim based on an alleged unfair claim settlement practice .
. . require[s] proof, as under CUIPA, that the unfair claim settlement
practice had been committed or performed by the defendant with such
frequency as to indicate a general business practice.’”73 The problem
therefore often lies in the ability of an individual plaintiff to state sufficient
facts indicating that not only did the insurer perpetrate misconduct against

68

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).
Mark Thomas Smith, Strategic Motions to Dismiss (Or Lack Thereof),
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial
_skills/pretrial-motion-dismiss.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
70
Id.
71
Id. “Practice Book § 10-44 permits a party to file a new pleading within
fifteen days after a motion to strike has been granted . . . .” Crespan v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. LLICV054002121S, 2006 WL 280009, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Mazza, 834 A.2d 725, 729 (Conn.
2003)).
72
Mark B. Seiger & Elizabeth F. Ahlstrand, When Pleadings Lack Specific
Facts, CONN. L. TRIB., Feb. 8, 2010, at 14-15 (quoting Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co.,
643 A.2d 1282, 1286 (Conn. 1994)).
73
Id.
69
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the plaintiff, but also that this misconduct is repeated with frequency
sufficient to render it a general business practice.
Pleadings alleging a violation of CUIPA often state facts asserting
that the claimant experienced unfair settlement practices, and that “upon
information and belief” the defendant has regularly engaged in such
practices with other insureds.74 Some courts have taken a lenient approach
when factually sparse pleadings are set forth, and have permitted pleadings
that contain either a factual allegation of a specific violation combined with
an assertion that this is a regular business practice, or pleadings containing
several claims based on the same incident.75 However, the majority of
courts have held that general allegations of unfair business practices are
insufficient, without giving any indication as to the precise level of fact
required to state a sufficient claim.76
The subsections of CUIPA describing the acts prohibited in settling
insurance claims are both broad and vague, and the pleadings filed by
plaintiffs vary widely depending on the nature of each insurance claim.77
The issue of how much factual detail is required is significant, because the
facts set forth in the pleadings often control the scope of discovery.78 If a
complaint that alleges unfair settlement practices “on information and
belief” survives an insurer’s motion to strike, the claimant may then have
the opportunity to conduct prolonged, intrusive, and expensive discovery,
inconveniencing both the claimant and the insurer.79
To date, the Connecticut Supreme Court has not had the
opportunity to consider the level of factual detail required to adequately
plead a CUIPA claim. The defensive motion to strike removes some
CUIPA claims from court before a decision is reached. Insurers often settle
CUIPA claims that survive a motion to strike; they would rather pay the
plaintiff a settlement than subject themselves to the broad discovery

74

Id.
Lee, supra note 38, at 380; Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 643 A.2d 1282
(Conn. 1994); Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 613 A.2d 838 (Conn. App. 1992).
76
Lee, supra note 38, at 380.
77
Chapell v. Larosa, No. CV990552801, 2001 WL 58057, at *8 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Jan. 5, 2001) (questioning how inappropriate behavior by insurers can be
ascertained, given the vague and broad language of the CUIPA statute).
78
Seiger & Ahlstrand, supra note 72, at 14-15 (quoting Lees v. Middlesex Ins.
Co., 643 A.2d 1282, 1286 (Conn. 1994)).
79
Id.
75
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discretion of the Commissioner of Insurance permitted under CUIPA.80
Particularly for a large insurer, the costs associated with such discovery,
such as time spent sorting documents, copying and shipping fees, and
storage fees, serve as an incentive to settle the case rather than try it in
court.81
In the trial courts, there are two conflicting lines of cases outlining
the level of fact necessary to state a claim that meets the general business
practice requirement of CUIPA. These cases differ not only in the facts set
forth in the various pleadings, but also in the legal analyses the courts
apply. The first line of cases requires that the plaintiff state facts
demonstrating a general business practice that go beyond the unfairness
immediately suffered by the plaintiff personally.82 The second line of cases
takes precisely the opposite position, holding that as long as the plaintiff
alleges that other insureds have been subjected to the same unfair
settlement practices, specific factual descriptions of these alleged instances
are not required.83
A. LINE 1: SPECIFIC FACTS REQUIRED TO ILLUSTRATE GENERAL
BUSINESS PRACTICE
The first line of cases reviewing the standards for pleading a
CUIPA claim concludes that pleadings must conform to Connecticut’s
Trial Rules, and as such, must contain a plain and concise statement of the
material facts. Such cases state that, despite the rule that pleadings must be
read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “an allegation based upon
‘reasonable information and belief’ is properly viewed as a legal
conclusion, particularly when the plaintiff has made no attempt to plead
facts establishing any other instance or instances to demonstrate the
80

See, e.g., Stancil, supra note 11, at 116 (“Fishing expeditions are sometimes
so expensive that the defendant will pay the plaintiff to leave even a lake the
defendant knows to be empty.”).
81
See, e.g., Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could
Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in A Digital Age, 58
Duke L.J. 889, 945 (2009) (stating that increased discovery costs have the effect of
“increasing parties' incentives to settle early, before much discovery . . . but also
increasing the incentive to file frivolous lawsuits that defendants would settle to
avoid discovery costs.”).
82
Wirth v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV095012844S, 2010 WL 654392,
at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2010).
83
Id. at *3.
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frequency of the alleged CUIPA violation.”84 This line of cases suggests
that, in order to properly plead unfair settlement practices as a general
business practice, the plaintiff must allege specific facts indicating that the
insurer’s misconduct has occurred with such frequency as to go beyond the
immediate claims of the plaintiff.85
One such case is Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corporation, where
the plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief from her employer, based
on alleged wrongful conduct in the treatment of the plaintiff’s workers’
compensation claims.86 All eight counts of the complaint were stricken by
the trial court, among which two were stricken because the plaintiff failed
to allege sufficient facts indicating that the defendant’s misconduct
constituted a general business practice in violation of CUIPA.87 In Quimby,
not only did the plaintiff fail to state sufficient facts indicating a general
business practice, she did not even allege that other claimants had been
treated in a similar manner.88 Without such an allegation, the facts stated
did not meet the well-settled requirement that a single act of misconduct is
insufficient to plead a claim under CUIPA.89 Therefore, the court affirmed
the trial court’s decision to strike the plaintiff’s complaint.90 The Quimby
case is one of few cases concerning the standards of pleading a CUIPA
claim to have been considered on the appellate level, and as the complaint
in question did not suggest that the unfair settlement practices occurred
with frequency, the precise amount of fact required to plead a CUIPA claim
was not addressed.
In some cases, the plaintiff will allege, without factual
substantiation, that other insureds have experienced the same unfair
settlement practices, in an attempt to fulfill the general business practice
element of CUIPA. This was the case in Ciarleglio v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.
Co., where the plaintiff was denied workers’ compensation benefits after
suffering job-related injuries.91 In considering the insurer’s motion to strike
plaintiff’s CUIPA claim, the court noted that, “[i]n what may be an attempt
84

Wiacek v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., No. 329601, 1998 WL 161378, at
*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. March 31, 1998).
85
Wirth, 2010 WL 654392 at *3.
86
Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 613 A.2d 838, 840-41 (Conn. App. 1992).
87
Id.
88
Id. at 845.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Ciarleglio v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. CV90 0276028 S, 1993 WL
541609, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 1993).
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to avoid prompt demise of the fourth count, the plaintiff has inserted the
magic words of other acts of insurance misconduct by the defendant,
although not stating the factual basis for that claim.”92
The Ciarleglio court viewed this strategy as problematic, in that the
language in the pleadings constituted a legal conclusion due to the fact that
the plaintiff did not name any other claimants whose workers’
compensation claims were handled inappropriately, and legal conclusions
are not properly admitted on a motion to strike.93 Furthermore, the court
acknowledged that the plaintiff had filed discovery to find other claimants
in a similar position in order to bolster his CUIPA claim, but held that
merely filing such a discovery request to give the appearance of fulfilling
the requirements of a CUIPA claim is insufficient.94 Because the complaint
failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim of unfair settlement as a
general business practice, the court granted the insurer’s motion to strike.95
The plaintiff’s complaint in Hellberg v. Travelers Home & Marine
Insurance Co. exhibited elements of the complaints in both Quimby and
Ciarleglio. There, the plaintiff asserted seven violations of CUTPA/CUIPA
with respect to one insurance claim that the insurer allegedly refused to
pay.96 The plaintiff further stated that “these violations are part of a ‘pattern
or frequency of similar unfair trade practices engaged in by the
defendant.’”97 In determining whether the complaint would survive the
insurer’s motion to strike, the court cited the holdings in Lees and Mead,
noting that more than one instance of misconduct must be demonstrated.98
The court not only relied on these key cases, but also quoted a similar
Connecticut Superior Court case, Finocchio v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance
Co., in granting the insurer’s motion to strike:
A recent Superior Court decision examined the level of
detail required in § 38a-816(6) claims holding that: “[a]
close examination of the plaintiff's allegations . . . reveals
that there are no specific factual references to the
defendant's action towards other insureds . . . . As all of the
92
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factual allegations in [the count at issue] involve only the
settlement negotiations between the plaintiff and the
defendant and fail to reference other insureds, the plaintiff
has not alleged a general business practice.” In that case,
the court held that allegations that the defendant “has in the
past engaged, and continues to engage in unfair and
deceptive acts and/or practices” were insufficient for the
purpose of § 38a-816(6).99
In some cases, the court explicitly analyzes how the Connecticut
fact pleading standard should be applied to CUIPA claims. One such case
is Currie v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., where there was disagreement
amongst the parties as to the limits of the plaintiffs’ insurance policy when
the plaintiffs’ store and warehouse burned down.100 Aetna moved to strike
the plaintiffs’ CUIPA claims, as the plaintiffs had made the broad
allegation that they and “other insureds and policy holders of the
defendants” had suffered misconduct.101 In granting defendant’s motion to
strike, the court held that:
[s]uch bald allegations are properly seen as legal
conclusions, particularly since the plaintiffs make no
attempt to plead any facts identifying these “other
occasions.” It is recognized that while Connecticut is a fact
pleading jurisdiction, requiring that “[e]ach pleading shall
contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts
on which the pleader relies,” the pleader, nevertheless, is
not required to plead “the evidence by which [material
facts] are to be proved.” But here, no facts are alleged
essential to establishing an unfair pattern of general
business practice by Aetna, as required by Section 38a816(6). As Aetna contends, the plaintiffs “have inserted the
magic words of other acts of insurance misconduct by the
defendant, although not stating the factual basis for that
claim.”102
99

Id. (quoting Finocchio v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., No. FSTCV095009607S, 2009
WL 1335073, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 2009)).
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This line of cases clearly indicates that a plaintiff cannot merely
insert key phrases and plural terms into their complaint to make it appear as
though other claimants have suffered the same unfair settlement practices.
For a complaint to be factually sufficient to survive a motion to strike under
Connecticut’s fact pleading standard, the plaintiff must provide information
as to the identities of other insureds that have suffered misconduct, and
must demonstrate that they have suffered the same type of misconduct
alleged in their complaint.
For example, in National Publishing Co., Inc. v. Hartford Fire
Insurance Co., Inc., the plaintiff sought insurance coverage following a
series of thefts, but had difficulty collecting covered costs from the
insurer.103 The plaintiff attempted to illustrate the frequency of misconduct
by listing eight other parties who had allegedly filed complaints against the
insurer with the Connecticut Insurance Department.104 In granting the
insurer’s motion to strike, the court recognized that “the plaintiff fails to
establish what facts, if any, support those entities’ complaints. The only
misconduct pleaded, therefore, is the ‘isolated instance’ of wrongdoing that
occurred against the plaintiff.”105 Because the complaint failed to establish
these facts, the court held that the plaintiff’s CUIPA claim was not
sufficiently pled, and granted the insurer’s motion to strike.106
This first line of cases sheds light on the level of fact required to
state a CUIPA claim in accordance with Connecticut fact pleading
standards. From these cases, we can derive a general rule that plaintiffs
must do more than allege that the insurer’s misconduct has occurred with
frequency;107 they must plead sufficient supporting facts, rather than merely
using plural terms alleging that “others” have suffered the same
misconduct.108 The judges considering these cases have analyzed not only
the purpose of the CUIPA statute itself, but have taken it into consideration
in conjunction with the legislative intent of the statute and the Connecticut
103
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standards for pleading a claim. The strength of this line of cases, therefore,
is that it takes into consideration Connecticut law as a whole, and does not
merely pick and choose certain rules to follow in certain circumstances.
B. LINE 2: LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PLEADINGS
The second line of cases reviewing the standards for pleading a
CUIPA claim concludes that claims alleging limited material facts may
survive a motion to strike. The rationale for these holdings is that CUTPA
and CUIPA are remedial in nature, and as such, should be construed
liberally to benefit claimants.109 Given that there is no appellate authority
governing how much factual detail is required to allege a general business
practice, and the district courts are split on this issue, courts that follow this
second line of reasoning apply liberal construction in holding that such
pleadings are sufficient to survive a motion to strike.110
The clear deficiency with these cases is that they fail to apply the
Connecticut standard of fact pleading in evaluating the motion to strike. In
Wirth v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, for example, the
plaintiff brought a claim of unfair settlement practices under
CUTPA/CUIPA against her insurer, in addition to claims of breach of
contract and bad faith.111 The insurer moved to strike the count under
CUTPA/CUIPA, arguing that the complaint was factually insufficient and
failed to set forth facts indicating unfair claim settlement as a general
business practice.112 In denying the insurer’s motion to strike, the court
noted that Connecticut courts are split as to the specificity of pleadings
required, but gave deference to the fact that other trial courts had held that
pleading specific instances of misconduct involving other insureds is not
109

Nation v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CV040093456S, 2005 WL 2364932, at
*2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2005) (“The court is aware that there is no appellate
authority as to whether a plaintiff must plead other specific instances of unfair
settlement practices on the part of an insurer in order to satisfy the allegation of a
general business practice and that superior court decisions are split on this issue.
Given the remedial nature of CUIPA and given that it is to be liberally construed to
give effect to the legislature's intent, the court holds that the allegation of a general
business practice in the plaintiff's complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to
strike.”).
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required.113 There was no reasoning or discussion as to why these cases
should be followed over those requiring specific instances of misconduct,
and no rationale was given as to why notice-style pleadings are sufficient.
The court in Wirth further stated that “[t]he plaintiff's allegations of insurer
misconduct reach beyond the plaintiff's individual claim, as evidenced by
her use of the plural ‘claims’ and ‘insureds.’ The plaintiff's choice of words
demonstrates that the acts are not confined to the plaintiff herself.”114
However, the court never questioned how the plaintiff knew that other
“insureds” had been similarly affected, or what the factual basis for these
claims was. Because the court in Wirth did not evaluate or discuss the
merits of the pleadings under Connecticut’s fact pleading rule, it is difficult
to say whether merely pluralizing words in a complaint causes the pleading
to contain facts sufficient to allege a general business practice.
The court in Pettibone Tavern, LLC v. OneBeacon Midwest Ins.
Co. provided a more thorough analysis of its reasoning in denying an
insurer’s motion to strike, but still neglected to apply Connecticut’s fact
pleading standard in considering the merits of the complaint.115 The insurer
moved to strike the insured’s complaint alleging CUIPA violations,
asserting that “[t]he better approach . . . is to require the plaintiff to do
more than merely parrot the language contained within the CUIPA count
and allege facts that demonstrate that the defendant engaged in a pattern of
misconduct.”116 The insured’s response was that “the more persuasive line
of cases does not require that it allege specific instances of insurer
misconduct.”117
In its reasoning, the Pettibone Tavern court considered the
language of CUIPA, as well as the holding in Lees that the plaintiff must
provide proof that the misconduct occurred with such frequency as to
indicate a general business practice.118 However, the court concluded that
because the plaintiff included language that the misconduct occurred in
“other claims”, the complaint survived the insurer’s motion to strike.119 The
court did not provide any reasoning as to why including this phrase in the
113
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complaint made it sufficient, nor did it mention how its conclusion fit in
with the requirement of proving frequency as stated in Lees.
Some opinions stemming from cases in this line not only fail to
consider the applicable state law, they provide no analysis whatsoever as to
the level of fact must be pled in order to constitute a general business
practice. In Bates v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., the plaintiff brought a
CUIPA claim against her insurer, alleging that her workers’ compensation
claims were handled inappropriately during settlement.120 In her complaint,
she set forth six instances of alleged misconduct pertaining to her single
workers’ compensation claim.121 Although the court acknowledged that a
CUIPA claim must include a showing of more than a single act of
misconduct under Mead and Quimby, the insurer’s motion to strike was
denied.122 The court reasoned that “[t]he plaintiff has also alleged that the
defendant has committed the same acts ‘with such frequency as to indicate
a general business practice.’ . . . The allegation of a general business
practice in the plaintiff's complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to
strike.”123 In doing so, the court in Bates not only failed to discuss the
Connecticut fact pleading standard, they also ignored the reasoning in cases
requiring more factual support to allege a general business practice. They
provided no explanation as to why the plaintiff’s allegations were
sufficient. Finally, the court in Bates did not offer any discussion as to why
an allegation of a general business practice is an appropriate factual
component of a pleading, rather than a legal conclusion.
What is missing in these cases is an analysis of Connecticut law as
a whole. Cases in this line do not take into consideration the level of facts
required in a complaint under Connecticut fact pleading standards. While
most of the cases in this line of reasoning acknowledge widely-followed
cases such as Mead, Quimby and Lees, which require proof of frequent
insurer misconduct, they merely cite these cases as a rule and then form
their own, unrelated conclusions.124 Many such cases hold that it is
factually sufficient to assert that several other persons have suffered similar
insurer misconduct, without naming those persons or stating any facts to
demonstrate how the instances of misconduct were similar. Furthermore, it
is difficult to tell how the courts reason through their decisions in this line
120
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of cases, as there is rarely a thorough discussion or analysis of the relevant
law. These courts often rely on other trial-level decisions stating that no
facts concerning other instances of misconduct are required, without
explaining their reliance or analyzing the justification for these holdings.
This line of cases is more favorable to insureds, who may have
meritorious claims but lack the factual detail to properly articulate these
claims at the pleading stage. However, denying a motion to strike does
provide a plaintiff their day in court, but it does so at an enormous potential
discovery cost to the insurer. Courts analyzing a complaint without the full
force of Connecticut law in mind are exposing insurers to needless
litigation that was not intended by the legislature in crafting the CUIPA
statute.
C. PLEADING STANDARDS APPLIED TO CUIPA CLAIMS IN FEDERAL
COURTS
CUIPA claims heard in federal court by diversity jurisdiction are
subject to federal pleading standards.125 Because the federal plausibility
pleading standard is less stringent than Connecticut’s fact pleading
standard, one might assume that more CUIPA claims survive dismissal in
federal court. However, this is not the case; the Connecticut District Court
has held that unsubstantiated allegations of unfair settlement as a general
business practice are not compliant with the plausibility pleading standard.
In 2010, the Connecticut District Court applied the Twombly and
Iqbal plausibility pleading standard to a CUIPA claim in Ensign Yachts,
Inc. v. Arrigoni.126 In Ensign Yachts, a yacht insured by Lloyd’s of London
was damaged during transportation for sale.127 In its complaint, Ensign
Yachts alleged that the insurer violated CUIPA’s prohibition against unfair
settlement practices by refusing to cooperate in the claims process and
ultimately denying the claim without justification.128 However, the
complaint asserted facts describing the unfair settlement practices suffered
by Ensign Yachts and alleged that this was a general business practice of
Lloyd’s, but did not identify any other specific instances of similar unfair
claim settlement practices.129
125
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In its decision, the Ensign Yachts court commented on the split
amongst Connecticut trial courts as to whether unsubstantiated allegations
of unfair claims settlement as a “general business practice” are sufficient to
plead a CUIPA claim. The court stated:
Given the remedial nature of CUTPA and CUIPA, the
Court would be inclined to agree with those courts which
have held that the allegation of a general business practice,
unsupported by specific instances of insurer misconduct in
other cases, is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.
However, the applicable pleading standard for this forum
requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions
or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’“ Thus, under the Iqbal pleading standard, a
mere assertion of a general business practice without
anything more is insufficient to sustain Ensign’s “CUIPA
through CUTPA” claims against Lloyds . . . for violation
of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-816(6). Accordingly, the Court
dismisses these claims.130
The Connecticut District Court has reached similar conclusions in
other cases applying the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility standard. One such
case is O'Neill v. Riversource Life Ins. Co., where the plaintiff asserted that
“upon information and belief” the defendant had evaded disability income
claims “as a general business practice.”131 The court in O’Neill dismissed
the plaintiff’s CUIPA claim, stating that “[w]hile pleading ‘upon
information and belief’ is permitted, O'Neill is obligated to do more than
recite the elements of the cause of action.”132
The District Court’s application of the plausibility standard is
notable for two reasons. First, cases such as Ensign Yachts and O’Neill
illustrate that pleadings asserting unfair claims settlement as a general
business practice “upon information and belief” do not pass the threshold
130

Id. (citations omitted).
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of the plausibility pleading standard. As such, similar unsubstantiated
pleadings would not comply with Connecticut’s more stringent fact
pleading standard. Also, the fact that the federal courts apply federal
pleading standards to CUIPA claims raises a potential Erie issue. The Erie
doctrine discourages forum shopping between state and federal
jurisdictions by binding the federal court to apply local substantive law and
federal procedural law to matters sitting in diversity.133 If the standards for
pleading a CUIPA claim were found to be substantive law for Erie
purposes,134 the federal courts might be required to apply Connecticut
pleading standards.135 Although not the focus of this note, the treatment of
CUIPA claims in federal courts would be a factor worth considering if this
issue reaches the Connecticut Supreme Court.
ANALYSIS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

VI.

Although a split opinion amongst courts as to the factual standards
for pleading a CUIPA claim might be confusing, it is not unusual. Cases
and motions are decided based on a judge’s objective opinion, and each
judge emphasizes different facts and arguments within a case.136 As a
result, the body of case law is not always perfectly consistent, but varies
based on which judge was hearing a particular case and what facts and
precedent they chose to emphasize. Our legal system is based on precedent,
and in deciding which decisions to rely on, the judge must objectively
analyze the facts at hand and identify similarities with past cases.137 When
opinions on a point of law appear to be split amongst the courts, as in this

133
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analysis. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Deloitte & Touche, 818 F. Supp.
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case, the judge must analyze how another court justified its decision in
determining whether it is appropriate to join it.138
For some legal issues, splits amongst trial courts persist until
legislation is drafted in an attempt to clarify the law and assist the courts in
rendering consistent decisions amongst cases with similar facts and claims.
Despite the conflicting trial court decisions stemming from the general
business practice requirement to plead an unfair settlement practice under
CUIPA, the legislature has yet to enact any law to correct this issue. In
2009, a bill was proposed in the Connecticut General Assembly that would
eliminate the portion of CUIPA requiring that unfair settlement practices
occur “with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.”139
The stated purpose of the bill was “[t]o allow a private cause of action for
unfair claim settlement practices without the necessity of showing a general
business practice on the part of an insurer.”140 However, this bill was not
enacted.
The fact that new legislation has not been enacted speaks to the
importance of the legislature’s intent in adopting the language of the
statute. The role of the courts is to construe and apply the plain language of
the statute, and the legislature is free to step in and provide instructions if
the court misconstrues its intentions.141 Inaction by the legislature is
characterized as acquiescence in the court’s construction of a statute.142 The
fact that the legislature has not acted to remove the “general business
practice” language of CUIPA therefore indicates its acquiescence with this
language, and with the courts’ requirement of a showing of multiple unfair
practices by an insurer to satisfy a CUIPA claim.
The treatment of CUIPA claims in federal court is also indicative
of how the Connecticut Supreme Court might rule on this issue. As seen in
cases such as Ensign Yachts and O’Neill, the Connecticut District Court has
held that allegations of unfair claim settlement as a “general business
practice” are insufficient to plead a CUIPA claim when applying a
plausibility pleading standard.143 The plausibility pleading standard is not
as demanding as fact pleading, requiring just slightly more factual
allegations than notice pleading.144 If unsubstantiated allegations are
138
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insufficient to comply with plausibility pleading standards, it is likely that
the Connecticut Supreme Court would find them similarly insufficient to
meet the state’s more stringent fact pleading standard.
Public policy rationale may also play a significant role in the future
analysis of the standards for pleading a CUIPA claim. If pleading standards
are too stringent, plaintiffs may be deterred from bringing valid CUIPA
claims simply because they do not have specific facts illustrating the
insurer’s general business practice, and no access to discovery to ascertain
such facts. Insurers should not be permitted to repeatedly commit unfair
insurance practices purely because plaintiffs cannot meet Connecticut’s
stringent fact pleading standard.
If the Connecticut Supreme Court were to place high value on
these public policy considerations, there may be ways to accommodate
plaintiffs without circumventing the fact pleading standard. For example,
plaintiffs could be granted a limited opportunity for discovery before a
complaint is dismissed for lack of specific facts. Alternatively, the
Connecticut Insurance Department or other regulatory entities could assist
plaintiffs by keeping records of unfair settlement claims, which plaintiffs
could use to identify other insureds who suffered similar wrongdoing.
However, although these proposed solutions might address public policy
concerns, they also have the potential to place undue strain on insurers;
more insureds may take advantage of the limited opportunity for discovery,
thus subjecting insurers to more frequent, costly and time-consuming
discovery expeditions. Because public policy considerations have serious
implications for both insureds and insurers, any proposed solutions should
be considered carefully, noting that well-reasoned trial court cases, the lack
of corrective legislation, and the treatment of CUIPA claims in federal
courts all indicate that specific facts must be pled alleging a general
business practice.
VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the plain language of the statute, CUIPA was intended
for use against insurers that commit more than a single and isolated act of
misconduct.145 However, trial court judges apply different standards in
analyzing the level of facts necessary to plead a general business practice.
As long as the general business practice requirement exists, and until the
issue is decided at the appellate level, there will continue to be debate
amongst judges over the level of fact required to plead a CUIPA claim.
145
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When thoughtfully considered, it is clear that there is no
compelling reason to excuse CUIPA claims from following Connecticut’s
fact pleading standard. It is true that it is difficult for individual plaintiffs to
find factual evidence to support their allegations of general business
practice without the benefit of full trial discovery, but it is by no means
impossible. Therefore, plaintiffs should not be permitted to plead claims
“based on information and belief,” or with unsubstantiated conclusions that
others have experienced the same misconduct, as such pleadings do not
meet the Connecticut fact pleading standard.

SUBPRIME AND CREDIT CRISIS
INVESTIGATIONS: WHAT CONSTITUTES A
CLAIM FOR THE PURPOSES OF PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE?
CAITLIN P. HOLT*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The subprime mortgage and credit crisis has generated an
unprecedented wave of lawsuits and government investigations of lenders
and financial institutions. The lending companies and financial institutions
have turned to their Directors and Officers (D&O) and Errors and
Omissions (E&O) liability insurance policies to cover the substantial costs
of defending against the regulatory investigations and lawsuits.1 The scope
of coverage under D&O and E&O policies varies significantly, with a
number of exclusions and policy limitations excusing insurance companies
from their duty to defend or reimburse the insureds under certain
circumstances. The financial crisis has given rise to controversy over what
legal and investigative proceedings constitute a “claim” for the purposes of
triggering coverage under D&O and E&O policies. With substantial legal
fees and considerable government fines at stake, the definition of a “claim”
is of increasing importance to insurance companies and the financial
institutions they insure.
Although a number of jurisdictions have addressed the meaning of
a “claim” in the context of a professional liability policy, the law regarding
whether government and regulatory investigations trigger coverage under
D&O and E&O policies continues to evolve. Two Court of Appeals
decisions recently examined whether government and regulatory
investigations fell within the policy definitions of a “securities claim” and
reached divergent conclusions as a result of differing facts and policy
language.2 These cases will have important ramifications for the treatment
of government and regulatory investigations of corporate wrongdoing, as
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2012, The University of Connecticut School of Law.
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liability policies. David M. Gische, Directors and Officers Liability Insurance,
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App’x 871, 873-75 (11th Cir. 2011); MBIA Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 652 F.3d 152,
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well as the professional liability insurance industry as a whole. The purpose
of this article is to examine the recent wave of government and regulatory
investigations related to the subprime mortgage and credit crisis and its
implications for D&O and E&O liability insurance. More specifically, this
article will explore the kinds of legal proceedings that have been
interpreted by courts to fall within policy definitions of a “claim,” so as to
evaluate whether government and regulatory investigations into subprime
lending practices will be covered by D&O or E&O policies.
II. THE INVESTIGATIONS
Given the catastrophic financial losses associated with the 2008
subprime mortgage and credit crisis and the subsequent financial
meltdown, it is not surprising that government and regulatory agencies
have commenced investigations into corporate and lending behavior.3 The
financial crisis provoked investigations into corporate wrongdoing by a
number of state and federal watchdogs, among them the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), and several State Attorneys General.4 The SEC began
its investigation into subprime mortgage lending in 2007 when it formed a
working group to investigate whether companies involved in subprime
mortgage lending were liable under federal securities law for failure to
disclose information to investors.5 In the five years since, the SEC has
brought lawsuits against a range of financial institutions, including Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac.6 The FBI also launched investigations into subprime
lending practices shortly after the crisis unfolded; in 2008, it announced it
was investigating fourteen corporations that had been involved in subprime
lending as part of its larger Subprime Mortgage Industry Fraud Initiative

3

John F. McCarrick, Subprime Claims: D&O and E&O Liability and
Coverage Implications, 775 PLI/Lit 299, 303-04 (April 2008).
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Kenneth M. Breen & Thomas R. Fallati, Subprime Lending Meltdown – Part
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York, N.Y.), July 2007, at 1-2, available at http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/
publications/742.pdf.
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launched the prior year.7 The FBI’s probe focused on firms suspected of
engaging in accounting fraud, improperly securing loans, and insider
trading.8
In 2010, the FDIC, a federal agency responsible for investigating
crime at financial institutions, announced that it was intensifying efforts to
identify wrongdoing and punish recklessness, fraud, and other criminal
behavior that contributed to the bank failures.9 The agency launched fifty
criminal investigations of bank executives, directors, and employees of
failed U.S. banks across the country.10 The Wall Street Journal reported
that “[h]undreds of ‘demand’ letters [were] sent to former executives,
directors and other employees, as well as their professional-liability
insurers, putting them on notice of potential claim . . . .”11 Since then, the
FDIC has filed over two dozen lawsuits against failed institutions and
authorized many more.12 The FDIC investigations and lawsuits come
several years after the initial wave of bank failures, but officials say it takes
a minimum of 18 months to prepare for legal action after a bank fails.13 It is
thus entirely possible the investigations will continue to multiply as the
agency turns its attention to more recent bank failures.
States have also assumed an active role in the subprime
investigations. The Attorneys General in New York, California, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Ohio and Connecticut have all initiated investigations of
financial institutions that were involved in the subprime crisis in their

7

Subprime Loans and More: It’s a Bull Market for Financial Fraud, FBI (Jan.
31, 2008), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/fin_fradu013108.
8
Kirke M. Hasson & Ernest T. Patrikis, Here Come the Regulators,
PILLSBURY (June/July 2008), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/
5217C99E2A691AA548942891FDB7C691.pdf.
9
Jean Eaglesham, U.S. Sets 50 Bank Probes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2010, at
A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487036282045756
19000289073686.html.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
The FDIC website states: “As of March 20, 2012, the FDIC has authorized
suits in connection with 54 failed institutions against 469 individuals for D&O
liability with damage claims of at least $7.9 billion. This includes 27 filed D&O
lawsuits (2 of which have been dismissed after settlement with the named directors
and officers) naming 222 former directors and officers.” Professional Liability
Lawsuits, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/pls/ (last visited Mar.
21, 2012).
13
Id.
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states.14 The state investigations have focused on whether mortgage lenders
are liable under federal and state laws and regulatory statutes for deceptive
disclosure practices with borrowers.15 Depending on the state, consumer
protection violations of this kind can result in both criminal and civil
liability.16 In his 2012 State of the Union address, President Obama
announced that Attorney General Eric Holder would launch “a special unit
of federal prosecutors and leading state attorneys general to expand [the]
investigations into the abusive lending and packaging of risky mortgages
that led to the housing crisis.”17
In addition to government and regulatory investigations into
subprime-related activity, financial institutions may commission internal or
“special litigation committee” investigations of their own.18 If a corporation
believes its officers or directors may be involved in wrongdoing, it may
choose to perform its own internal investigation. Sometimes the internal
investigation is prompted by an external investigation similar to the
examples discussed above. At other times, internal investigations are
brought about in response to a demand by a shareholder who is planning to
bring a derivative lawsuit.19 Either way, corporations commonly form
“special litigation committees” to conduct independent investigations of
suspected misconduct.20
The costs of defending a policyholder against government or
regulatory investigations of corporate wrongdoing are staggering. It is not
uncommon for companies to spend millions of dollars responding to
government and regulatory investigations and defending against follow-up
litigation. For example, in a recent New York case a company sued its
insurer to recover $29.5 million it spent responding to a SEC and state

14

Breen & Fallati, supra note 4, at 1; Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen., The
Housing Bust and Approaches to the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, NAAGazette
(2007).
15
Breen & Fallati, supra note 4, at 1-3.
16
Id. at 2.
17
President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 2012).
18
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR
COMPANIES AND THEIR COUNSEL IN CONDUCTING INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 1
(2008).
19
Id.
20
Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge LLP, Addressing Coverage for SLCIncurred Legal Costs, LAW360 (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.law360.com/articles/
146250/addressing-coverage-for-slc-incurred-legal-costs.
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investigation, only $6.4 million of which the insurer agreed to pay.21 The
costs associated with corporate investigations are substantial for several
reasons. First, the investigations typically involve a large number of
individuals, thus requiring a lot of time, money, and legal assistance.22
Secondly, the investigation periods may consume months, or in some cases,
years.23 Moreover, indemnification obligations often require corporations
to cover the legal expenses incurred by individuals employed by the
corporation.24 In many cases, state corporate indemnification statutes
require companies to indemnify their directors and officers in order to
shield them from personal liability should they make an unwise business
decision.25 If an investigation leads to a lawsuit, the insurer may find itself
exposed to many more millions of dollars worth of claims. Indeed, a
number of the biggest financial institutions have already reached $400 to
$600 million-dollar settlements in subprime-related litigation.26 Subprimerelated investigations thus threaten to cost insurance companies vast sums
under D&O and E&O policies, whether the investigations reach the courts
or not.
III.

WILL D&O AND E&O INSURANCE COVER THE COSTS OF
DEFENDING
AGAINST
SUBPRIME-RELATED
INVESTIGATIONS?

With so many subprime-related investigations surfacing on the
heels of the financial crisis, both insurers and policyholders should be
concerned with whether D&O and E&O (together sometimes referred to as
“professional liability”) policies will cover the costs of responding to
investigative inquiries and paying for legal defense fees. D&O insurance,
21

MBIA Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 08 civ. 4313, 2009 WL 6635307, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 652 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir.
2011).
22
Patricia Bronte, D&O Coverage for Corporate Criminal Investigations, 7
NO. 11 INS. COVERAGE L. BULL. 1, 2 (2008).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers
Indemnification and Liability Insurance: An Overview of Legal and Practical
Issues, 51 BUS. LAW. 573, 574 (1996).
26
Kevin LaCroix, A Status Update on the Subprime and Credit Crisis-Related
Litigation, THE D&O DIARY (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.dandodiary.com/2012/
01/articles/subprime-litigation/a-status-update-on-the-subprime-and-creditcrisisrelated-litigation.
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which was developed after the 1929 stock market crash, is intended to
cover the cost of indemnifying and defending a corporation’s directors and
officers for wrongful acts committed while carrying out their corporate
responsibilities.27 In contrast, E&O insurance provides more general
coverage for defense costs arising from wrongful acts committed by the
corporation and its employees.28 Generally, the insurance company’s duty
to defend a policyholder is activated when a lawsuit is initiated.29 If the
allegations in the complaint support a cause of action that falls within the
scope of the policy, coverage is triggered.30
Whether the policy will cover the costs associated with responding
to and defending against a government or regulatory investigation depends,
of course, on the actual language of the policy.31 D&O and E&O insurers
do not share a common form, so policies vary from carrier to carrier.32
While most policies share similar conditions and exclusions, insurance
companies have developed their own terms and wordings over the years.33
What may seem like a trivial difference in the wording of a key term could
make all the difference with regard to the policy’s coverage.34 Insurance
policies feature a number of exclusions and limitations on coverage, and it
is common for insurance companies to deny coverage as a result. Absent an
applicable policy exclusion, insurers have relied on ambiguities in the
policy terms to deny coverage. Recently, insurers have capitalized on
ambiguity in the term “claim” to avoid covering fees and costs associated
with investigations.

27

JOSEPH P. MONTELEONE & CARRIE E. COPE, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’
(D&O) LIABILITY: EXPOSURES, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE COVERAGE 1
(2008).
28
Charles Allen Yuen, Errors & Omissions Insurance Coverage: Common
Claim Scenarios, 827 PLI/Lit 65, 67 (June 2010).
29
1 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION
OF INSURANCE COMPANIES AND INSUREDS § 4:1 (5th ed. 2010).
30
Id.
31
Bronte, supra note 22, at 2.
32
Randy Paar, Directors and Officers Insurance, in D&O LIABILITY &
INSURANCE 2004: DIRECTORS & OFFICERS UNDER FIRE 9, 21 (2004).
33
CATHERINE HANNA, SUBPRIME PRIMER: WHERE’S THE PRIMARY EXPOSURE?
4 (2008), available at http://www.hannaplaut.com/publications/Subprime
Primer.pdf.
34
Robert D. Chesler & Cindy Tzvi Sonenblick, Does A Subpoena Constitute A
‘Claim’ For Purposes Of D&O Insurance Coverage?, 14 MEALEY’S EMERGING
INS. DISPUTES 1, 1 (2009).
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Should a policyholder be denied coverage under its professional
liability policy, it has a number of remedies. Most often, the insured brings
a declaratory judgment action against the insurer seeking a declaration of
coverage under the policy.35 Policyholders also have the option of suing for
breach of contract damages36 or breach of good faith and fair dealing.37
Insurers must therefore be cautious when denying coverage. In D&O and
E&O coverage disputes, the policyholder has the burden of proving that the
claim falls within the policy’s coverage.38 When a policy exclusion is at
issue, however, the insurer has the burden of proving that the exclusion
applies.39
IV. WHAT CONSITUTES A “CLAIM” FOR THE PURPOSES OF D&O
AND E&O INSURANCE?
D&O and E&O policies are designed as “claims made” policies,
meaning coverage can only be triggered when a “claim” is made against
the insured.40 The scope of the term “claim” is unclear. As companies are
increasingly confronted with subpoenas, document requests and similar
inquiries in connection with government and regulatory investigations and
lawsuits prompted by the financial crisis, the companies have submitted
claims to their insurers seeking coverage under their D&O and E&O
policies. In turn, a number of insurers have denied coverage on the premise
that the subpoena, document request or inquiry does not constitute a
“claim” under the policy. As a result, the meaning of a “claim” has recently
become a hotly contested issue in determining whether coverage extends to
government and regulatory investigations.41

35

See, e.g., Diamond Glass Companies, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No.
06-CV-13105(BSJ)(AJP), 2008 WL 4613170, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2008); St.
Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Foster, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1040 (C.D. Ill. 2003);
Foster v. Summit Med. Sys., Inc., 610 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
36
E.g., Diamond Glass Companies, 2008 WL 4613170, at *1.
37
E.g., Ctr. for Blood Research, Inc. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 305 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.
2002).
38
WINDT, supra note 29.
39
Id.
40
Monteleone & Conca, supra note 25, at 588.
41
ORRICK, HERRIGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, When Is a Claim Not a Claim?
Insurance for Government and Regulatory Investigations, Insuance Recovery Case
Law Update, ORRICK 1 (2009), www.orrick.com/fileupload/2055.pdf.
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A. DEFINING A “CLAIM”
In determining whether or not coverage applies to an investigation
or noncourt proceeding, the policyholder and insurer must ask themselves
whether the action in question gives rise to a “claim,” and whether that
claim was made during the policy period.42 It follows that the critical
question is, “What is a claim?” In the 1980’s and 90’s very few
professional liability policies defined the term.43 In one early case, the court
quoted Justice Frankfurter as saying that “claim” is one of those “words of
many-hued meanings [which] derive their scope from the use to which they
are put.”44 When the meaning of the term was disputed in the earlier
coverage cases, courts looked to the accepted meaning of the word within
the context of the agreement, since “an insurance policy, like any contract,
must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties as derived from the
plain meaning of the policy’s terms.”45 The courts have determined that the
term has no special meaning in the insurance industry.46 The MerriamWebster Dictionary defines the word “claim” as “a demand for something
due or believed to be due.”47 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a
“claim” is:
(1) The aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right
enforceable by a court. (2) The assertion of an existing
42

Peter S. Selvin, Parsing Policies, LA DAILY J., May 29, 2009, at 7.
Bronte, supra 20, at 2. Examples of cases disputing the meaning of the term
in the absence of a policy definition include Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual
Arts, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 189 F.3d 208 (2nd Cir.1999); Winkler v. Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 930 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1991); Polychron v. Crum
& Forster Ins. Cos., 916 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1990); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Home
State Savs. Ass’n, 797 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Ambassador Group, Inc.
Litig., 830 F. Supp. 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Federal Sav. &
Loan Ins. Corp., 695 F. Supp. 469 (C.D. Cal. 1987)).
44
MGIC, 797 F.2d at 288 (quoting Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S.
497, 529 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
45
Andy Warhol, 189 F.3d at 215 (citing In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 158 F.3d
65, 77 (2d Cir. 1998)). See, e.g., Polychron, 916 F.2d at 463; Joseph P. Bornstein,
Ltd. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 828 F.2d 242, 245 (4th Cir.
1987); Richardson Elecs, Ltd. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 120 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700-01 (N.D.
Ill. 2000); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ayo, 1992 WL 245552, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept.
9,1992), aff’d, 31 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 1994).
46
Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 642 N.E.2d
723 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
47
MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 227 (11th ed. 2011).
43
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right; any right to payment or to an equitable remedy, even
if contingent or provisional. (3) A demand for money,
property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right.48
Many courts have relied on a definition of an insurance “claim” as the
“assertion, demand or challenge of something as a right; the assertion of
liability to the party making it to do some service or pay a sum of
money.”49
Due to the frequency of corporate scandals over the last decade,
insurers have become more careful about defining key terms in insurance
policies. Today, most D&O and E&O policies expressly define the term
“claim,” albeit with variation.50 The majority of D&O and E&O policies
associate a “claim” with a civil lawsuit commenced by the service of a
complaint.51 Apart from civil lawsuits, however, the scope of the definition
varies from policy to policy.52 Some policies include criminal or
administrative proceedings within the definition, and others define a
“claim” more broadly to include arbitrations and mediations as well.53 The
definition may explicitly include government or regulatory investigations.54
A “claim” is also sometimes defined more generally as the start of a
“judicial or administrative proceeding.”55
Since the definition varies from one policy to the next, the precise
wording is critical to determining if coverage extends to certain actions.56
Where the definition specifically includes a “government or regulatory
investigation” or a “judicial or administrative proceeding,” it is likely a
formal government investigation into a company’s alleged wrongdoing
related to subprime lending practices would fall within the meaning of a
“claim.” Likewise, definitions that encompass “investigations by any

48

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 281-82 (9th ed. 2009).
See, e.g., Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Fed. Savs. & Loan Ins. Corp., 695 F. Supp.
469, 479 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
50
Bronte, supra note 22, at 3.
51
When Is a Claim Not a Claim?, supra note 41. The service of a complaint is
“relatively easily recognizable as a claim.”
52
When Is a Claim Not a Claim?, supra note 41.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
David E. Borden & Ellen B. Van Vechten, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability
Insurance, in 4 LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION 47-12,
47-18 (David L. Leitner et al. eds., 2005).
56
HANNA, supra note 33, at 4.
49
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governmental entity into possible violation of law” will probably provide
coverage for formal subprime investigations.57
The more challenging question is whether a preliminary
investigation or proceeding – marked by a grand jury subpoena, document
request, or informal inquiry or the like – falls within one of the policy
definitions of a “claim.” Professional liability policies are frequently
unclear as to whether coverage extends to preliminary investigations and
noncourt proceedings commenced before the corporation or its directors
and officers are formally threatened with a suit or charged with
misconduct.58 The majority of D&O and E&O policies “intend to treat as
covered only those SEC or government fees and expenses incurred after the
date the SEC elevates an investigation to formal status or the government
issues a ‘target’ letter to an insured party.”59 If the definition of a “claim”
does not explicitly include the action in question (e.g. a subpoena,
document request, target letter, etc.), the insurance company may have a
basis for denying coverage for the costs associated with such an action.60
B. SUBPOENAS AND INVESTIGATIVE DEMANDS
Generally, investigations into corporate wrongdoing – whether led
by an attorney general, a regulatory agency or a grand jury – begin with the
issuance of a subpoena.61 Most courts have held that a subpoena constitutes
a “claim.”62 The decisions, however, have been highly fact sensitive.63 Any
variation in policy wording or the facts of a case may affect the insurer’s
duty to defend.
One of the first cases to address whether a subpoena or grand jury
investigation falls within the meaning of a “claim” under a professional
liability insurance policy was Polychron v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co.64 After
57

R. Mark Keenan & Craig M. Hirsch, Subprime Lending Litigation and
Investigations: Insuring Against the Costs, COMPLINET (May 2, 2007),
http://www.andersonkill.com/webpdfext/Complinet-May2007KeenanAndHirsch.pdf.
58
Jonathan C. Dickey & Amy L. Goodman, Practicing Law Institute,
Indemnification, D&O Insurance, and Other Funding Mechanisms, in SECURITIES
LITIGATION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 14-1, 14-24 (Jonathan C. Dickey ed., 2008).
59
McCarrick, supra note 3, at 312.
60
When Is a Claim Not a Claim?, supra note 41.
61
Chesler & Sonenblick, supra note 34, at 1.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Polychron v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 916 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1990).
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a D&O insurer refused to reimburse a bank president for legal fees incurred
during a grand jury investigation, the bank president (the policyholder)
brought action to recover his losses.65 He argued that the grand jury
investigation, which began with receipt of a subpoena for documents,
constituted a “claim” against him under the policy.66 The insurance
company, on the other hand, contended that a “claim” didn’t manifest until
the grand jury indicted him – which occurred after the policy had expired.67
Since the insurance policy did not define a “claim,” the court examined the
ordinary meaning of the word and determined that the term was broad
enough to encompass the grand jury investigation prior to the indictment:
The function of a subpoena is to command a party to
produce certain documents and therefore constitutes a
“claim” against a party. The subpoena, it is true, was
directed to the bank, but the documents demanded . . .
related to the plaintiff’s conduct as a bank official. Further,
the grand jury’s investigation and the questioning by the
Assistant United States Attorney amounted, as a practical
matter, to an allegation of wrongdoing against [the
policyholder], for which he prudently hired an attorney.
The defendant’s characterization of the grand jury
investigation as mere requests for information and an
explanation underestimates the seriousness of such a
probe.68
Likewise, in Richardson Electronics, Ltd., v. Federal Insurance
Co. the U.S. District Court held that subpoenas and other demands made in
a government investigation constituted a claim for the purposes of a
professional liability policy.69 After racking up more than $5 million in
legal fees in connection with a criminal antitrust violation investigation by
the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, Richardson Electronics
(hereafter “Richardson”) sought reimbursement under its D&O policy.70 As
part of the investigation, the Justice Department served a Civil
65

Id. at 462.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 463.
69
Richardson Elecs., Ltd. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 120 F. Supp. 2d 698, 701 (N.D. Ill.
2000).
70
Id. at 699.
66
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Investigative Demand and subpoenaed documents and testimony by
Richardson executives and employees.71 When Federal Insurance Co.
(hereafter “Federal”) refused to pay, Richardson sued. Federal argued that
the antitrust investigation did not constitute a “claim” under the policy, and
as a result the costs associated with the investigation were not covered by
insurance.72 Although the policy defined a number key terms, like
“wrongful act” and “losses,”73 it did not supply a definition of the term
“claim.”74 The court examined the dictionary definition of the term (“a
demand for something due or believed to be due”75) and concluded that the
Justice Department’s investigation sufficed because it “required Richardson
and its officers and directors to comply with various demands for testimony
and production of documents.”76 The court emphasized that a claim is a
“demand for something due,” but not necessarily money.77
1. A “Claim” is More than a Mere Threat or Document Request
The mere threat of litigation or legal action does not give rise to a
“claim.”78 By its very nature, a “claims-made” policy provides coverage for
“claims” made against the insured. The threat of legal action is merely a
potential claim, since it has not met the condition that a claim actually have
been made.79 The distinction between a potential claim and “claim” giving
rise to coverage was described in Bensalem Township v. Western World
Insurance Co., where the court held that “‘notice that it is [someone’s]
intention to hold the insureds responsible for a Wrongful Act’ is an event
71

Id. at 700.
Id. The policy provided that Federal would pay “on behalf of each of the
insured persons all loss for which [he] is not indemnified by the insured
organization legally obligated to pay on account of any claim(s) made against him .
. . for a wrongful act committed . . . before or during the policy period.” Id. at 699
n.3.
73
Id. at 699 n.3.
74
Id. at 700-01.
75
Richardson Elecs., Ltd., 120 F. Supp. 2d at 701 (quoting Cent. Ill. Pub.
Serv. Co. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 642 N.E.2d 723, 725 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994)).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Winkler v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 930 F.2d 1364, 1366
(9th Cir. 1991).
79
Id. See also MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Home State Savs. Ass’n, 797 F.2d 285,
288 (6th Cir. 1986).
72
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commonly antecedent to and different in kind from a ‘claim.’”80 Thus,
letters or actions that “indicate the likelihood, if not inevitability, of some
future claim . . . do not constitute a ‘claim made’ . . . .”81 It is also well
settled that “requests for explanations, expressions of dissatisfaction or
disappointment, mere complaining, or the lodging of grievance” do not
constitute “claims.”82
Similarly, courts have differentiated between a mere request for
information and a more serious government or regulatory investigation.83 In
Trice v. Employers Reinsurance Corp. it was held that a request for
information did not constitute a “demand for money or services” within the
meaning of a claim, even though the request specifically alluded to the
possibility of a lawsuit.84 The court said that “‘an actual claim is
distinguished from an ‘event’ which could give rise to an actual claim in
the future.’”85 In St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Foster the court held
that a letter from an attorney requesting information about the company did
not constitute a “claim.”86 The court distinguished between the letter at
hand and the Justice Department’s demand for documents in Richardson.87
“[T]he seriousness of [the Justice Department’s] investigation was clearly
material to the district court’s determination [in Richards Electronics] . . .
.”88 While “a formal lawsuit is not required to present ‘a demand for money
or services,’ the inquiry must present more than a mere request for
information.”89 The court explained that such a broad construction of a
claim would be “bad public policy” because it would produce “a flood of
notices of ‘claims’ based on requests for information or efforts at
80

Bensalem Twp. v. W. World Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (E.D.
Pa.1985) (quoting language from Article VI of the policy in question).
81
In re Ambassador Group, Inc., Litig. 830 F. Supp. 147, 154 (E.D.N.Y.
1993).
82
Monteleone & Conca, supra note 25, at 589.
83
See, e.g., Richardson Elecs., Ltd., v. Fed. Ins. Co., 120 F. Supp. 2d 698, 701
(N.D. Ill. 2000).
84
Trice v. Emp’rs Reinsurance Corp., No. 97-1271, 1997 WL 449736, at *3
(7th Cir. 1997) (citing Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Bartolazo, 27 F.3d 518, 519 (11th Cir.
1994)).
85
Id. (quoting Emp’rs Ins. of Wausaw v. Bodi-Wachs Aviation Ins. Agency,
Inc., 39 F.3d 138, 143 (7th Cir. 1994)).
86
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Foster, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1047 (C.D. Ill.
2003).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. (citing Trice, 1997 WL 449736 at *3).
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intimidation by attorneys that may never materialize into demands against
any insurance policies.”90
A survey of the case law shows that the determining factor as to
whether a demand for information constitutes a claim is its seriousness. For
example, the court in National Stock Exchange v. Federal Ins. Co. found
that a request for an informal document regarding subprime activities did
not constitute a “claim.”91 The distinction drawn between a demand and a
request in cases like National Stock Exchange can spell trouble for
policyholders who comply with an informal request in hopes of nipping the
inquiry in the bud. If a “regulatory request and investigation is informal and
a settlement is made in compromise to avoid a formal investigation,
coverage may be precluded entirely.”92
In contrast, the court in Dan Nelson Automotive Group v.
Universal Underwriting held that a civil investigative demand by various
states attorneys general gave rise to a claim under an E&O policy.93 The
court found that the demands, which requested that the plaintiff produce
certain documents regarding its business practices, “functioned to
command the Plaintiffs to produce documents and provide information
relevant to the alleged violations of statutes, and therefore constitute a
claim . . . within the meaning of the policy.”94
In Ace American Insurance Company v. Ascend One Corporation,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland weighed the seriousness
of state subpoenas and investigative demands and whether they constituted
a “claim.”95 In this case, Amerix, the policyholder, was served by the
Office of the Attorney General of Maryland with an “administrative
subpoena” pursuant to the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.96 Among
other things, the subpoena sought documents relating to the company’s
structure, governance, relationship and interactions with consumers. A year
later, the Texas Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division served
Amerix with a “civil investigative demand.”97 In response, Amerix hired
90

Id.
Nat’l Stock Exch. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 06 C 1603, 2007 WL 1030293, at *6
(N.D. Ill. 2007).
92
HANNA, supra note 16, at 5.
93
Dan Nelson Auto. Grp. v. Universal Underwriting, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4987 (D.S.D. Jan. 15, 2008).
94
Id. at *16-17.
95
Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Ascend One Corp., 570 F. Supp. 2d 789, 796 (D. Md.
2008).
96
Id. at 791.
97
Id. at 792.
91
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attorneys, produced “tremendous quantities” of information and data for
the state officials, and paid over $140,000 in fees and expenses.98
Unsurprisingly, ACE denied the claim on the basis that neither the
subpoena nor the demand contained a “claim for wrongful acts,” as
required under the policy.99 The court determined otherwise. “Claim” was
defined as “a civil, administrative or regulatory investigation against any
Insured commenced by the filing of a notice of charges, investigative order
or similar document.”100 The court evaluated the seriousness of the
documents in order to determine whether or not they constituted an
“investigation” under the definition, noting that both documents came from
state attorneys general offices.101 It found that both the “caption on the
subpoena (‘In re: Amerix’) and the specific inquiries into Amerix’s
marketing and credit counseling activities” indicated that the policyholder
was the target of an investigation and “not simply a source of
information.”102 It concluded that:
The extent and specificity of the Subpoena and Texas
Demand indicate that the documents were issued to serve
the function of an investigative order. This is further
supported by the fact that the sole investigatory tool
granted to the Maryland Attorney General’s office under
the Consumer Protection Act is subpoena power.
Therefore, the Subpoena . . . and related Texas Demand
are, or at the very least are equivalent to, the filing of an
investigative order or similar document.103
Some courts have drawn a distinction between a subpoena issued
to a custodian of records for the purposes of producing records, and a
subpoena seeking more than just information. In Center for Blood
Research, Inc. v. Coregis Insurance Co. the First Circuit of the U.S. Court
of Appeals addressed whether a subpoena served by an Attorney General
constituted a “claim,” when there was no indication that the government
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102
Id. at 797.
103
Id. at 798.
99

600

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18.2

was seeking anything more than information from the organization.104 The
policy definition of “claim” included “any judicial or administrative
proceeding in which any insured(s) may be subjected to a binding
adjudication of liability for damages or other relief.”105 The court reasoned
that a subpoena for the production of records “could not possibly” subject
the policyholder “to a binding adjudication of liability in the investigation
before the assistant United States attorney.”106 Even if the investigation
uncovered information leading to the commencement of civil or criminal
proceedings, those proceedings would “have had to have been pursued in a
different form.”107 The court chided the policyholder on not recognizing the
“limitations of the investigation and of the scope of coverage under the
insurance policy.”108 Notably, subpoenas or investigative demands from
private counsel are not enough to establish the existence of an
“investigation” for these purposes.109
2. A “Claim” is a Demand for Damages or Relief
Most professional liability policies require a claim for damages.110
Some define a “claim” as a “written demand for money”111 or a “written
demand for monetary or non-monetary relief.”112 Others include within the
definition of a “claim” a requirement that there be a “binding adjudication
of liability for damages or relief.”113 The damages and relief requirements
can prove problematic for policyholders who are under investigation and
seeking insurance coverage. When D&O and E&O policies require a claim
for “damages,” a policyholder may have difficulty convincing the court that
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a regulatory action seeking restitution or civil penalties is covered.114 In
such cases, claims seeking restitution, disgorgement, fines or civil penalties
have been found to fall outside of the policy’s coverage. In Bank of the
West v. Superior Court, for example, the court held that sums of money
paid as disgorgement were not “damages” within the meaning of the
insurance policy.115
The concept of “relief” as it relates to the definition of a “claim”
has been a focus of much litigation. In Foster v. Summit Medical Systems,
Inc. the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a SEC investigation was not
a covered claim because it did not subject the directors and officers or
company to a binding adjudication for relief, as required by the D&O
policy.116 The policy defined a “Securities Action Claim” as “any judicial
or administrative proceeding initiated against any of the Directors and
Officers or the Company based upon, arising out of, or in any way
involving [securities laws and regulations] . . . in which they may be
subjected to a binding adjudication of liability for damages or other relief .
. . .”117 The court held that a SEC subpoena did not fit within either the
ordinary or legal meaning of the term “relief.”118
In Minuteman International, Inc. v. Great American Insurance Co.
the court advanced a much broader interpretation of “relief.”119 The facts of
the case resemble most other claim disputes. The SEC issued an order
directing a private investigation of Minuteman International Inc. (hereafter
“Minuteman”) and sent it a subpoena and a notice of investigation.120
Minuteman spent nearly $1 million complying with document production,
retaining counsel, and complying with a subsequent SEC cease-and-desist
order.121 The insurance carrier declined to reimburse Minuteman, claiming
that the SEC investigation did not constitute a “claim” under the D&O
policy because no relief was sought.122 The insurer tried to draw a
distinction between “seeking relief in the form of monetary damages,
114

Selvin, supra note 42 (“One of the most challenging issues from a
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injunctive-type sanctions, or criminal charges and performing the
investigation that leads up to a request for that type of relief.”123 The court
disagreed, finding that the relief sought by the subpoena was the production
of documents or testimony.124 “Consistent with Richardson and Polychron,
the [SEC] Order and subsequent subpoenas served on plaintiff were
demands for relief in that they were demands for something due. A demand
for ‘relief’ is a broad enough term to include a demand for something due,
including a demand to produce documents or appear to testify.”125
Not every court has agreed with Minuteman’s broad interpretation
of the term “relief.” In Diamond Glass Companies, Inc. v. Twin City Fire
Insurance Co., the court rejected Minuteman’s conclusion, choosing
instead to rely on the ordinary and accepted meaning of the word.126
Diamond Glass Co. (hereafter “Diamond”) was issued a subpoena by a
federal grand jury seeking the production of documents and testimony as
part of a government investigation into the company’s business practices.127
When Diamond submitted the claim to its insurer, the insurer categorized
the matter as a “notice of a potential claim.”128 The insurer asked Diamond
to notify it when an actual claim was made against the company, and said
any defense costs incurred prior to the matter rising to the level of an actual
claim would not be covered.129 Litigation ensued over whether the grand
jury investigation and subpoena constituted a “claim” for the purposes of
the D&O policy.
Diamond made three unsuccessful arguments for why insurance
coverage should have attached.130 First, it unsuccessfully argued that the
123
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Id. at *7.
125
Minuteman Int’l. Inc., 2004 WL 603482 at *7.
126
Diamond Glass Cos. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. 06-CV13105(BSJ)(AJP), 2008 WL 4613170 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2008).
127
Id. at *1.
128
Id. at *2.
129
Id.
130
Id. The policy definitions, in pertinent part, are as follows:
“Entity Claim” means any:
(1) written demand for monetary damages or nonmonetary
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investigation was a criminal proceeding within the definition of an “Entity
Claim.”131 The court rejected the argument on the grounds that the policy
language expressly required “the return of an indictment, filing of a notice
of charges or similar document.”132 In the absence of such proceedings, the
investigation was not a criminal proceeding within the meaning of the
policy. Next, Diamond made an argument that the grand jury subpoenas
constituted “written demands for non-monetary relief” as described in the
definition of an “Entity Claim.”133 The court rejected Minuteman’s broad
description of the word “relief” and held that the ordinary meaning of the
word and the term’s context in the policy make clear that investigative
subpoenas and search warrants are not “demands for non-monetary
relief.”134 Diamond’s last argument for why the investigation constituted a
“claim” involved the “target” language under the definition of an Insured
Person Claim.135 Diamond claimed that it became a “target” within the
meaning of the policy when it was subpoenaed to testify before a grand
jury and informed that it was a subject in the grand jury investigation.136
The court held that coverage did not apply because Diamond never
received “written notice” identifying it as a “target individual against
whom formal charges may be commenced.”137 For the reasons stated
above, the court determined that Diamond had failed to state a claim and
was not entitled to coverage under the liability policy.138

against an Insured Entity.
“Insured Person Claim” means any:
(1) written demand for monetary damages or nonmonetary
relief commenced by the receipt of such demand;
against an Insured Person
“Insured Person Claim” also means a formal civil, criminal,
administrative, or regulatory investigation commenced by the
service upon or other receipt by an Insured Person of a written
notice from an investigating authority specifically identifying
such Insured Person as a target individual against whom formal
charges maybe commenced.
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Furthermore, the court in Andy Warhol Foundation for Visual Arts,
Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co. held that a letter that requested additional
information and informed the insured of a willingness to take “all
reasonable and necessary steps . . . to effect a recovery in this matter” did
not state a “claim” because it made no demand for relief.139 In MGIC
Indem. Corp v. Home State Sav. Ass’n, the court emphasized that the policy
agreement is “speaking not of a claim that wrongdoing occurred, but a
claim for some discrete amount of money owed to the claimant on account
of the alleged wrongdoing.”140 The court said that claims “made in the
newspapers that directors and officers . . . engaged in wrongful acts” would
“obviously not be the kind of ‘claims’ that could make [an insurance
company] liable under the insuring agreement.”141 Only claims that demand
payment of “some amount of money” could trigger the insurer’s obligation
to cover the expenses.142
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: THE SECOND AND ELEVENTH
CIRCUITS ADDRESS D&O COVERAGE FOR REGULATORY
INVESTIGATIONS
Last year proved to be an important one in solving the recurring
question whether D&O coverage extends to expenses incurred in
connection with informal government and regulatory investigations of the
policyholder. In 2010 both the Second and Eleventh Circuits for the U.S.
Court of Appeals reviewed appeals addressing the issue and came to
different results, one finding coverage and the other not. The cases
highlight just how fact sensitive the determination remains, since both
opinions relied heavily on the specific circumstances and key policy
definitions at issue.
A. MBIA, INC. V. FEDERAL INSURANCE CO.
In the widely publicized case MBIA, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York was confronted
with whether a company’s D&O policy covered defense costs incurred in
139
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connection with an SEC order of investigation and several subpoenas
issued by the SEC and the New York Attorney General (NYAG).143 In
2001, the SEC issued an Order Directing Private Investigation and began
an inquiry into alleged accounting misstatements in the insurance
industry.144 In 2004, it issued subpoenas compelling MBIA to produce
various documents concerning transactions involving “non-traditional
products.”145 That same year, the NYAG joined the investigation and
served MBIA with similar subpoenas.146 When MBIA alerted its insurers
and asked for their consent to retain counsel and respond to the agency’s
inquiries, the insurers denied that the subpoenas triggered coverage under
the D&O policies. Concerned with the investigation’s negative market
impact, MBIA asked regulators to forgo the issuance of further subpoenas
and volunteered to comply with additional informal requests for
information.147 MBIA subsequently filed suit against its insurers for breach
of contract and sought a declaratory judgment of coverage.148
MBIA’s D&O policy provided coverage for defense costs for
“Securities Claims,” defined as “a formal or informal administrative or
regulatory proceeding or inquiry commenced by the filing of a notice of
charges, formal or informal investigative order or similar document” that
“in whole or in part, is based upon, arises from or is in consequence of the
purchase or sale of, or over to purchase or sell any securities issued by
[MBIA].”149 The district court found coverage under the definition for both
the SEC and NYAG investigations. The NYAG subpoena was held to have
triggered coverage because “an ordinary businessperson would view a
subpoena as a ‘formal or informal investigative order’ based on the
common understanding of these words.”150 Also of importance in the
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court’s decision was the inclusion of the term “similar document” in the
definition of a “claim.” The court held that even if the subpoena were not
an “order” within the policy definition of a “Securities Claim,” it is a
“similar document” capable of commencing an investigation.151 The court
also held that legal costs incurred by a special litigation committee (SLC)
were covered under the company’s D&O policy.152 In the midst of the SEC
and state investigations into MBIA’s investments, several shareholders
filed derivative suits against the company.153 As is common, MBIA formed
an SLC comprised of members of its Board of Directors to investigate the
allegations made in the derivative actions.154 The insurer declined to
reimburse MBIA for the costs associated with the internal SLC
investigation (namely attorney fees) because the committee engaged in
“independent decision-making” and consequently the attorney that was
hired to assist it “could not have represented the company through its
representation of the SLC.”155 The court disagreed, noting that the SLC
“was vested with full and exclusive authority . . . to determine whether
pursuit of the litigation was in the best interest of MBIA.”156 The court thus
held that the internal investigation fell within the policy’s definition of a
“Securities Claim.”
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holdings
with regard to the SEC order, NYAG subpoena, and the SLC. The insurers’
argument that the NYAG subpoena was a “mere discovery device” and
dissimilar to an investigative order fell flat.157 Referencing ACE Am. Ins.
Co. v. Ascend One Corp., the court said a NYAG subpoena is “at the
absolute minimum, a ‘similar document’ to those listed in the definition of
a ‘Securities Claim’ because it is similar to other forms of investigative
demands by regulators.”158 The Second Circuit also agreed with the district
court’s assessment that a businessperson would view the NYAG subpoena
as a “formal or investigative order” based on the common understanding of
the words.159 With regards to the SLC matter, the Second Circuit broadened
.” Id. The court noted that MBIA’s failure to comply with the order “may subject
[it] to prosecution.” Id.
151
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the district court’s holding and ruled that the SLC expenses fell within the
policy’s definition of “Defense Costs.”160 The court based its decision on
the fact that MBIA directed and acted through the SLC when the SLC
moved to dismiss the derivative suit, and thus constituted an “insured
person” under the policy.161
B. OFFICE DEPOT, INC. V. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO. OF
PITTSBURG, PA.
In Office Depot, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, Pa.,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida held that costs
incurred by Office Depot, Inc. in connection with an informal SEC
investigation and an internal investigation and audit were not covered by
the office supply company’s D&O insurance policy.162 Upon receipt of a
letter informing it that the SEC was “conducting an inquiry” into the
company to determine whether it had violated federal securities laws,
Office Depot voluntarily produced various documents and made its
employees and officers available for sworn testimony.163 Because the
informal SEC investigation never culminated in the filing of any judicial or
administrative complaints against the company or its directors or officers,
coverage for the investigation was denied.164 Office Depot sued for over
$23 million in reimbursement for legal fees and expenses incurred in
connection with the informal SEC investigation, as well as an internal audit
and investigation of the company’s accounting practices initiated in
response to a whistleblower complaint.165 Applying Florida law, the district
court granted the insurers’ motions for summary judgment, holding that the
SEC investigation was not a “Securities Claim” within the policy’s
definition.166
160
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Thereafter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
issued an unpublished per curiam opinion affirming the lower court’s
holding and denying coverage for Office Depot’s defense costs.167 The
Eleventh Circuit rejected Office Depot’s argument that “administrative or
regulatory proceeding” was an undefined and ambiguous term and could
thus reasonably include an investigation of the insured entity.168 The court
determined that the expenses incurred after the SEC’s request for voluntary
cooperation were “in furtherance of its pre-suit discovery” and “constituted
an ‘investigation’ rather than an ‘administrative or regulatory
proceeding.’”169 Since the policy’s definition of a “Securities Claim”
expressly excepted both “an administrative or regulatory proceeding
against” and “an investigation of” Office Depot,170 the court held that the
costs were not covered.171 The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the district
court’s holding that the investigation did not fall within the definition of a
“claim” under the insured party indemnification provision, since the letters
sent by the SEC “only broadly request[ed] information to assist the SEC in
determining whether Office Depot committed securities violations.”172
Unlike a Wells Notice, which all parties agreed triggered a claim under the
(2) brought derivatively on the behalf of an Organization by
a security holder of such Organization.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the term “Securities Claim” shall
include an administrative or regulatory proceeding against an
Organization, but only if and only during the time such proceeding is also
commenced and continuously maintained against an Insured Person.”
(Emphasis added by court).
167
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definition, the SEC letters at issue did “not allege that violations have
occurred or identify specific individuals that could be charged in future
proceedings.” Since the correspondence did not fall within the policy’s
definition of a “claim,” it did not trigger coverage.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although a number of jurisdictions have addressed the meaning of
a “claim” in the context of a government or regulatory investigation, the
coverage analysis remains incredibly fact sensitive. The outcomes of the
cases have depended in large part on the factual circumstances, seriousness
of the investigation, and specific language of the policy. Because the
Second Circuit broadly interpreted “Securities Claim” to include informal
regulatory and government investigations, policyholders will likely “cite
MBIA for the proposition that a company does not forfeit its D&O
coverage when it volunteers to cooperate with investigative agency
requests.”173 When seeking reimbursement under D&O and E&O policies,
policyholders will also look to the Second Circuit’s holding that coverage
extends to expenses incurred by a special litigation committee. On the other
hand, insurers will undoubtedly rely on Office Depot when denying
coverage for costs associated with informal SEC investigations. Since both
the Second and Eleventh Circuit opinions are heavily rooted in the policy
language and specific circumstances presented, it may be easy for future
litigants to distinguish MBIA and Office Depot from other cases.
Nonetheless, both decisions are important examples of situations where a
court found or denied coverage for costs associated with regulatory and
government investigations into corporate wrongdoing.
A number of practical implications for insurers and policyholders
flow from this discussion. The case law illustrates the importance of
seeking the most favorable definition of the term “claim” or “Securities
Claim” possible. Given the high cost of responding to subpoenas and
investigations and defending against subsequent legal proceedings,
173
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insurance carriers should structure their policy agreements carefully.
Likewise, it is of the utmost importance that companies and financial
institutions carefully examine their current D&O and E&O liability policies
to determine what types of noncourt proceedings and investigations
constitute a “claim.”174 The uncertainty over government and regulatory
investigations falling within the definition of a “claim” has provoked
insurers and policyholders alike to take another look at their policies. As a
result, the insurance industry continues to evolve. Insurance companies are
now introducing professional liability policies that specifically agree to
cover the costs of certain internal investigations, most often investigations
commenced at the bequest of shareholders, and costs incurred in
anticipation of a formal regulatory investigation.175As regulatory
investigations become more frequent, at least one carrier has introduced a
separate insurance product to provide coverage for informal SEC
investigations.176 It will be interesting to watch as D&O and E&O policies
continue to evolve in the coming years as the law on coverage for
investigations develops.
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